An Unimaginable Peace

The last days of 2024 are marked by a visible bitterness of the fighting in Ukraine, where the Russians are slowly advancing both in Donbass and in the Kursk region partially controlled by the Ukrainian forces since August.[1] As the Russian generals reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin, in 2024 they took close to 200 Ukrainian villages and towns and more than 3,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory.[2]

It seems that these days Putin feels firmly confident about the future, being backed by a still-strong Russian economy and healthy government finances,[3] and is showing almost no interest in armistice negotiations – and this is confirmed by many of his closest aides.[4] Even if some kind of talks were to start, the conditions put forward by the "Russian Führer" this summer (surrender of four Ukrainian oblasts plus Crimea to Russia with official recognition of the new border; no NATO membership for Ukraine; its "demilitarization" and "de-Nazification," as well as the termination of all international sanctions against Russia),[5] alongside his later remarks that he would communicate only with "Ukraine's legitimate leaders" and not with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose term expired earlier this year, leave not much room for hopes they would succeed.[6]

In Moscow, the Russian bureaucrats realize quite well that Ukraine has been overexposed to war for years, that an inevitable lowering of mobilization age to 18 would destroy the approval ratings of President Zelensky, and that Donald Trump's return to the White House may make many things much more problematic for Kyiv.[7]

(Source: 5.ua)

The Ukrainian Political Scene Is Filled With Zelensky's Adversaries

However, it is not only the Russian leadership but the Ukrainian one as well that seems not well prepared for the talks. After Zelensky's short-lived shock following Trump's victory, the rhetoric in Kyiv has changed, and these days Ukrainian politicians point out that financially, their country has enough resources to fight for at least the first half of the next year;[8] that the Western armaments and ammunition are now coming faster and in larger quantities than before;[9] and that they will not agree to most of Putin's conditions.[10]

Assessing Zelensky's stance, I would say that it's largely understandable: He realizes that the peace treaty (or another agreement that may end the fighting) would lead to the termination of martial law, and, necessarily, to new elections, which he will most probably lose people are extremely tired of the war and because he has little support among his country's political and business elite.[11] The Ukrainian political scene is filled these days with Zelensky's adversaries,[12] and the local entrepreneurial community hopes that after the war, huge international reconstruction efforts will follow, producing a financial bonanza – so those hunted by the current president are looking for revenge (for example, the man who invested a lot of effort into propelling him into politics, Mr. Ihor Kolomoysky, is currently imprisoned in Kyiv).[13]

Of course, one should expect the emergence of tons of data about corruption and abuse of power in the current administration as the war ends, and this adds to the elites' doubts about the prospects of armistice, which most probably will lead to the most dramatic overhaul of Ukraine's political class since it declared independence. Moreover, I would say that a huge part of the Ukrainian society remains opposed to accepting Putin's conditions for peace,[14] and the very attempt to launch negotiations on Russia's terms may cause a revolt inside Ukraine and lift radical proponents of the war to power.

Trump-Putin Talks Will Start But May Not Yield Anything Serious

It should be added that these days President Putin is openly playing the role of inadequate maniac, saying at his press conference that his decision to invade Ukraine was prompted, at least to some degree, by his sense of boredom, and that all that followed fascinates him as a kind of constant activity (движуха).[15] He fires ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities, promising more will follow, in retaliation for a recent Ukrainian attack on Kazan.[16] This tactic, I would argue, delivers some results – not only did Prime Ministers Viktor Orban of Hungary and Robert Fico of Slovakia visit Moscow, but it is believed that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz will soon follow suit. The Europeans seemingly have little enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine militarily, and they seem at least disappointed in the face of the U.S. request for 100,000 troops to be sent as peacekeepers to oversee the future Ukraine-Russia demarcation line.[17]

No one wants a war with Russia, and the goal of preventing a nuclear showdown is now often mentioned by many Western policymakers. All this makes Trump's plan to launch negotiations as soon as possible (both Trump and Putin confirmed they wish to meet and talk in order to find a solution to the ongoing conflict)[18] at least a bit problematic. If Trump's strategy is based on an assumption that the U.S. will dramatically increase its assistance to Ukraine in the event that Putin does not agree on proposed conditions, it might fail, simply because of the West's fear that Putin may start a nuclear war if Russia is subjected to more intense pressure than it faces now (of course, retired Ukrainian politicians may say that their country will attack Russia if Ukraine is not admitted to NATO, but the U.S. president cannot be this bold).[19]

I believe that a Trump-Putin meeting may, and will, be organized quite soon, allowing both parties to deliver their vision of possible steps toward the resolution of the conflict. But two serious problems may arise in this case, beside the question of Ukraine's willingness to accept what both men can agree upon between themselves. On the one hand, the U.S. cannot speak for the entire Western alliance, and so it cannot assure that the Russian claims will be met – e.g. the issue of lifting the freeze on the Russian assets in Belgium is not in the U.S.'s jurisdiction – and, by pushing forward such a decision, the U.S. would violate Europeans' interests, at least in the sense that a €30+ billion loan issued against the interest payments on the Russian funds would automatically be transformed into a blank loan provided to an insolvent Ukrainian government.[20]

Trump may, of course, get some support from European leaders like Orban and Fico (Orban had already postponed his decision concerning the extension of the EU sanctions till late January, when Trump's vision will become clear),[21] but the Brussels bureaucracy will find an opportunity to keep sanctions in place.

On the other hand, Putin has been breaking his own promises and commitments for years,[22] and whatever he may promise Trump may not be what he promises Zelensky (I mean that the Kremlin can find many excuses for not honoring its commitments). Putin might express his conditions to Trump, and when the Ukrainian leadership becomes ready to make a deal, it will appear that Zelensky is not recognized by Putin as Ukraine's "legitimate leader." Putin may explain his unwillingness to honor some deals by Ukrainians' moves showing that Kyiv isn't controlled by its Western allies (and it really is not, as everyone saw after the attack on the Kursk region.[23] Honestly speaking, I would predict that the talks will start but will not yield anything serious because of dozens of factors, thus allowing the ongoing war to continue further.

Peace In Ukraine May Come Only At The Price Of The Western World's Complete Humiliation

The major difficulty that the Western world is facing in Ukraine is that any kind of peace treaty that may suit President Putin in fact nullifies the major principles of the international order that has existed since the end of the World War II. Until now, there has been no change of borders due to a major war between sovereign states. The cases of Korea and Vietnam were the results of civil wars inside these nations; the lengthy saga of decolonization was about the creation of new states with formal recognition by their former sovereigns; the collapse of several multinational states like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia resulted from largely legitimate secessionist movements; and some quasi-sovereign entities like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, or Transdniestria have not been recognized by international community. The only long-term change of borders through occupation – that of Armenia's control over Nagorno-Karabakh – was just recently reversed after Azerbaijani forces recaptured their sovereign territory. Under these circumstances, it would be extremely difficult for the Western powers to agree on Russia's claims for recognition of the new Ukraine-Russia border without causing the current order to collapse.

Another important issue would be a deep crisis of the non-proliferation regime, as many nations across the world realize that nothing except possession of a nuclear arsenal can guarantee their sovereignty and territorial integrity, since the international community is unable to retaliate against aggressor nation.

Last but not least, since Russia will never agree to pay compensation to Ukraine for either the loss of the vast part of its sovereign territory or for those damages inflicted onto the territory and people that will remain under Kyiv's control, the very idea of an aggressor nation's responsibility for the damage it has caused will also be largely devalued. Therefore, peace in Ukraine may come only at the price of the complete humiliation of the Western world, and – if we do not anticipate a full-scale war between NATO and Russia – it cannot in any sense fit into a Trump-proclaimed program of "Making America Great Again."

Compared To The Soviet Union, Today's Russia Looks Even More Dangerous For The West

I would be very surprised if it appears that Putin doesn't realize all these points (or at least most of them). His agenda, as one may see after evaluating his quarter-century-long rule, isn't focused on Russia's prosperity. Unlike Trump, he doesn't want to make Russia great – he is much more obsessed with his wish to make the West weak and diffident. Putin simply doesn't care how huge Russia's losses are and how many of his subjects are killed in Ukraine – for him, it's a fair price to pay for the dismemberment of a world centered around Europe and the U.S., moved by the West's liberal values, and run democratically.

Compared to the Soviet Union, today's Russia looks even more dangerous for the West. The USSR (at least in theory) wished to overtake the Western world for the sake of the global Communist revolution, while Putin's Russia seeks ways to destroy it just, as Putin himself said, because of his boredom and his endless drive towards even more universal «движуха» (increased activity).

Today it seems for him that his dreams may finally come true – the West should either accept absolutely new rules of the global game or continue the war "that will continue to the last Ukrainian." Quite soon, we all will see what the West's response to such plans might look like – but for me from today's standpoint, long-term peace in Ukraine seems to be completely unimaginable...

*Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.