Former ISIS Emir in Charge of Weapon Depots: Corruption, Military Defeats, and Al-Baghdadi's Disappearance Have Demoralized Members; ISIS Obtained Sarin and Mustard Gas, Worked on Chemical Weaponization at Mosul University

In an interview broadcast in installments on AlaanTV, Abu Al-Qassem Al-Suri, the ISIS Emir in charge of weapon depots in Syria and Iraq who defected from the organization, talked about Al-Baghdadi's disappearance from the scene, the consequent uncertainty about the leadership, and the demoralization felt among ISIS members, commanders, and emirs. Everybody in ISIS knows that the organization is "on its way to perdition," he said. "There are no victories, no conquests. Nothing but defeat, defeat, and more defeat." On the issue of chemical weapons, Al-Suri said that ISIS had obtained "considerable quantities" of sarin, chlorine, and mustard gas from Tel Afar and was carrying out experiments in the Mosul University labs to develop chemical weapons. Talking about the drop in oil revenues, he said that this had led ISIS to raise the zakkat and that it imposed taxes on trucks carrying supplies and forced wealthy traders to cover the costs of battles. In another installment, he said that the burning alive of Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh had been a "mistake" that ISIS regrets, a "major turning-point" that "changed the way many people viewed the Caliphate." "The [Islamic] State is nothing but a racist militia," Al-Suri said. The installments of the interview ran from January 23 to February 5.

Abu Al-Qassem Al-Suri: There are 22 emirs still alive who could replace Al-Baghdadi, but today, nobody knows Al-Baghdadi's whereabouts or who is close to him, or who could actually replace him. It is currently assumed that Abu Al-Yaaqub will inherit Al-Baghdadi's position as the leader of the organization. But today, the situation is not what people think. The organization has come to resemble the Ba'ath regime. Today, ISIS members no longer care who the Caliph is, because the Caliph has become like a figment of the imagination, who made one appearance and then vanished. Today, there is no evidence that he is still alive.

[…]

Al-Baghdadi's disappearance is a source of much distress for ISIS members, commanders, and emirs. This causes a lot of distress, confusion, and problems. For example, there were two members who would constantly ask me: "Why doesn't Al-Baghdadi show up? Where is he, with everything that's going on, with the decline, the defeats, and the losses that the organization is undergoing? Some emirs are also saying that he should make an appearance, in order to unite the ranks and raise the morale. We, the emirs, would also wonder why Al-Baghdadi never appears, never making speeches, never visiting the organization members. This makes one wonder - perhaps he died, perhaps he is wounded, or perhaps he is ashamed because he promised liberation, and everything points to defeat: Baiji fell and Mosul is about to fall. It is somewhat disgraceful that he promised one thing and things are heading in the exact opposite way. It is inconceivable that he accepts the current situation and all the embezzlement... On the other hand, perhaps he does accept this situation, and this is why he remains silent and does not make speeches. There is embezzlement and a lot of corruption, and the Caliph must certainly be aware of this. His silence at this point in time only makes things worse, and portends the fall of the Islamic State.

[…]

I tried several times to take an inventory of the chemical weapons, but all my requests [for information] were denied. To the best of my knowledge, [ISIS] obtained raw materials from Tal Afar, such as sarin, chlorine, and mustard gas. There are considerable quantities of these substances, and this could cause a lot of damage. More importantly, they took samples of these substances, and conducted experiments at Mosul University, in an effort to develop them [into chemical weapons], under the supervision of academics and scientists in the field. Some of these scientists were from Mosul University, and they continued to work in its laboratories, which are fully equipped for experiments in chemistry and physics. There are also foreign academics with diplomas from abroad, and there are two people who defected from the [Syrian] regime, and who used to work for the regime's Scientific Studies [and Research Center]. They were paid high salaries by ISIS to continue their experiments, and to develop something new, by loading chemicals on light and heavy weapons, like tank shells and even personal arms - all in order to kill.

[…]

There was a period when the organization was on the offensive. Then came a period when it went on the defensive, and now we are in the period of withdrawal. There are no victories, no conquests. Nothing but defeat, defeat, and more defeat.

[…]

Today, everybody in ISIS - members, commanders, and emirs – know that gone are the days of "The Islamic State Is Here to Stay and Expand." Today, it is nothing but losses, losses, and more losses. They know that the organization is on its way to perdition. They have realized that everything that has a beginning must have an end. The members of the organization have lost their patience and their willpower. Members joined in the belief that there would be victories and conquests, and that there would be an Islamic state, or whatever... All this talk is over now. The [Islamic] State is nothing but a racist militia, which purports to speak in the name of Islam, but has nothing to do with Islam. It is Islamic in name only.

[…]

The coalition airstrikes began to target the oil wells and the convoys carrying oil. The oil revenues have dropped. At first, zakkat and taxes on trucks carrying food supplies were secondary sources of revenue, but now they have had to raise the zakkat.

[…]

They confiscate the property of people who want to leave. In the past year or so, due to financial difficulties and in order to cover the expenses of the battles, they have begun to force wealthy traders to cover all the costs of one month of battles, for example, including food, clothes, and transport.

[…]

The case of [Jordanian pilot] Al-Kasasbeh was on everybody's minds. To this day, ISIS regrets this mistake. This was a major turning-point. It changed the way many people viewed the Caliphate, and the kind of battles waged against it. Also, from the humanitarian perspective, nobody can accept such a thing.

[…]