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June 15, 2010 Special Dispatch No. 3035

Editorials in Pakistani Dailies Urge Army Operations Against the Taliban in North Waziristan

June 15, 2010
Pakistan | Special Dispatch No. 3035

The failed Times Square bombing of May 1, 2010 and the subsequent arrest of key suspect Faisal Shahzad has highlighted concerns that the Taliban continue to plan attacks from the Pakistani tribal region of Waziristan. Situated along the Afghan border, the region is divided into the two districts of North and South Waziristan. Last October, the Pakistani Army launched an operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in their stronghold of South Waziristan. However, the militants moved into neighboring North Waziristan, where the Pakistani Army continues to have a peace agreement with the militants led by commanders Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir Ahmad.

After the Times Square attack, there have been fresh demands that the Pakistani Army carry out an operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in North Waziristan as well. The right-wing Urdu-language Pakistani daily Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt said in a report recently that Pakistan is under immense American pressure to start an operation in North Waziristan.[1] In the report, the newspaper also accused the U.S. of trying to gain "victory" against the militants in Pakistan in order to hide its failure against them in Afghanistan. There is growing expectation in Pakistan that the Pakistani Army will soon launch an operation in North Waziristan.

However, a new report recently came to light that the militants may be moving from North Waziristan to some other Pakistani regions as well as to Afghanistan, as part of a tactical move to avoid any military operation. According to a report in the Pashtu-language Afghan newspaper Wrazpanra Khedmatgar, under a deal with the Pakistani government, all Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants who are based in North Waziristan, including Punjabi, Uzbek, and Arab militants, as well as those from the Mehsud tribe, have agreed to leave for South Waziristan or Afghanistan.[2]

In the following editorials and article, leading Pakistani newspapers and a former Pakistani diplomat examine the issue of North Waziristan.[3] In the first editorial of May 7, titled "North Waziristan, the New Terrorist Epicenter," the Lahore-based newspaper Daily Times urges the Pakistani military to quit its "hands off" policy on North Waziristan. The newspaper also wrote a second editorial on the subject on May 31, warning that the military must continue its drive against the militants in order to prevent them from regrouping, as some recent reports have suggested. A third editorial in the liberal newspaper Dawn, titled "North Waziristan Operation," argues that Pakistan must carry out an operation against the Taliban in North Waziristan, but warns that if the military is not able to hold the district after clearing it of militants, it may become "another morass" as the militants will make a comeback.

On a different note, Ayaz Wazir, who comes from the Pakistani tribal region and is a former Pakistani ambassador to Kabul, urges the Pakistani government to pursue non-military means to tackle the militants in North Waziristan, though he himself does not suggest what such options could include. In an article, titled "North Waziristan: Why Only the Military Option?" Wazir warns that the refugee crisis resulting from such an operation in North Waziristan may destabilize the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region which will not be in the national interests of Pakistan.

"There are... Reports of North Waziristan Not Only Providing a Safe Haven for Militants Displaced by the Military's Offensives, But also Militants from Far and Wide, Including what are Now Dubbed the 'Punjabi Taliban'"

Following are excerpts from the May 7th editorial in the Daily Times:[4]

"The investigations into Faisal Shahzad's attempted car bombing in New York have shifted the focus to his links in Pakistan. While little evidence has so far emerged of his link to one or another terrorist groups, his own admission according to U.S. officials says he received bomb-making training in North Waziristan during a five-month stay in the country. One should be grateful that the training did not prove adequate; otherwise the bomb that failed to go off would have had devastating consequences for innocent citizens in New York.

"Faisal's family, relatives, and friends are being sought. His parents and some relatives have gone 'underground,' while some arrests are reported across the country. The Pakistani investigation team, spanning both military and civilian intelligence agencies, says a case can only be registered against Shahzad once some link is established with a terrorist group on Pakistani soil. One cannot but agree with the skepticism of the DG ISPR [Director General of the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Public Relations department] that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP's) claim of responsibility needs to be taken with a pinch of salt since there is no evidence they have the kind of outreach to mount an operation on U.S. soil.

"Nevertheless, the involvement of the TTP or even more significantly Al-Qaeda in imparting the rudimentary training Shahzad received can not be ruled out. Shahzad continues to insist he acted alone, but the confession of a link with North Waziristan and phone records showing calls to Pakistan just before the botched bombing contradict that claim. All this could lead to the speculation that a new strategy is being resorted to by the terrorist network to use 'lone wolf' operators abroad to hit the U.S. That would fit in with the nature of asymmetrical warfare, in which hitting 'soft' targets is the logical progression when the terrorists are under pressure, as they are from the Pakistani military's offensives in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and Swat and the U.S. drone strikes..."

"While the investigations in the U.S., Pakistan, and elsewhere grind on, this perhaps is the moment to reflect on the role of North Waziristan in the new configuration of terror. Reports have consistently pointed out that militants who escaped the military's offensives in Swat, South Waziristan, and other parts of FATA have found refuge in North Waziristan with the Jalaluddin Haqqani network. The military in the past has seemed reluctant to expand its operations into North Waziristan, partly because Haqqani is still seen as a pro-Pakistan asset in a post-U.S. Afghanistan, partly because the military was reluctant to open a new front while it was still engaged in 'mopping up' operations in Swat and FATA.

"If the story about Faisal Shahzad receiving training in North Waziristan is true, and there are other reports of North Waziristan not only providing a safe haven for militants displaced by the military's offensives, but also militants from far and wide, including what are now dubbed the 'Punjabi Taliban,' it may be inescapable for the military to focus on how to take out this new epicenter of terrorism. This is not only necessary for the success of the military's efforts elsewhere in FATA and Swat, it is now critical generally to ensure that the militants are unable to regroup and cause headaches to Pakistan and the world through attacks such as the New York one.

"Failing to take action against the terrorists holed up in North Waziristan will doubtless bring renewed pressure from the U.S., and if cooperation is not forthcoming, the millions of dollars of U.S. military and civilian aid may be threatened. The government and the military need to revisit the 'hands off' policy on North Waziristan and grasp the nettle firmly."

On Regrouping of the Taliban: "Already There Have been a Few Incidents of Terror Attacks in Swat Valley and the Threats by the Taliban Have Scared the Local Population"

Following are excerpts from the May 31st editorial from the Daily Times:[5]

"After the Swat operation and South Waziristan offensive, the government machinery and the military are facing some real difficulties in clearing the areas of all extremist elements, rehabilitating the local populace, and restructuring local civilian administration in those areas. It is an uphill task and it would be foolish to expect that it could be done overnight. The IDP [internally displaced people, or refugees] crisis is still far from over. Not only are there financial and logistical problems, but [the task] to bring back normalcy to these areas needs long-term political and economic planning. For the time being the army is holding onto these areas so that the militants are not allowed to make a comeback.

"Already there have been a few incidents of terror attacks in Swat Valley and the threats by the Taliban have scared the local population. To retain the confidence of the people and to assure them that the militants would not be allowed to return to the area is a time-consuming job. The local people have seen so much bloodshed and their lives being destroyed by the Taliban that they are unsure of whom to believe. Our dual policies [of supporting some militants and attacking others] of the past may be one of the reasons for this trust deficit. It is important that the locals are taken into confidence and a strong local administration be put in place.

"The military is doing its best to regain areas that were strongholds of the militants. The aerial blitz taking place in [the district of] Orakzai Agency is an effort to make it more difficult for militants to move back and forth to and from the Khyber Agency. The game plan seems to be to isolate the militant groups and then eliminate them one by one. Bajaur is tough turf and it would take some time before the army is able to clear the extremist elements from there.

"On a different note, much has been made of The Washington Post's report on the U.S. military planners looking at options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan. Like most other countries, the U.S. is perhaps engaging in war gaming a contingency plan. Perhaps no more should be read into it. The U.S. seems to have more faith now in its frontline ally in the war against terrorism and has said so on a number of occasions."

"There is the Danger that the Pakistan Army May Wait Too Long... Pakistan Needs to Clean Up North Waziristan for Its Own Sake"

Following are excerpts from the May 22 editorial in Dawn:[6]

"Would the U.S. like to see an operation launched by the Pakistani security forces in North Waziristan Agency sooner than later? Absolutely. Are the Americans pressuring Pakistan to launch the operation now? It's difficult to say with any certainty because all such discussions are held behind closed doors, but several factors point to the possibility that the Americans may not be.

"First, the Pakistan Army has made it clear that an operation of some kind in North Waziristan is not completely off the table. In fact, it has indicated that an operation is likely once circumstances are more propitious. Those circumstances include dealing with hot spots in Orakzai Agency first; ensuring that the overstretch of troops and resources caused by the operations in [the districts of] South Waziristan, Malakand, and elsewhere is brought down to manageable levels; and trying to achieve more favorable circumstances on the ground in North Waziristan. Eventually, some kind of operation in the Mir Ali area [of North Waziristan] is expected. That may be extended to areas of 'secondary' importance to the Pakistan Army.

"The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has not been as successful in the 'clear and hold' phase of counter-insurgency as it would like to have been, and without enough boots and resources on the ground, North Waziristan may become another morass.

"Second, people familiar with strategic and operational discussions between Pakistan and the U.S. are skeptical of the notion of specific demands that the Pakistan Army is asked to 'agree' to. There is clearly some misalignment between the interests of the army and the U.S. in North Waziristan. Given its 'prioritization approach' [which means sparing those Taliban who are not fighting against Pakistan], the Pakistan Army is concerned first and foremost with the militant hubs that are used to launch attacks inside Pakistan; similarly, the Americans are concerned more about militant hubs that project into Afghanistan and perhaps even have their eyes set on targets in the West.

"Nevertheless, the onslaught of drones in North Waziristan against both sets of militants indicates a level of cooperation which belies claims of 'extreme pressure' [by the U.S. on Pakistan]. More likely, the frequent high-level meetings between American and Pakistani officials result in discussions about overall strategy and aims, and the specifics are left to each side to fill out.

"Yet, there is the danger that the Pakistan Army may wait too long, once again clinging to the deep 'red lines' that proved so disastrous [during operations] in Swat and South Waziristan. Pakistan needs to clean up North Waziristan for its own sake. Debating 'hammer and anvil' strategies and the number of check posts with the Americans is alright. But the sooner the job is done in North Waziristan, the better."

Former Pakistani Ambassador: Will a Military Operation in North Waziristan "Serve Our National Interests? Is a Military Operation the Only Option?"

Following are excerpt from Ayaz Wazir's article in The News:[7]

"… To cover its failures in Afghanistan, the U.S. government has consistently continued to increase pressure on us to extend military action yet further within Pakistani territory, on one pretext or another. Although our rulers acted like the proverbial obedient servants and carried out every military demand made of us, often to utter disregard for life and the safety of our civilian populations, they have failed to win the confidence or approval of their masters in Washington..."

"Whether or not the military operation is launched, the question that comes to mind is: will that serve our national interests? Is a military operation the only option? Will that bring peace and stability to the area, and to the country as a whole? Will it stop the bleeding of the country's resources in terms of men and material? Have the military operations conducted in other parts of FATA achieved the desired results? If not, we have to take stock of the situation, and tell our friends that killing our own people on our own soil is not in our interest. If some of these people are misguided and do cross the border into Afghanistan to cause mayhem, then the NATO forces stationed there should take whatever action against the infiltrators they consider appropriate.

"If the U.S. drones can target wanted people on Pakistan's soil in total disregard of our sovereignty, why do the Americans hesitate to take similar action when such elements cross the border into Afghanistan? We have rendered enough sacrifices. Both our armed forces and the civilian population have suffered a great deal, but that has hardly earned us any laurels from Washington.

"People in the tribal areas have rendered the supreme sacrifice of abandoning from their hearths and homes for the success of military operations. They and their families suffered immensely as internally displaced persons wandering on roadsides and in camps in [the areas of] Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank. Nobody paid any real attention to their plight. Their sacrifices earned them nothing but lip service from the government or its functionaries who would turn up only for photo-ops.

"Other equally important questions that come to mind are whether the countless operations conducted so far in FATA have earned a place of honor for us with the West? Have they eliminated militancy from the area or, to the contrary, contributed to the spread of the menace deeper into other parts of the country? If the reply to these questions is in the negative, then we need to look at the problem afresh and redraw our parameters. We should formulate and follow a policy which is not only in line with but also reflective of the aspirations of the general public. Unless we do that, we will be fighting successful battles but not a successful war

"Again, an operation in North Waziristan will not be that easy. This will require additional troops and equipment from an already overstretched army. Will we still be able to maintain an effective vigil on our eastern border? Will we be able to contain the spread of this battle to the border with Afghanistan which the army has not touched in all the operations conducted in FATA so far. Also, will the army be able to prevent it from spreading to other areas inhabited by the Wazir tribe (South Waziristan, as well as those across the border in Afghanistan). If launched, the operation is likely to become a bushfire engulfing the entire region of the two Waziristans and across the Durand Line [i.e. Afghanistan-Pakistan border].

"Where will the IDPs go? Bannu, which is in close proximity to the east, remains mostly under curfew. Adjacent is South Waziristan, where a military operation is underway in the Mehsud area. To its north is Kurram. Kurram is already suffering from sectarian violence which has caused the closure of the road link with the rest of the country. Its inhabitants travel to Peshawar via Kabul. Unless special arrangements are made to open the roads for traffic in those areas, which is unlikely in view of the operation, people will have no choice but to cross the border into Afghanistan and take refuge there. Will we be able to effectively counter enemy propaganda that the Pakistani army has made its own people refugees in another country? How will the international community react is another matter. I do not believe these repercussions have been taken into consideration.

"We have not yet rehabilitated the IDPs of [operations in] Bajaur and South Waziristan. They are braving the summer heat in camps with only the barest possible essentials at their disposal. The operation will not only increase the number of IDPs but will also uproot those displaced Mehsuds who had found some shelter in the Wazir areas of the two Waziristans.

"How many times are we going to conquer FATA? Each tribal agency has experienced at least two military operations in the last nine years. The people are fed up and have no capacity or patience left for any more sacrifices. The treatment meted out to the tribesmen so far is certainly not commendable. There is every likelihood of the same treatment following a fresh operation. Let us reconsider our policy options if we really want peace and harmony to return to the area."

Endnotes:

[1] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, June 2, 2010.

[2] Wrazpanra Khedmatgar, Afghanistan, May 27, 2010.

[3] The text of the editorials in this dispatch has been lightly edited for clarity.

[4] Daily Times, Pakistan, May 7, 2010.

[5] Daily Times, Pakistan, May 31, 2010.

[6] Dawn, Pakistan, May 22, 2010.

[7] The News, Pakistan, June 3, 2010.

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