Series Of 'Accidents' Resulting In Destruction Of Undersea Infrastructure Are A Chinese Salami-Slicing Operation

Four disturbing incidents occurred in the last two years, all of which destroyed global infrastructure. Chinese "civilian" maritime vessels were involved in every event.

Four Incidents

Incident 1

On February 2 and 8, 2023, two submarine communication cables connecting Taiwan and Matsu Islands were severed, disconnecting the internet. Taiwan's Institute of National Defense and Security Research reported that the cables were damaged by "Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fishing vessels and unidentified ships." "This incident resulted in local landlines, mobile communication, broadband Internet, and Multimedia on Demand (MOD) services being blocked, rendering communication impossible," Taiwan's Institute of National Defense and Security Research reported.[1] Most recently, on February 25, 2025, Taiwan announced that a Togolese-registered vessel and its Chinese crew have been detained "after a submarine communications cable linking Taiwan and Penghu was severed."[2]

(Source: Indsr.org.tw)

Incident 2.

On October 8, 2023, the gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia was severed. A post-incident investigation revealed that Chinese-owned and Hong Kong-flagged container ship Newnew Polar Bear damaged the Balticconnector, an undersea gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland. The incident occurred in the Finnish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where Finnish authorities retrieved the anchor from the seabed on October 24, 2023.[3] Beijing denied accountability claiming that the anchors were dropped due to a storm and then dragged by strong winds. Meteorological records showed no storm during the time.

The Newnew Polar Bear in Arkhangelsk, seen missing its portside anchor. Source: (ViltalyV./fleetphoto.ru/Yle)

Incident 3.

On November 17 and 18, 2024, undersea fiber-optic communications cables, the BCS East-West Interlink (between Lithuania and Sweden's Gotland island) and C-Lion1 (connecting Finland and Germany), were severed in the Baltic Sea.

Satellite images showed a Chinese civilian cargo vessel, the Yi Peng 3, which departed from the Russian port of Ust'-Luga on November 15,[4] sailing the area precisely when the cables were severed. The Lithuanian Geopolitics and Security Studies center reported: "It is suspected that the breach was caused by the Chinese-registered merchant ship Yi Peng 3, which dragged its anchor over two objects located approximately 100 km apart. The vessel was only temporarily stopped in Danish waters and it was only a month later that officials from Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland were allowed to board the vessel for observation while the Chinese officials who arrived with them carried out an investigation that lasted several hours. A few days after this inspection, the Yi Peng 3 continued its voyage toward its destination in Egypt."[5]

Beijing refused to cooperate with the Swedish-led investigation. They even denied the Swedish prosecutor entry onboard the ship to question the crew.[6] Instead, the Chinese conducted their own investigation and declared the incident a mere "accident." In an effort to show transparency, four token observers from the EU were allowed to witness the investigation. It was a sham; The four had no say in the final verdict.

Yi Peng 3 (Source: Getty Images)

Incident 4.

On January 3, 2025, the Trans-Pacific Express Cable near Keelung City in northern Taiwan was damaged. The cable also connects to South Korea, Japan, China, and the United States. Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and Chunghwa Telecom stated that the international undersea cable was cut by a Chinese ship, the Shunxin-39, a freighter registered in Cameroon.[7]

The ship, owned by a Hong Kong company, Jie Yang Trading Limited,[8] originally sailed under China's flag but changed its registry in 2024 to one from Cameroon (as Shunxin-39) and another in Tanzania (as Xinshun-39). According to the Taiwan Coast Guard, the vessel's crew were entirely made up of Chinese nationals.

Tracking data showed the vessel crossing the site where undersea cables were situated in northern Taiwan. It carried two sets of automatic identification systems (AIS). Both were switched off shortly before the cables were severed.

The Shunxin-39, a freighter registered in Cameroon. (Source: Taipeitimes.com)

One Mission, Varying Objectives

Beijing takes no responsibility for the incidents and maintains that they were all accidents. Tsai Jung-hsiang of the National Chung Cheng University in Taiwan vehemently disagrees with Beijing's narrative.[9] Neither do other maritime authorities. The Taiwanese professor correctly reasoned that the deployment of vessels for the same mission (to destroy undersea infrastructure) using the same method and perpetuated by the same country cannot be a coincidence. He believes that the missions were carefully planned to fulfill varying objectives.

The objectives for the incident affecting Sweden were multi-layered. They are: to test how NATO would react given that Sweden is the alliance's newest member; to cause economic instability by disrupting internet and communication services between EU countries; to send a signal that China's has both the capability and political will to cause damage and chaos; and to cause NATO countries to focus on internal security rather than broader geopolitical strategies.

The incident that affected Finland and Estonia were done to aid Russia. Its objectives, too, are multi-layered. They are: to disrupt energy security of the EU; to test NATO's response – its readiness, tolerance, methods, level of unity, and the sanctions it will take; and to pile up costs for EU nations who are already grappling with the costs of supporting the Ukraine.

The incidents in Taiwan serve a different purpose. First of all it is China's rehearsal for a blockade. Second it applies psychological pressure on Taiwan, to break its will, undermine its confidence, and keep it on the edge. It also serves as a warning to Taiwan's allies demonstrating the risks of coming to Taiwan's defense.

Salami-Slicing Strategy

In the context of warfare, a salami-slicing strategy refers to a tactic where an aggressor achieves its objectives through a series of small, incremental actions taken individually thereby avoiding crossing any red lines and provoking a significant response. Collectively, however, these actions result in a strategic advantage.

The strategy exploits the ambiguity of the situation where actions could be written off as an accident or coincidence. It gives the perpetrator plausible deniability.

China's track record shows that it will continue to deploy its salami-slicing operations until there is pushback from its victims.

Experts agree that China needs a taste of its own medicine. Victim countries are advised to apply the same gray zone tactics toward China, whenever possible, as an act of deterrence. In addition, China should be made to pay a steep cost for its rogue tactics by way of stiff economic sanctions and legal repercussions.

Peaceful nations must realize that the People's Republic of China is a communist country that has every intention of sowing global havoc and destruction in its pursuit of hegemony. That said, nations must brace themselves by way of infrastructure resilience, diversification of supply chains and civil society preparedness.

*Andrew Masigan is the MEMRI China Media Studies Project Special Advisor. He is a Manila-based economist, businessman, and political columnist for The Philippine Star. Masigan's articles in MEMRI are also published in The Philippine Star.