memri
March 23, 2021 MEMRI Daily Brief No. 267

Time For New (And Fewer) Stratagems In America's Global 'Great Game'?

March 23, 2021 | By Amb. Alberto M. Fernandez*
MEMRI Daily Brief No. 267

Thirty years ago was the last year in the existence of that baleful entity known as the Soviet Union. August 1991 saw an attempted coup attempting to stave off the inevitable, but by the end of the year the red flag with the hammer and sickle came down. That was also the year of the Gulf War, in which the United States and its allies easily expelled Saddam Hussein from Iraq.


In June 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul displayed and removed BLM and LGBTQ banners.[1]

The United States and its European allies spent considerable money and effort in the post-Soviet era to help countries formerly under the Soviet yoke, from the Baltic to Central Asia, stand on their own two feet and to promote Western bedrock principles of free markets and individual freedom. There were both public and private initiatives, many of them of real lasting value.

On the private side, I can think of the important work done by the Rumsfeld Foundation and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in promoting people-to-people and young leader networks and fellowships.[2] The idea, which still has enduring importance, highlights "free market economic systems, good governance, the rule of law and basic human freedoms; supports the sovereignty of their countries and traditional national values; and also acknowledges the importance of regional and global cooperation."[3]

But while the goals and values are enduring, that post-Soviet Union Eurasian environment envisaged by the West looks in retrospect both dated and triumphalist. While the United States may still see Russia as an adversary thirty years later, other powers are rising. China, with its ambitious economic and political goals stretching all the way to Europe is the principal one,[4] although Turkey, in the imperial dreams of its bombastic president, looks both toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. China, Russia, and Turkey are competitors in Eurasia who also find multiple ways to cooperate. They are rivals who are strongly against the United States. The world is changing, although the Biden administration seemingly seeks to return to a passing globalist framework – supposedly disrupted by Donald Trump. Meanwhile the European Union works to position itself closer to both Russia and China and at arm's length from the Americans.[5]

There is still, and not just in Eurasia, a global desire for America as benign hegemon, ally, and guarantor of last resort. America cannot fully play that role anymore, and should resist such blandishments, but it also should not close in upon itself completely in an effort to correct a decades-long case of imperial overreach. There must be, should be, smart, cost-effective ways for the United States to project power in priority situations without being dragged into open ended costly foreign policy commitments and marginal crusades. This is a situation where we can perhaps learn from our adversaries – Russia, Turkey, China – to be more strategic and cost-effective in our interventions.

The incoming Democratic administration is very new and yet U.S. foreign policy seems poised upon an inflection point. The international ambitions of the incoming team seem to be very broad with both enhanced spending and a larger list of priorities.[6]

Iran is an early priority. So far, the Administration seems to be trying, unsuccessfully, a policy of preemptive, piecemeal appeasement to lure Iran to the negotiating table. Some of these steps – such as referring to Iranian-backed militia/death squads in Iraq as "Shia-backed" have been truly bizarre.[7] The Iranians seem emboldened by such largesse.[8]

One of the earliest directives of the new American administration expanded on defending LGBTQ rights worldwide, not just as a traditional human rights tasking for the State Department, where it already existed, but much more broadly.[9] Among the agencies tasked with this directive is the Defense Department.[10] This focus is not much of a surprise given a 2020 Democratic campaign that highlighted this issue (the Trump Administration in early 2017 highlighted a commitment to international religious freedom as a signature issue) but certainly a gauge of a government wanting to do much more, rather than less, internationally. In announcing this new directive, President Biden said that the United States "cannot afford to be absent any longer on the world stage."[11]

Biden has also called for a tougher line against democratic Hungary and Poland, announced the renewal of assistance to the Palestinian political leadership, undermined Afghanistan's democracy and made clear official unhappiness or coldness towards U.S. allies Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

All of these issues have their context and can be plausibly explained by their advocates. It is also worth noting that the Biden administration's nascent foreign policy is also being criticized from the left as being not progressive enough.[12]

Although I disagree with some of the new policies (I disagreed with Trump's policies on Turkey, Afghanistan, and Venezuela), my principal concern so far with the administration's foreign policy is less content and more process. Once again it seems too expansive, befitting an empire in full flower bestriding the world like a colossus, rather than a still very strong country that should prioritize and build up its strength after multiple foreign misadventures, a pandemic, and a long domestic wish list. There also seems to be a disconnect in the official American tone sounding at times like a doddering, toothless scold. As one analyst described it, "speak harshly and carry a small stick."[13]

An obvious way to husband one's strength and project power is to build and empower like-minded local allies, countries that have their own abilities to project some power regionally and whose worldview is broadly complementary to the broad thrust of U.S. foreign policy goals. While China, Russia, and Iran build up their partners and proxies in the region, we seem to be tearing ours down.

The new vibe in the Middle East so far is that the United States cannot really be trusted and that it is out of step with the reality on the ground. Countries, especially our allies, are hedging their bets. Removing the Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist List while the group launched major offensives inside Yemen and against Saudi Arabia while the Americans said repeatedly that this was "unacceptable" has provoked bitter criticism in the region at our supposed naivete, which is actually a conscious decision leaning towards Iran and its allies.[14] No one should minimize the multiple challenges the United States faces on the international stage and it is still early days for a new leadership not even fully staffed. And certainly, some senior officials in place understand the global landscape.[15]

There is a danger here as the new Administration signals a course correction from the previous one. It is to be seen as trying to do too much and failing but also of saying too much and delivering too little, of alienating allies and not truly winning over adversaries. Also, can a nation seemingly at war with itself and internally tearing down its own identity, history, and political narrative truly implement a smart and disciplined foreign policy?

*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.  

 

[1] Voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-embassy-seoul-displays-then-removes-black-lives-matter-banner, June 15, 2020.

[2] Rumsfeldfoundation.org/greater_central_asia/camca, accessed March 22, 2021.

[3] Rumsfeldfoundation.org/greater_central_asia/camca, accessed March 22, 2021.

[4] Upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2019/08/02/US-should-not-let-China-replace-Russia-in-Central-Asia/2911564747553/

[5] Nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/politics/biden-europe-russia-china.html

[6] Devex.com/news/in-brief-biden-makes-a-case-for-foreign-aid-99081

[7] Newsweek.com/middle-east-us-shouldnt-resort-sectarian-thinking-opinion-1575500

[9] Foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/04/the-missing-realism-of-bidens-pro-lgbtq-foreign-policy, March 4, 2021.

[10] Theamericanconservative.com/dreher/sjw-pentagon-culture-war-against-allies, March 17, 2021.

[11] Thenation.com/article/politics/bidens-foreign-policy-team-cant-handle-new-threats-with-old-strategies, March 16, 2021.

[12] Salon.com/2021/03/15/10-big-problems-with-joe-bidens-foreign-policy--and-one-solution, March 15, 2021.

[13] Twitter.com/Doranimated/status/1372843073533792256, March 19, 2021.

[14] Washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saving-yemen-peace-process-blunting-houthi-push-marib, March 17, 2021.

[15] Foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2018-12-11/more-less-or-different?utm_medium=email_notifications&utm_source=reg_confirmation&utm_campaign=reg_guestpass, February 2019.

Share this Report: