A month after the ceasefire that ended the 2014 Gaza-Israel War, the first stirrings of self-criticism could be discerned in the Hamas movement. Several websites close to Hamas published an article titled "The War Against Gaza – Where Did The Resistance Go Wrong?" reflecting a more realist and critical view of the war's outcomes, and attempting to examine the mistakes made by the movement. The article, by journalist and researcher Saleh Al-Nu'ami, claimed that Hamas had made mistakes during the war with Israel, and that it must recognize them and learn lessons from them. Israel's targeted assassinations of Hamas members had not justified the escalation to total war, Al-Nu'ami stated, and Hamas' demands in the negotiations with Israel had been unrealistic. He also argued that wars between Hamas and Israel in recent years have proven that Gaza alone cannot bear the burden of the task of liberation.[1]
Along with this article, a statement by a Hamas official also hints at introspection on the part of the movement: Hamas political bureau member Moussa Abu Marzouq told the Jordanian daily Al-Dustour that Hamas is "objectively assessing the course of the operation in order to learn where it erred and where it was on target, as well as whether it can improve its image."[2]
Following are excerpts from Al-Nu'ami's article:
Saleh Al-Nua'ami (Image: Palinfo.com)
The Resistance's Biggest Mistake Was Being Dragged Into War Under Impossible Conditions
"It is improper for the Palestinian leadership to make do with celebrating its brave stand during Israel's aggressive war on Gaza and its success in thwarting Zionist plots; rather, it must learn important strategic lessons about the course of the war and its outcomes, and recognize its mistakes, which increased the cost of that brave stand. The worst mistake was that the resistance was dragged into a war under the worst regional and internal conditions in the history of the Palestinian problem.
"Some claim that the war was forced on the resistance, on the assumption that the resistance was responding to Israeli assassinations of its men. But this is a superficial explanation that fails to reflect thinking about the appropriate arena of conflict in which to respond to this aggression, and in which the damage would be minimal. This is not a tribal conflict, and therefore Israeli assassinations do not necessarily require such a response on the part of the resistance, which leads to all-out war under impossible conditions. It was only the resistance's preparations, heroic function, and tactical creativity on the battlefield that prevented Israel from realizing its goals, and even thwarted the gamble, by regional [elements] that lie in wait for the resistance, that the Zionist war machine would succeed in erasing [the resistance] from the equation.
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"There is no doubt that regional [elements], that turned their backs on the resistance during the war, contributed to its duration and reduced the Palestinians' ability to achieve their goals, while Zionist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted that regional [elements] had created the ideal conditions for war..."
The Demands Posed By The Resistance Extended The War And Increased Losses
"Is it appropriate for the Gaza Strip to become the one and only arena of conflict with the occupation? The three wars in 2008 [Operation Cast Lead], 2012 [Operation Pillar of Defense], and 2014 [Operation Protective Edge] have proven that the Gaza Strip's demographic and geographic nature raise the price that the resistance and its supporting public must pay. It has become clear that Israel has taken advantage of the population density [in the Gaza Strip] to sow horrible destruction of life and property in the civilian Palestinian rear in order to pressure the Palestinian resistance to stop the firing.
"It is true that the political atmosphere in Gaza following July 2007[3] created an ideal environment to strengthen the resistance's capabilities in the Gaza Strip – unlike the situation in the West Bank – but the resistance should have worked to provide the proper conditions to launch a different front or fronts in order to relieve the pressure on Gaza.
"The Palestinian resistance erred when it itself contributed to the reduction of its own political maneuverability when it raised a string of demands that was difficult to force on Israel in light of problematic regional and internal circumstances. This led to the extension of the war and greater losses. Thus, for example, not only did Israel reject the resistance's demands to establish a sea port and airport, but even the Palestinian Authority [PA], which was empowered to negotiate a permanent ceasefire on behalf of the Palestinians, adopted the Zionist position. No knowledgeable person could imagine that Israel would agree to what the PA rejects. This indicates that it was a mistake to hide behind the demand to establish an airport and sea port, when there could have been many other demands to remove elements of the siege.
"Forcing Israel to meet these demands was impossible, since one side may only dictate all its terms to the other side when the former has successfully inflicted a classic defeat upon the latter. This was impossible in light of the balance of power, which heavily favors the Zionist entity. So, taking into consideration the steadfastness, the thwarting of the plans of the occupation, and the regional environment lying in wait, this was a grand achievement in itself.
"One of the biggest mistakes of the resistance was its inability to assess the intentions of the Netanyahu government, [and] its disregard of the impact the Israeli leadership's ideological makeup had on its conduct in battle and on its willingness to meet the demands of the resistance...
"These comments are not intended to downplay in any way the achievements of the resistance... but there is an urgent need to look at the empty half of the glass in order to become familiar with the weak points and to learn the lessons necessary for the resistance. Events have proven that the resistance is the only option that guarantees the removal of the occupation."[4]
[1] It is noteworthy that Ibrahim Al-Madhoun, columnist for the Hamas organ Al-Resalah also captured the self-critical stirrings within the movement, stating: "Victory on the ground does not necessarily indicate a swift or clear political achievement, which is what the movement aspires to after scoring some political points, the most important of which was strengthening its popularity in the West Bank and restoring faith in the armed struggle program." Al-Resalah (Gaza), September 15, 2014.
[2] Al-Dustour (Jordan), September 22, 2014.
[3] The author was apparently referring to Hamas' June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip.
[4] Paltoday.ps, September 18, 2014.
