Some 100 days after he took office, the foreign policy of Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi is becoming apparent. Mursi seeks to adopt a foreign policy different from that of Mubarak: More independent and not dictated by the U.S.; more vigorous, with the aim of restoring Egypt's leading status in the region; more balanced and open to all world countries without preferring a certain bloc; and peaceful rather than confrontational. In an August 2012 interview with Reuters, Mursi said: "The Egyptian foreign policy will be based on regional and international balance and on openness to all... in an attempt to convey a message of peace and stability... We will never be party to aggression towards anyone, and we will not stand for anyone threatening our safety or the safety of the region for any reason. My words are addressed to all, including all countries of the region... [Our] foreign policy will be based on cooperation and nonintervention in the affairs of others."
In practice, this policy is characterized by "walking between the raindrops": Egypt seeks to take a median position in the regional and international balances of power and a regarding the main issues on the regional and global agendas. Mursi is stepping cautiously, attempting to maintain correct relations with all players and leave Egypt room to maneuver, so that it can respond to the shifting currents in the Middle East and the world.
It should be said that a tendency to delay decisions and opt for the safer position has been typical of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) since the onset of the revolution. The movement does not rush to take positions on various developments, but rather tests the waters first, and eventually tends to make a decision that enables it to retreat if its interests and the changing circumstances make this necessary. This pattern is evident in four main areas:
A. The Syrian crisis and Iranian-Saudi rivalry: It was only at a fairly late stage, when he feared "missing the train," that Mursi came out against the continuing rule of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, and supported the Arab League resolution calling upon him to cede power to his deputy towards establishing a transitional government with the Syrian opposition. In doing so, Mursi aligned himself with the countries calling for Assad's ouster –including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the U.S. – yet he did not close the door to Iran, which supports the Syrian regime. In fact, Mursi even visited Iran, breaking a freeze in relations that had existed since 1979, and also included it (along with Turkey and Saudi Arabia) in his initiative to stop the bloodshed in Syria, to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
B. The Hamas–Fatah schism: Despite the ideological affinity of Hamas and the MB, Mursi does not appear to favor either side in the inter-Palestinian schism. Egypt has received officials from both the PA and Hamas, and Mursi has met with PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas, as well as with Hamas leaders Khaled Mash'al and Isma'il Haniya. He objects to the establishment of a free trade zone between Egypt and Gaza at this stage, and he rejects Hamas' requests to stop the Egyptian army's demolition of the Gaza tunnels or to loosen restrictions on the passage of Palestinians through the Rafah border crossing. Additionally, there seems to be no truth to reports on the opening of a Hamas office in Cairo.
C. Relations with the U.S.: Mursi's policy on this issue is ambivalent and runs hot and cold. On one hand, he wants tight relations with the U.S. and desires its continued financial aid, to which end he conveys assurances regarding respecting the peace agreement with Israel. On the other hand, Mursi has tried to create an impression of a distancing in Egypt-U.S. relations, for instance by visiting China before the U.S.; by an initially feeble response to the violent protests outside the U.S. embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012 following the publication of the film Innocence of Muslims; and by stating that, though Egypt is not hostile to the West, it is not as friendly as it was during the Mubarak era. Mursi is signaling that Egypt is no longer an ally that the U.S. can take for granted, and that relations with it are no longer relations of dependency, but are conditional upon respecting its interests.
D. Relations with Israel: Here, too, Mursi has taken a dual strategy. On the diplomatic level, he has expressed commitment to the peace agreement, and has thus far not initiated any amendments to it or brought it to referendum. He even sent a friendly letter to Israeli President Shimon Peres upon the appointment of a new Egyptian ambassador to Israel, in which he wrote he was looking forward to developing the friendly relations between the countries. At the same time, he has not come out against the anti-Israeli sentiment among the Egyptian public. For instance, he did not stop MB General Guide Dr. Muhammad Badi' from calling for jihad against Israel, and he participated in a prayer where the preacher cursed the Jews.
Mursi's letter to Peres
A Safe Bet On The Syrian Revolution
Until recently, the Egyptian MB avoided explicitly supporting the Syrian revolution. Moreover, in a statement it issued in April 2011, the Egyptian MB praised the Assad regime's position on the resistance, which angered the Syrian MB. As a sister movement, the Syrian MB expected the support of the Egyptian MB at a much earlier phase of the struggle against the Assad regime, estimating that the Egyptian revolution would show solidarity with the Syrian one. When this estimation turned out to be wrong, the Syrian MB became furious at its sister movement in Egypt, as well as in Tunisia. Syrian MB spokesman Dr. Zuhair Salem, for example, said: "If they cannot extend tangible [assistance], they should at least remain silent. Before announcing their objection to foreign intervention, the Egyptians and Tunisians should at least present a practical and positive alternative to stop the daily killing." This schism between the Syrian and Egyptian MB is not new, for there have long been differences between them: the Egyptian MB has traditionally supported the Syrian regime and its allies in the resistance axis, while the Syrian MB is an outlawed oppositionist organization that has opposed the Assad regime for decades, and its officials have repeatedly spoken out against Iran and Hizbullah.
Even after Mursi's June 2012 victory in the Egyptian presidential elections, he did not hurry to express support for the Syrian revolution. Only in August 2012 did Mursi, fearing to "miss the train", take a decisive stance against the Syrian regime and in support of the uprising against it. In his speech at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Tehran, Mursi made his first harsh and explicit statements against the Assad regime, calling it "an oppressive regime that has lost its legitimacy" and stating that Assad must step down. Mursi added that Syria needed to transition to peaceful democracy, called for solidarity with the struggle of the Syrian people, and said that Egypt was "willing to cooperate with all sides in order to stop the bloodshed." In protest of his statements, the Syrian delegation left the hall, and Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mu'allem accused Mursi of interfering in Syria's internal affairs. Several days later, in a speech at the Arab League Foreign Ministers summit, Mursi once again called on Assad to step down, predicting that the days of his regime were numbered. He demanded to increase efforts to end the Syrian tragedy, and estimated that there was still a chance to stop the bloodshed. "We are all responsible for the blood of the Syrian people," he said.
Mursi's decision to support the Syrian revolution was the result of several factors. On the level of the leader, supporting the Syrian people increases his popularity and grants him internal legitimacy, since post-revolution Egypt has widespread popular sympathy towards the Syrian revolution. On the level of the region, Mursi apparently considers Syria's allies – Iran and Hizbullah – to be in a weak position. Iran is buckling under the weight of economic sanctions and the attempts to isolate it in the international arena, and Hizbullah's status in Lebanon is in decline. On the other hand, Mursi recognizes the potential for extensive economic aid for Egypt from Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. And indeed, following his clarifications on the Syrian issue, the Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jabor Al Thani, stated that his country would invest $18 billion in projects in Egypt over the next five years, and would transfer funds to the Central Bank of Egypt by the end of this year. Turkey pledged to transfer an aid package for the Egyptian economy, as part of which one billion dollars would be invested in infrastructure projects, and an additional one billion would be granted as a five-year loan. Saudi Arabia also committed to assist Egypt, and opened an office of the Saudi Investment Authority in Cairo.
Mursi is also inclined towards the anti-Syrian camp because it is part of the anti-Shi'ite camp, for Egypt sees itself as a beacon of the Sunni Arab world, opposing Iranian-Shi'ite expansionism in Egypt itself and in the region at large.
On the international level, supporting the Syrian uprising gains Mursi points with the U.S., and could help to persuade America to erase some of Egypt's debt, continue its economic and military aid to this country, and pressure the International Monetary Fund to approve a $4.8 billion loan for Egypt.
Mursi's support of the Syrian uprising wasn't merely declaratory. Though the Egyptian Foreign Minister stressed that Egypt has not and would not send troops to Syria, his office announced it would establish a military field hospital for Syrian refugees on the Jordanian border, and dispatch aid totaling 250,000 Egyptian liras to refugees inside Syria via the Red Cross. In addition, Egypt recently complied with the July 2012 request by the Arab League to cease broadcasting government Syrian TV channels on its NileSat and ArabSat TV networks. Furthermore, Mursi announced an initiative to stop the bloodshed in Syria along with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. However, this initiative has encountered difficulties due to the poor relations between the latter two countries.
Checks And Balances Vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia And Iran
It seems that, since taking office, Mursi is attempting to maintain close relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, while at the same time keeping the door open to Iran. Mursi's first official presidential visit outside Egypt was to Saudi Arabia in mid-July 2012, during which he stressed that the security and stability of the Gulf were closely related to those of Egypt. This visit was meant to alleviate Saudi and Western fears that, with the rise of the Egyptian MB (which has a long history of tense ideological and political relations with the Saudi Salafi stream), Egypt would cease being Saudi Arabia's ally and partner in leading the Arab world and in confronting Iran, as it was during the Mubarak era. The visit was also meant to ensure Egypt the economic aid it so desperately needs.
As mentioned above, some six weeks later, in late August 2012, Mursi visited Tehran to attend the NAM conference and to transfer the rotating presidency of the NAM to Iran, as required by the NAM protocol. This visit to Iran – the first by an Egyptian president since 1979 – was meant to balance Egypt's inclination towards Saudi Arabia, and to pressure the Gulf states and the West to realize their pledges of economic aid to Egypt, while avoiding any impression of an Egyptian defection to the Iranian side. The visit, then, was part of the dual approach to the Iranian regime: on the one hand, it broke the long freeze in Egyptian-Iranian relations and was a gesture of friendship towards Iran, which used the conference to show that it was overcoming its international isolation. On the other hand, it was not an official visit that indicated intentions to normalize relations with this country. Moreover, Mursi's attack on the Assad regime in his Tehran speech, and his implications regarding Egypt's Sunni inclination, were a slap in the face of the Iranian regime. Mursi also opened his Tehran speech by praising the Prophet Muhammad and the Caliphs Abu Bakr, 'Omar and 'Uthman, who, according to Shi'ite belief, deprived the Caliph 'Ali of his right to succeed the Prophet.
According to Mursi's spokesman, in his meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the periphery of the conference, the Egyptian president stressed that "Iran's position on the Syrian crisis and its support of the Syrian regime is one of the factors that prevent the development of Egyptian-Iranian relations." The Egyptian media also reported that the Egyptian delegation to the NAM conference had blocked an Iranian initiative to establish an Iranian-led workgroup for resolving the Syrian crisis. Mursi's visit to Tehran only lasted a few hours, and he refused to meet Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Mursi also did not tour any Iranian nuclear facilities, contrary to Iranian media reports prior to the visit.
Mursi's inclusion of both Iran and Saudi Arabia in his August 2012 initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis is another reflection of the duality in Egypt's attitude towards these two countries. Mursi presented his initiative when he came to Saudi Arabia for the Islamic Conference summit in Mecca, which was also attended by the Iranian president. The initiative was aimed at replacing the Syrian regime; preventing Syria's partition on sectarian or ethnic lines; considering the regional status of China, Russia, and Iran and providing guarantees to those countries; while opposing foreign intervention in Syria.
Mursi and Saudi King 'Abdallah at the Mecca summit
Mursi and Ahmadinejad at the NAM conference in Tehran
The four countries involved in the initiative eventually established a mediation committee, whose first meeting was held at the level of foreign ministry representatives in Cairo on September 10, 2012. Two additional meetings were held at the level of foreign ministers in Cairo on September 16, 2012 and at the close of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in late September, 2012; both were held without Saudi Arabia's presence. Saudi Arabia did not explain its absence, but editorials in the Saudi daily Al-Riyadh by Yousuf Al-Kwailit indicated that it had refused to cooperate with Mursi's initiative due to Iran's involvement. Al-Kwailit wrote: "Iran is part of the Syrian crisis and not part of its solution." In a similar vein, the Egyptian foreign minister later said, "Iran is part of the Syrian problem, but it has a chance to become part of the solution."
In an interview with the London-based Saudi daily Al-Hayat, the Egyptian foreign minister explained that Iran's inclusion in the initiative was done out of a recognition of reality. "We are not partners of Iran," he said. "We object to sending military aid to the Syrian regime, which kills its sons on a daily basis. Any aid to it is aid to this killing... Those who support it politically perpetuate the conflict..." He added that the four countries in the initiative agreed that the bloodshed in Syria must stop and that change must come, but differed on the means by which to achieve this. Egypt, he said, opposes foreign military intervention in Syria, and believes that "prior to any solution, the Syrian president must step down... and cede all power to his deputy, who will conduct dialogue with the opposition for the purpose of establishing a transitional government [as required by the Arab League resolution]. However, some [of the other countries in the initiative] oppose this.'"
This initiative has thus far proven fruitless, and must be seen as part of Mursi's attempts to maintain correct relations with all leading countries in the region, and moreover, to create momentum that would help Egypt regain its status as a regional leader.
Mursi again took a pro-Iranian line in his meeting with French President Francois Hollande during the U.N. General Assembly in New York in late September 2012. He said Iran could not be expected to meet the demands of the international community so long as Israel did not respect the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Currently, Iran continues to court Egypt. For example, former Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ebrahim Mahmoudzadeh recently said at an Egyptian-Iranian economic conference in Tehran that Iran wanted to help Egypt build satellites and nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, and was willing to cooperate with it in all fields. Also, in a meeting with the newly-appointed head of the Egyptian Interests Section in Tehran, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi expressed Iran's desire to deepen its regional and international cooperation with Cairo and offered it Iran's scientific and technological assistance.
Median Position Between Hamas And Fatah
Mursi has also adopted a median position on the inter-Palestinian schism between Hamas and Fatah, and wants to avoid the appearance of leaning towards either side. An editorial in Al-Ahram on this topic stated: "There are those who forget, intentionally or not, that the residents of Gaza and Ramallah are all Palestinians, and their plight is one and the same, even if there are differences of opinion [between them]... Egypt has always fought for the Palestinians' rights, whether they live in Gaza or Ramallah, and it will continue to do so. They are all our brethren... Some say that Egypt supports one side among our Palestinian brothers, at the expense of the other, but these are dubious and tendentious claims. Egypt stands alongside all Palestinian parties, not out of love for one side or another, but for the sake of Egyptian national security..."
Mursi, who is ideologically close to Hamas, has certainly showed it greater respect than his predecessor, Mubarak. Unlike Mubarak, he met with Hamas leaders in Cairo, for example with Khaled Mash'al on July 19 2012 and with Isma'il Haniya on July 26, 2012. However, following the terrorist attack in Rafah on August 5, 2012, in which 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed, Egypt downgraded the level of meetings with Hamas, due to suspicions of its involvement in the attack. In subsequent visits to Cairo, Mash'al met not with Mursi but with the head of Egyptian intelligence (on September 18, 2012), and Haniya met with the prime minister (on September 17, 2012). The Egyptian foreign minister even clarified explicitly that meetings with Hamas officials in Egypt were not held at the level of their official positions. As for 'Abbas, he was one of the first Arab leaders with whom Mursi met after his victory. Mursi also refrained from establishing a free trade zone with Gaza, which Hamas desires, and only slightly loosened restrictions on Palestinians in the Rafah Crossing, complying with 'Abbas's perception that the PA is responsible for the crossing, as specified in the Rafah Crossing agreement. Nor was a Hamas office established in Cairo.
Mursi meeting with Haniya
Mursi meeting with Mash'al.
Mursi meeting with 'Abbas
In addition, Mursi did not heed Hamas' requests to stop the ongoing operation to demolish the Gaza tunnels, though the move evoked criticism in Egypt.
As part of his balanced attitude to Hamas and Fatah and of its efforts to restore Egypt's status as a regional leader, Mursi wants to maintain this country's role as sponsor of the Palestinian reconciliation. In response to reports on Iran's proposal to host the Palestinian reconciliation talks, an editorial in the Egyptian government daily Al-Ahram warned against those who would "exploit the Palestinian problem for the benefit of the local agendas of Arab and Islamic countries," and added: "Reports that Iran has offered Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas to host the Palestinian reconciliation in Tehran during the NAM conference are puzzling. 'Abbas told the leaders in Tehran that Cairo was the gateway for Palestinian reconciliation, and that if they wished to participate, they must knock on its door. That should have been enough..."
Distant Friendship With The U.S.
As for relations with the U.S., Mursi's policy has again been characterized by maneuvering between closeness and distance. On one hand, Mursi wants tight relations with the U.S. and desires its continuing financial aid, to which end he has conveyed calming messages regarding respecting the peace agreement with Israel. For example, when one of his advisors called to amend the Camp David Accords, the president's spokesman quickly clarified that the statement did not reflect the opinion of the president, and that the Camp David Accords should not be amended at this time, since Egypt had the tools to control Sinai and restore security in all areas.
At the same time, Mursi is signaling to the U.S. that Egypt is no longer an ally that can be taken for granted, and that relations with it are no longer dependent relations, but are conditional upon respecting its interests. This message was conveyed, for example, by Mursi's decision to visit China before visiting the U.S., and to visit Iran despite U.S. objections. In response to U.S. condemnations of high-level Egyptian participation in the NAM conference in Tehran, Mursi's spokesman said that every country had the right to decide whether to participate, and that Egypt would not agree to interference in its internal or foreign affairs. An article on the MB website explained that Mursi's Egypt is independent in its decision making and is no longer subject to U.S. dictates: "Mursi did not start [his presidency] with a visit to the U.S., which indicates that this Egyptian president has a different policy: one that reflects the pulse of the Egyptian street, breaks free of the American chains and opens up new horizons with all countries of the world..."
"Mursi visits China"
In early September 2012, following Mursi's clarification of his position on Syria, he was invited to make an official visit to Washington in December 2012. However, several days later, Egyptian-U.S. relations took a turn for the worse after the Egyptian authorities delayed in suppressing violent protests held outside the U.S. embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012 following the publication of the film Innocence of Muslims, and was also tardy in condemning the protestors, who attempted to breach the embassy and set the U.S. flag on fire. Following these events, President Obama made an unprecedented statement, saying that the U.S. did not see Egypt as either an ally or an enemy. In response, Mursi told the New York Times that Egypt would not be hostile to the West, but also would not be obedient, as it was under Mubarak. When asked whether he considered the U.S. an ally, Mursi responded: "It depends on your definition of ally," and added that he saw the U.S. and Egypt as "true friends."
Due to the tense relations, Obama avoided meeting Mursi when the latter made his first presidential visit to the U.S. to attend the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 25, 2012. An editorial in Al-Ahram summarized some points from Mursi's interview with the New York Times on the eve of his departure for the U.S.: "Mursi stressed that Egypt would not be hostile to the West. Alluding to attempts by some Western countries to drive a wedge between it and the U.S., [he promised] that such attempts would fail and that the friendship would remain. However, the president stated firmly that this friendship would not be along the same lines as [the relations] that existed between America and the pre-revolutionary Egyptian regime, and stressed that, from now on, Egypt would not belong to anyone like it did before the revolution..."
It should be mentioned that U.S. decision makers have recently debated the question of financial aid to Egypt. While U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocates continuing the aid to Egypt, the U.S. Congress is insisting that this aid, totaling $450 million annually, should be withheld for the first time.
Ambiguous Position On Israel
Mursi's policy vis-à-vis Israel vacillates between commitment to the peace agreement, and the need to heed the many voices calling to amend the agreement, and even the extremist voices calling for jihad against Israel. Since assuming office, Mursi has reiterated his commitment to the peace agreement with Israel as part of honoring all international agreements signed by Egypt before his election, and has not initiated any amendments to the Camp David Accords. This, despite the fact that the August 2012 terrorist attack in Rafah sparked increasing demands to amend the military clause of the agreement, so that Egypt could move military forces into Sinai without Israel's consent. On the other hand, Mursi is not blocking prominent public voices that oppose the peace agreement, including calls by MB General Guide Dr. Muhammad Badi' for jihad against Israel.
Mursi is careful to follow diplomatic protocol with Israel, though this is usually a source of embarrassment for him, and sparks criticism from the Egyptian public. Thus, for example, when Israeli media reported in mid-July 2012 that Mursi had sent a thank-you letter to Israeli President Shimon Peres in response to a letter of congratulation by Peres, Mursi's spokesman denied this report. A second letter sent by Mursi to Peres upon the appointment of a new Egyptian ambassador to Israel in mid-October 2012 – in which he said he looked forward to tightening the friendship between the countries, addressed Peres "dear friend," and signed "your loyal friend" – likewise caused public outrage in Egypt. The secretary general of the MB, for example, stressed that the movement did not share the president's feelings and continued to see Israel as Egypt's chief enemy. The president's spokesman said in response that this was the accepted diplomatic language that was used in communication with all countries.
Mursi and Peres: "Friends Forever."
An incident that occurred on October 19, 2012 – when Mursi attended a Friday prayer at a mosque in Marsa Matrouh and was filmed nodding his head and saying "amen" to a preacher cursing the Jews – demonstrates the internal contradiction in his policy. Al-Ahram columnist Dr. Osama Al-Ghazali Harb wrote in response to this incident: "I do not know how the honorable president would respond if asked: 'Do you agree with what [the preacher,] Sheikh Futouh, said?' If he says no, it is a problem, and if he says yes, it is an even bigger problem... The incident and its implications will not go over well [with Western viewers], since this matter reveals the massive gap that still exists between the official contractual obligation for peace with Israel and the popular objection to this [peace] agreement. As part of his official duty, the president must respect the agreement, as he has stated many times. But, at the same time, he cannot disconnect from the prevailing popular mood..."
* L. Lavi is a research fellow at MEMRI.
 Ara.reuters.com, August 27, 2012.
 This can be seen, for example, in the MB's position on the trials of members of U.S. civil society organizations that allegedly received foreign funding from the U.S. in violation of Egyptian law. Initially the MB avoided taking a stand on the matter despite the public outrage in Egypt. Later on, when they could no longer maintain their indecision, the MB joined the anti-American campaign. However, it ultimately agreed to the deal made between the U.S. and Egypt to remove the American defendants from the country before the trial. For more, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 804, Crisis between Egypt, U.S. Deepens over American Funding to Civil Society Organizations – Part II: The Islamists Join the Government/SCAF Campaign against the U.S., February 24, 2012; and MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 818, Crisis between Egypt, U.S. Deepens over American Funding to Civil Society Organizations – Part IV: Release of American NGO Activists from Egypt – A Sign of Increasing Pragmatism in the Muslim Brotherhood's Policy, March 30, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), October 17, 2012.
 The statement expressed appreciation for the Assad regime's stance on the "Zionist-American project," for its struggle against the Greater Middle East Plan, and for his support of the resistance, the Palestinian factions, the rights of the Palestinian people, and the Lebanese resistance. At the same time, the MB expressed its support of the Syrian people's right to freedom and democracy, and their objection to aggression towards Syrians expressing themselves peacefully. Ikhwanonline.com, April 6, 2011.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 30, 2012.
 Another example of the schism between the Syrian and Egyptian MB occurred in 2008, when the former joined the National Salvation Front, a large opposition movement operating outside Syria, to the chagrin of the Egyptian MB. Factjo.com, April 7, 2009.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 31, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt); Al-Jazirah.com, September 6, 2012.
 See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 871, Iran Launches Diplomatic Initiative Aimed At Preventing The Fall Of Assad's Regime, Collapse Of Entire Resistance Axis, And Regional War, August 10, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 7, 2012.
 Al-Shurouq (Egypt), October 1, 2012.
 Al-Sharq (Saudi Arabia), September 10, 2012.
 Syria-news.com, October 3, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), August 28, 2012.
 Al-Dustour Al-Asli (Egypt), September 5, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), July 13, 2012.
 For Mursi's Tehran speech, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LioX4tTTLQ; for more on Iranian reactions to the speech, see MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 4931, Iranian Website Publishes Regime's Top-Secret Guidelines For NAM Conference Media Coverage; The Censorship Of Mursi, Ban Ki-Moon Speeches, September 4, 2012.
 Al-Dustour Al-Asli (Egypt), September 18, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 2, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), October 28, 2012.
 Presstv.ir, August 26, 2012; Farsnews.com, August 29, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 7, 2012.
 Rassd.com, August 15, 2012.
 Al-Wafd (Egypt), September 1, 2012.
 Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), September 10, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 17, 2012.
 Al-Hayat (London), October 3, 3012.
 Al-Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), August 29, 2012, September 12, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 21, 2012.
 Al-Hayat (London), October 3, 2012.
 Al-Hayat (London), September 27, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), October 19, 2012.
 ISNA (Iran), October 23, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 24, 2012.
 Aljazeera.net, July 19, 2012.
 Aljazeera.net, July 26, 2012.
 See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 4920, Egyptian Officials, Journalists Accuse Hamas Of Responsibility For Attack On Troops In Rafah, August 29, 2012.
 Al-Shurouq (Egypt), September 18, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), September 18, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 21, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 18, 2012.
 During his visit to Turkey, Mursi's spokesman said that the notion of establishing a free trade zone was only discussed in the media, and not in official circles. Al-Ahram (Egypt), October 2, 2012.
 Al-Shurouq (Egypt), September 7, 2012.
 Ikhwanonline.com, August 19, 2012.
 Aljazeera.net, July 19, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), July 18, 2012.
 See, for example, Al-Shurouq (Egypt), October 7, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 3, 2012.
 See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 4846, Mursi: Recognition Of Peace Agreement With Israel – Conditional; MB Calls For Jihad To Liberate Palestine, July 23, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 26, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 22, 2012.
 Ikhwanonline.com, August 29, 2012.
 Umh1.com, August 27, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 8, 2012.
 See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 4971, Harsh Self-Criticism In Arab World Over Violent Reactions To Anti-Islamic Film, September 24, 2012.
 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 21, 2012.
 Nytimes.com, September 22, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 24, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), September 30, 2012.
 See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5011, Muslim Brotherhood General Guide Muhammad Badi': Jerusalem Will Be Regained Only Through Jihad, Not Through Negotiations, October 17, 2012.
 Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), August 1, 2012.
 Al-Ahram (Egypt), October 17, 2012.
 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), October 19, 2012.
 Al-Watan (Egypt), October 18, 2012.
 Al-Fagr (Egypt), October 19, 2012.
 See MEMRI TV Clip #3614, Egyptian President Morsi Joins Preacher in Prayer for Dispersal of the Jews, October 19, 2012.
 See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 5023, Columnist In Egyptian Daily Al-Ahram Says MEMRI TV Clip Embarrassed President Mursi, October 23, 2012.