On March 24-25, 2010, a high-level delegation of senior Pakistani officials, led by the country's foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, held meetings in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other senior American civilian and military leaders. The talks, billed as Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue, were aimed at assisting Pakistan in the areas of economic development, energy and water resources, agriculture, finance, education and social issues.
However, the main focus was on the Afghanistan situation. Although steered by the civilian government leaders of Pakistan, the talks were driven by Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani, who was in Washington in the run-up to and throughout the talks, holding several meetings with top U.S. military officials. The presence of the Pakistan army chief and the foreign minister denotes another point: that the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama is now working in close cooperation with the Pakistani military and civilian officials.
Prior to the talks, Pakistani newspapers and television channels raised people's expectations that the U.S. and Pakistan were about to sign a civilian nuclear partnership agreement similar to the one the U.S. signed with India. However, soon after the talks, it became clear that these Pakistani media reports were unfounded, as the U.S. officials clarified that no nuclear deal was possible with Pakistan, though they recognized Pakistan's viewpoint on the Afghan situation, and its perceptions of threat from India's presence in Afghanistan.
In the articles below, several Pakistani commentators and former diplomats take a look at the success or failure of the Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue.[1] Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, a former diplomat and former editor of leading Pakistani daily The News, argued that the talks were limited to mere assurances from the U.S. but failed to get any commitments from the Obama administration on substantive issues. However, she underlined Pakistan's central role in resolving the Afghan situation, particularly in time for Obama to run for reelection.
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, a leading strategic affairs commentator, noted that the U.S. alone cannot resolve all Pakistani problems, and that Pakistan must look for its own policy framework, especially with regard to its concern over India's presence in Afghanistan, to address regional security issues. Asif Ezdi, a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, expressed disappointment that the U.S. did not promise Pakistan a civilian nuclear agreement like the one with India. Ezdi also urged Pakistani leaders to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), two UN disarmament efforts dear to the Obama administration, and in another article Dr. Masood Bano, a Pakistani academic and commentator, observed that the Obama administration's policy is not different from the one during the Bush administration.
Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, "How Strategic Was the Washington Dialogue?" March 30, 2010
Former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. and U.K. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi wrote in an article titled, "How strategic was the Washington dialogue?" that the Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue was lacking in substance, as the U.S. failed to deliver on Pakistan's demand for a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement and for recognition of Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons state. Noting that the talks helped both countries gain a better understanding of each other's perspective on the Afghan situation, Lodhi urged Pakistani leaders to mobilize their "own resources rather than look to Washington" in resolving the country's problems. Following are excerpts from her article:[2]
"Assurances [Were] Conveyed to the Pakistani Delegation that America's Long-Term Strategic Interests were Consistent with Pakistan's Security"
"What emerged from the Washington encounter was already committed assistance for some development projects and a pledge to fast-track delivery of military hardware for Pakistan. Important, however, were the assurances conveyed to the Pakistani delegation that America's long-term strategic interests were consistent with Pakistan's security, and that these lay east of Afghanistan.
"But despite the well-orchestrated pageantry, the strategic dialogue made little, if any, visible progress on the big-ticket issues that topped Pakistan's priorities: preferential trade, addressing the troubled Pakistan-India equation and securing access to civilian nuclear technology. While the U.S. didn't want to say no to Pakistan's requests, it didn't say yes either.
"The high-powered engagement was driven principally by U.S. compulsions to secure Pakistan's cooperation as the Afghan endgame approaches and for the continuing fight against Al-Qaeda. While the effort in the dialogue was to accord primacy to bilateral relations, Afghanistan remained the most pressing concern..."
"The anodyne joint statement issued at the end of the talks was more important for what it did not say than for what it did. Absent, despite Islamabad's efforts, was any reference to U.S. support for the resumption of formal peace talks, or composite dialogue, between Pakistan and India or the need to resolve disputes – Kashmir and water among them."
"Pakistan's Minimum Expectation to Secure... Formal Recognition of Its Status as a Nuclear-Weapons Power Did Not Materialize"
"There was silence on further engagement on civilian nuclear energy. American officials told the Pakistani delegation that this was not the time to press the issue. Pakistan's minimum expectation to secure in the communiqué some kind of formal recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapons power did not materialize.
"As for trade, the vague U.S. assurance to 'work toward enhanced market access' fell short of a firm commitment on trade concessions, much less hold out any prospect of a future free-trade agreement. Considering Washington has for years been unable to deliver the modest trade access... Pakistani expectations of preferential trade access will have to be squared with this reality.
"Nevertheless, the Pakistani delegation saw a marked change in the mood in Washington. Even though the foreign minister overstated the point by describing this as a '180-degree turn' the environment for the talks was no doubt very positive. Pakistan's Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani read this as acknowledgement of the fact that 'Pakistan had as a nation stood up to terrorism.'
"Certainly Washington made a special effort to roll out its top national security team for the dialogue and shower praise on Pakistan for its anti-militancy efforts. This improvement in tenor helped to restore a semblance of normalcy to a relationship that has recently been under much strain."
"[T]hey Focused on An Immediate Priority: How to Manage the Afghan Endgame"
"A new willingness to listen to Pakistan's concerns and priorities was evident. These had been earlier conveyed in a 56-page document handed over to U.S. National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones during his February visit to Islamabad. This had, according to American officials, been carefully read in Washington.
"The really substantive – and strategic – exchanges took place outside the formal dialogue process in unpublicized meetings. They included a dinner hosted by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, and attended by General Kayani, as well as the unannounced meeting between the top members of the Pakistani delegation and Vice President Joseph Biden. Pakistan's economic needs, India and Afghanistan apparently figured in these meetings.
"Although the content of these parleys and earlier meetings at the Pentagon and Centcom headquarters have not been revealed, it is believed they focused on an immediate priority: how to manage the Afghan endgame. Views were also reportedly exchanged on how a post-war Afghanistan could be stabilized. The two sides are believed to have attained a better understanding of each other's perspectives so as to align their policy on the next steps forward."
"For President Obama, Whose Re-Election Prospects Hinge Considerably on 'Success' in Afghanistan, It is Critical to Secure Pakistan's Cooperation"
"For President Obama, whose re-election prospects hinge considerably on 'success' in Afghanistan, it is critical to secure Pakistan's cooperation – militarily in implementing his surge strategy, and politically, once the ground shifts to negotiations with the Taliban. The exchanges on the sidelines of the strategic dialogue sought to determine the parameters of such cooperation.
"Washington has not yet come around to seek a political settlement in Afghanistan. For now it wants to weaken, not talk to Taliban leaders. Efforts are being ratcheted up for a full-scale military offensive in Kandahar in coming weeks. The U.S. has adopted a public posture of distancing itself from President Hamid Karzai's reconciliation efforts but has pointedly not signalled disapproval...
"Washington's shoot-first-to-talk-later strategy is therefore predicated on the assumption that its military campaign will be able to weaken the Taliban. The specifics of a reconciliation strategy would then be fashioned as the situation changes on the ground.
"In the light of this strategy it is unlikely that the Pakistani delegation would have heard any specifics about the timing and modalities of talks with the Afghan insurgents, even though it is apparent that they will eventually be pursued. The discussions left little doubt in the minds of Pakistani officials that Washington was looking for a way to 'exit' from the Afghan war."
"Pakistan's Decision-Makers Should Draw an Important Lesson from the Talks; Islamabad Needs to Change Its U.S.-Centric Mindset"
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"As for Pakistan's stance, General Kayani reiterated this at various forums: once a political framework for political reconciliation had been fashioned in what must be an Afghan-led initiative, Pakistan was willing to play a role. Without such a framework peace efforts would not succeed. He also reaffirmed Pakistan's interest in seeing a stable, peaceful and friendly Afghanistan...
"The future of Pakistan-U.S. relations will hinge as much on how the Afghan endgame is played out as on other strategic issues. On the other security issues, Washington has listened to Pakistan's case but chosen to be noncommittal, even as it has tried to show more 'understanding.' These issues will not disappear just because Washington is unable to help address them: the unstable Pakistan-India relationship, the strategic challenges posed by the destabilizing effects of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, the festering Kashmir dispute, and the complexities of the water issue. Public views of the U.S. in Pakistan will also be determined by what didn't figure in the strategic dialogue: U.S. policies toward the Muslim world.
"Pakistan's decision-makers should draw an important lesson from the talks. Given the limits on Washington's capacity to address Pakistan's concerns – just as there are constraints on Pakistan's ability to support all of America's geo-strategic interests – Islamabad needs to change its U.S.-centric mindset, learn to mobilize its own resources, rather than look to Washington to solve all its problems and fashion a foreign policy that is in sync with the multipolar world we live in."
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, "Turning a New Page," March 26, 2010
In an article titled "Turning a new page," noted Pakistani strategic affairs commentator Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa argued that Pakistan needs a new framework to address various problems confronting it internally and in the neighborhood. Arguing that a policy to force India out of Afghanistan would be counter-productive, she wrote that Pakistan needs to work with the U.S. and India for a multilateral commitment so that its interests are not threatened in the region.
Following are excerpts from the article:[3]
"Let's Say That We Manage To Convince the U.S. to Give Us a Role in Afghanistan Where We Could Ensure Our Larger Strategic Interests – Would We Then be Willing to Shut Down the Jihad Machine?"
"From the standpoint of U.S.-Pakistan ties, the major question is whether we are willing to deliver more to the U.S. in exchange for a broader role in the region than what we delivered before. The U.S. is back to talking to the military as well. The fact that the army chief [General Ashfaq Kayani] received greater attention and better treatment than visiting army chiefs from other states normally get in Washington, indicated the Obama administration's desire to take both the civilian and military leadership together.
"For Senator David Lugar... the U.S. couldn't do much if the Pakistanis wanted a lame civilian government. America's demand is for Islamabad to clamp down on all terror networks including those we are fighting and others that we have links with. This demand is linked to the U.S. concern about rabid elements taking over weapons of mass destruction after assuming control of the Pakistani state.
"We have been keeping some of the 'strategic assets' [militant groups] because of the Pakistani military's concern for India's nefarious activities in Afghanistan. Let's say that we manage to convince the U.S. to give us a role in Afghanistan where we could ensure our larger strategic interests. Would we then be willing to shut down the jihad machine? These are tough questions which we cannot answer without, as... starting a strategic dialogue inside Pakistan."
"While it [Pakistan] Must Aim for Gaining a Foothold in Afghanistan to Secure Its Position, a Policy to Force Other Neighbors [Like India] Out Would Prove Counter-Productive"
"The conspiracy theorists will naturally question America's logic for treating Pakistan fairly this time. Perhaps political realism buffs may understand that in this changing world no country can afford to adopt neo-conservative tools and attitudes any more. Washington might have realized that it will have to listen to Pakistan and feel concerned about Pakistan's inherent insecurity vis-à-vis India's role in Afghanistan.
"The fact of the matter is that the Afghanistan problem cannot be solved without the U.S., India and Pakistan abandoning their neo-conservative approach and adopting realism, which is not about the use of force all the time, but that involves measured movement.
"This means using both force and negotiations depending on a particular situation. It also means understanding the inherent limitations of the use of force. Brute power cannot be advantageous all the time nor is overestimating one's strength. Pakistan's internal dialogue would require an assessment of how far it can go in using force to draw benefits and estimating strategic benefits and costs.
"While it must aim for gaining a foothold in Afghanistan to secure its position, a policy to force other neighbors [like India] out would prove counter-productive. It would help if Islamabad combined the acquisition of a role in Afghanistan with multilateral assurances that India or any other country would not threaten its core interests.
"Furthermore, an internal dialogue entails building and strengthening institutions at all levels. The foreign minister spoke of the expat community investing in Pakistan. However, he did not mention improving accountability and ensuring transparency in governance. Perhaps that was not the right forum to give guarantees of improving the state system. Nevertheless, nothing that he said demonstrated a willingness to do so.
"A glance at the audience [i.e. Pakistani policy makers present during the talks] indicated that those present might be very intelligent and successful, but they were also part of a crowd that eventually didn't allow reforms to happen and opportunities to reach a larger group of people than the most affluent and well-connected. The bottom-line is about the need to change our mindset first and adopt a new framework that will help in maximising our gains domestically, regionally and internationally..."
Asif Ezdi, "Strategic Dialogue or Strategic Farce," March 29, 2010
In an article titled "Strategic dialogue or strategic farce?" Asif Ezdi, a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, lamented that the U.S. government has not bothered to consider Pakistan's demand for a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement. Pointing out that the U.S. had signed such an agreement with India, Ezdi urged Pakistani leaders to confront the U.S. on the issue, tell the U.S. that Pakistan's cooperation on Afghanistan will not come cheaply, and if necessary threaten to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from entering into force. Following are excerpts from the article:[4]
"The Obama Administration is Not Prepared to Seriously Consider Pakistan's Demand for Civilian Nuclear Cooperation"
"It should be clear to everyone from the outcome of the talks in Washington that the Obama administration is not prepared to seriously consider Pakistan's demand for civilian nuclear cooperation, although it does not want to reject it outright publicly. At the joint press conference after her talks with Qureshi, Clinton said the U.S. was prepared to listen to the Pakistani delegation on whatever issues it raises. But she carefully stopped short of saying that Washington would consider the Pakistani request.
"Since then, an unnamed senior U.S. official has made it clear that a civilian nuclear agreement with Pakistan is not on the table and that there are no plans for any formal talks on this issue. He noted that there was no reference to it in the joint statement issued after the talks. Kerry and Lugar, two leading U.S. Senators, both of whom Qureshi met with during his visit to Washington, have taken a position similar to that of the Obama administration. The reason, clearly, is that since Washington can buy Pakistan's cooperation on Afghanistan quite cheaply and easily by giving increased economic and military assistance, it does not need to offer nuclear cooperation, a course that would put Washington's newly forged strategic partnership with Delhi under great strain.
"Some sections of the U.S. media have openly voiced opposition. The Washington Post wrote in an editorial that a nuclear deal for Pakistan should be a non-starter for a host of reasons, including Pakistan's failure to come clean about its involvement in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The newspaper chose to ignore the steps which Pakistan has taken in the last five years to strengthen export controls in the country and which have been acknowledged internationally, including by U.S. officials.
"Among the U.S. think tanks too, there are strong reservations over Pakistan's request for peaceful nuclear technology. A major consideration is that it would upset India. At the same time, there are also some who favor using a possible nuclear deal as a bargaining tool ('a dangling carrot') to get more cooperation from Pakistan.
"Getting access to civilian nuclear technology will by no means be an easy task. There will be many hurdles we will have to cross: the reservations of the U.S. administration, opposition in the Congress, the India lobby, the protagonists of non-proliferation and finally the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group of the UN]. India had the advantage of support from the nuclear industry which we will not have. We will therefore need a long and sustained effort. But we have not even started."
"If Pakistan is Not Given Access to Peaceful Nuclear Technology, It Will Have Very Good Reasons to Refuse Participation" in the CTBT and FMT
"Pakistan is not without leverage in pursuing its demand for nuclear energy. Not only does Pakistan have a central role in the stabilization of Afghanistan, our participation is needed in two key nuclear disarmament accords, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). The CTBT cannot enter into force without Pakistan's ratification and Pakistan's consent is needed to start negotiations on the FMT in the [UN's] Conference on Disarmament. If Pakistan is not given access to peaceful nuclear technology, it will have very good reasons to refuse participation in both.
"Pakistan has in the past linked its signature and ratification of the CTBT to India taking the same steps. That was before the nuclear deal with India. In the changed situation, our national leadership should make an unequivocal declaration that our becoming a party to the CTBT would furthermore be conditional upon Pakistan getting a similar nuclear deal.
"As regards the FMT, as our permanent representative at Geneva has told the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan's concerns over a treaty that would freeze existing imbalances in fissile materials stockpiles have been heightened by the waiver given to India in 2008 from NSG guidelines. The waiver would enable that country to dedicate its own indigenous stocks for weapons production and thus threaten Pakistan's security. Pakistan is therefore perfectly justified in opposing the commencement of negotiations on an FMT unless these concerns are addressed...
"Gilani should tell the U.S. president and the other participating leaders that (a) unless Pakistan is given firm assurances of a waiver from NSG guidelines within a finite period, it would continue to oppose FMT negotiations in the CD; and (b) Pakistan would only sign or ratify the CTBT after India has done that, and after Pakistan gets access to civilian nuclear technology on the same terms as India. If Gilani does these things, he will not only compel the supplier countries to rethink their duplicitous (munafiqana) nuclear policies toward Pakistan but also make his name in the country's history."
Dr. Masooda Bano, "Limited Options," March 27, 2010
In an article titled "Limited options," senior Pakistani commentator Dr. Masooda Bano, who is based at Oxford University, U.K., lamented that the talks failed to show any change in the Pakistan-U.S. relations during the Obama administration.
Noting that the Obama administration is actually following policies initiated during the administration of George W. Bush, Bano observed: "The reality thus is that the Obama administration has failed to turn a new page in its relationship with Pakistan."
Following are some excerpts from the article:[5]
"The Question is Whether U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan Has Changed... As Compared to the Bush Administration"
"No one would advise Pakistan to be at war with the U.S. However, the problem is that the Obama administration has failed to demonstrate that it actually is working on developing a long-term partnership with the people of Pakistan.
"The question is whether the U.S. policy toward Pakistan has changed in practice under the Obama administration as compared to the Bush administration. The honest answer is that it is very difficult to identify such a difference.
"In terms of how the U.S. views Pakistan, the Obama administration... has actually confirmed that it sees Pakistan as a major problem rather than a country with which it will likely form strategic long-term partnership. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is facing the problem of militancy, but beyond that the comparison between the two countries ends. One is a war-torn country, with all its formal state institutions as well as social infrastructure eroded due to the long period of instability; while the other, despite its development challenges, still is a fully functional country with a proper state system in place. While the former needs institutionalization of entirely new processes to run the state system, the latter only requires reforms.
"The two countries are very complex and different. By lumping the two together [in the Afghanistan-Pakistan policy], the Obama administration actually gives away its negative perception of Pakistan. A dialogue attempted in a context where one party knows that the other one is actually seeing it as a major problem is unlikely to bear fruit.
"There is more to Pakistan than militancy. Insisting on treating Pakistan under the banner of a generic Pak-Afghan policy, however, shows that the U.S. is not willing to deal with Pakistan beyond the limited lens of militancy. In such a context, the claim that the present U.S. administration is actually focused on building a long-term relationship with the people of Pakistan fails to convince."
"The Other Indicator that Shows that the Policy of the Current Administration Fails to Record Any Major Shift Toward Pakistan than That of the Previous Government is the Emphasis on Drone Attacks"
"The other indicator that shows that the policy of the current administration fails to record any major shift toward Pakistan than that of the previous government is the emphasis on drone attacks.
"The number of drone attacks carried out in the tribal belt of Pakistan has increased dramatically under the present U.S. government. Many of those who die in these attacks are civilians. However, the U.S. administration is consistently using this strategy and sadly the current Pakistani government has given its full consent to do this. Again, the emphasis on the use of drone attacks does not reflect a strategy of winning hearts and minds of ordinary Pakistanis; the drone attacks in the tribal areas can hardly create friendly feelings for the U.S., especially in people who are losing their family members in these attacks.
"To keep on using military force to combat militancy is basically a simple extension of the Bush doctrine. It is difficult to see how the Obama administration claims to have developed a new policy toward Pakistan when its strategy is overwhelmingly based on the use of military force."
"The Bush Administration Worked Through [Supporting] Musharraf Rather Than Building Relationship with the People of Pakistan; the Obama Administration is Doing the Same by [Supporting] the Sitting Government"
"Finally, the third indicator that the policy has not changed much is evident by the slow progress recorded in development programs assisted by the U.S. The U.S. might have allocated increased economic and development aid to Pakistan last year, but the problem is that it has made very little practical effort to ensure that this aid is used effectively.
"USAID does run many projects in Pakistan, but the increased U.S. aid for Pakistan since 9/11 has clearly failed to create any visible difference in the development sector. The education sector, which has received most of the development aid, still paints an extremely sorry picture. Had the U.S. government put as much emphasis on ensuring that the development aid given to Pakistan was used efficiently as it did on ensuring that the Pakistani government continued to undertake military operations, there would have definitely been some progress in the education sector
"The reality thus is that the Obama administration has failed to turn a new page in its relationship with Pakistan. The Bush administration worked through [supporting] Gen. Pervez] Musharraf rather than building a relationship with the people of Pakistan; the Obama administration is doing the same by [supporting] the sitting government. The strategy is exclusively that of the use of military force; mechanisms for ensuring long-term development of Pakistan, or gaining trust of the ordinary Pakistanis are still nowhere in sight."
