The Rise (and Fall?) of the Islamic Emirate in Gaza

The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Monitor (JTTM) was the only news source to report last week that a confrontation was brewing between Hamas and salafi jihadis in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip ("Possible Showdown Between Al-Qaeda Supporters and Hamas at Friday Prayers in Rafah; Fatah Supporters Vow to Join in Fray," August 13, 2009, http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1729¶m=GJN ). This report is offered as a free sample from the JTTM; to subscribe to the JTTM, visit http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/about_memri.htm or contact us at jttm@memri.org .

Introduction

On August 14, 2009, the radical Sheikh 'Abd Al-Latif Musa, aka Abu Al-Nur Al-Maqdisi, denounced Hamas from the pulpit of the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque in Rafah and declared the formation of an Islamic Emirate in Palestine. He called on those with weapons to enroll under the "military command of the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque." Following prayers, Hamas security forces laid siege to the mosque and to surrounding buildings in which the rebels had taken up positions. When the smoke cleared, 22 people were dead, including 'Abd Al-Latif Musa and a high-level Hamas military commander; scores of others were wounded. [1]

The proximate cause of this confrontation was decidedly local in nature. Hamas had demanded that Musa hand over the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque to the Hamas government's Ministry of Religious Endowments. This assault on clerical independence led the radical preacher to draw a line in the sand, and he called on supporters to attend Friday prayers and defend the mosque. While he may have hoped that the defense of the mosque would succeed, he must have known that death was a likely outcome; indeed, in his appeal to supporters on Tuesday, August 11, he told them that "death in obedience [to Allah] is better than life in disobedience [to Allah]." [2]

An online poster calling for attendance at Friday prayers at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque

As local in nature as it may have been, this short-lived episode is likely to have long-term implications both for Gaza and for the jihadist movement on the whole. While 'Abd Al-Latif Musa was not a major figure in the larger jihadist world, he was a popular preacher in Rafah, and his "martyrdom" at the hands of Hamas could become an iconic moment in the erosion of Hamas' popularity and the growth of the local salafi jihadi movement.

As for the implications for the jihadist movement on the whole, the episode has greatly exacerbated an already existing divide between the jihadist grassroots, who are virulently anti-Hamas, and the Al-Qaeda leadership, which had recently made conciliatory gestures toward the Palestinian movement. [3] The senior Al-Qaeda leadership is now in a difficult position: they either need to reverse course and endorse action against Hamas, which they probably see as a divisive waste of energies, or else risk alienating their hardcore supporters. As it is, they appear to have lost the leadership on this issue to others, such as the Jordan-based independent jihadist cleric Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.

An online poster from the Ansar Al-Mujahideen forum celebrating the birth of the Islamic Emirate in Palestine; Sheikh 'Abd Al-Latif Musa is the figure wearing orange on the right

The Roots of the Ideological Split: Salafi Jihadis and the Muslim Brotherhood

Al-Qaeda is part of a wider movement often referred to as the salafi jihadis. The Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb was a formative influence on the salafi jihadi movement in its early days, but Qutb represented a radical development within the Brotherhood that was combated by its subsequent Supreme Guides. Today the salafi jihadis are indomitable enemies of the Muslim Brotherhood; Ayman Al-Zawahiri, for instance, wrote an acerbic book against them called "The Bitter Harvest."

The root of this dispute is that the Muslim Brotherhood is ecumenical in matters of creed and pragmatic in choice of means; in contrast, the salafi jihadis are closer to the Wahhabis in adhering to rigid positions in matters of creed - a fact that greatly limits their possible margin for pragmatism. They consider democracy and elections a form of apostasy, reject gradualism in implementation of the shari'a, and are proud to pronounce other Muslims apostates when they consider this to be what the shari'a dictates.

Hamas differs somewhat from the wider Muslim Brotherhood in that its identity was formed within the Palestinian context of war against Israel; it also has some shared history with the salafi jihadis through figures like 'Abdallah 'Azzam. However, in recent years Hamas has run in the Palestinian elections and sat in the Palestinian parliament, acts that salafi jihadis generally consider apostasy (and all the more so since the Palestinian Authority was established by the Oslo Accords). In addition, Hamas did not declare an Islamic Emirate in Gaza after it took power in the 2007 coup; the judicial system, for instance, remains a non-shari'a one. For these reasons and others, the salafi jihadis, and those in Gaza in particular, became nearly as hostile to Hamas as they are toward the Muslim Brotherhood. [4]

The Jihadist Reaction to the Rafah Uprising

Here we will survey jihadist reactions to the events in Rafah and the most recent opinions on Hamas, distinguishing between four classes of jihadists: 1) jihadist groups in Gaza; 2) independent jihadist clerics; 3) the jihadist forum moderators, and 4) the jihadist Internet grassroots. We will also point to an early indicator of likely conflict between jihadist popular opinion and the Al-Qaeda leadership over the Rafah events and the proper stance to take on Hamas in its aftermath.

Jihadist Groups in Gaza

There is a confusing array of jihadist groups claiming to be active in Gaza, some of whom emerged only in the wake of the events in Rafah. Following is a survey of those that have been involved in recent developments or have reacted to them.

The group apparently most closely involved in the events is Jund Ansar Allah. This is a relatively new salafi jihadi group that recently took credit for an attack on Israeli soldiers. [5] In the lead-up to the Rafah showdown it issued a call to attend prayers at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque, [6] and upon the declaration of the Islamic Emirate in Palestine it quickly pledged loyalty to Abu Al-Nur Al-Maqdisi and announced that it was dissolving its independent structure into the Emirate. [7] Even after the Rafah showdown it hopes to avoid conflict with Hamas: After Hamas Interior Minister Fathi Hamad accused Jund Ansar Allah of several past attacks on Palestinian targets in Gaza, the group issued a clarification that it had no interest in fighting Hamas and dismissed Hamad's words as propaganda. [8] In the past, however, it has made threats against Hamas in order to deter it from killing or capturing its own members. [9]

The symbol of the Jund Ansar Allah organization

Jaysh Al-Islam is a salafi jihadi group centered around the Dughmush clan in the Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City. It is probably numerically the most important group in the Gaza Strip, as well as the best-armed, though some have entertained doubts about its ideological purity. [10] It is best known for having kidnapped BBC reporter Alan Johnston. [11] In the past it has threatened Hamas with war, but as with Jund Ansar Allah, the threat was made in order to deter Hamas from taking action against the group. [12] (The deterrent does not seem to have been effective, since the two groups clashed in the fall of 2008). Jaysh Al-Islam has not issued any official reaction to the events in Rafah; however, one Dughmush is a very frequent poster on the Al-Falluja forum; he has issued a warning to civilians to stay away from Hamas locations and from the police, indicating that they are targets for attack. [13] There have also been reports of a Hamas siege on a city block in Gaza City controlled by the Dughmush clan, the outcome of which is not yet clear. [14]

The Jaysh Al-Islam emblem

Katibat Suyuf Al-Haqq, or the Swords of Justice Brigade, is a new group that declared itself in the wake of the events in Rafah. It claims to be based in Beit Hanun in the northeast of the Gaza Strip. It issued a communiqué posted on August 16, signed by a certain Abu Malik Al-Shimali, in which it pledged loyalty to the new Islamic Emirate. The statement also included a warning to Muslims to stay away from police stations, the offices of the security forces, and mosques and other buildings frequented by the Hamas leadership, indicating that they are potential targets. [15]

In a subsequent communiqué, also posted on August 16, the group claimed to have kidnapped four Hamas spies. It said that following the group's previous communiqué it which it pledged allegiance to the Emirate, the Hamas government ordered the "apostate police" to send spies to collect information on the Brigade in Beit Hanun, and that these spies had tried to raid one of their safe houses on the night of August 15. According to the communiqué, the Brigade members managed to escape, and after discovering the addresses of the spies' homes it kidnapped four of them. The communiqué threatens that they will be killed, and that "the streets of Gaza will flow with the blood of those who fight Allah, His Prophet, and the believers." [16]

Another group that emerged following the Rafah uprising, Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'l-Jihad - Bayt Al-Maqdis ("The Monotheism and Jihad Group in Palestine") is potentially very significant. The name "monotheism and jihad" is that used by the influential jihadist cleric Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi for his website, www.tawhed.ws, which in addition to being a platform for Al-Maqdisi also serves as the central online library of jihadist literature in general. Every jihadist is presumably aware that in the past Al-Maqdisi criticized his student Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi for using the name "monotheism and jihad" for his organization in Iraq without Al-Maqdisi's permission. [17] (This is the group that later became Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and then the Islamic State of Iraq.) The question that arises, then, is whether the new Palestinian Monotheism and Jihad group has usurped the name, or whether it has the blessing of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi; if the latter, the group has the potential to unite the various Gazan jihadist groups under its banner, a step that Al-Maqdisi has urged in the past. [18] One source claims that Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi has in fact endorsed the group; [19] while he generally insists that his website is the only source that speaks for him, it is possible that he is using other channels so as to maintain plausible deniability (especially vis-à-vis the Jordanian authorities). For this reason it is worth devoting some detailed attention to this new group and its intentions.

Monotheism and Jihad issued two communiqués on August 16, 2009. The first announced the establishment of the group and the foundation of its doctrine: Monotheism was the message of all the prophets, and to achieve it one needs not only to believe in Allah but also to renounce idolatry, of which man-made law is one form; further, the championing of this creed requires jihad. It is not sufficient to wage jihad without upholding the monotheistic creed, nor is it sufficient to focus on creed to the exclusion of jihad: thus the Monotheism and Jihad Group was formed to combine the two. [20]

The topic of the second communiqué was "the massacre at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque." It begins by citing some eschatological hadith, the upshot of which is that we are living in the end of days, "a time in which the party of falsehood appears in the garb of the party of truth, and the party of treachery in the garb of the party of integrity… The day has come when Islam is combated by a troop who wrongly and falsely are considered Islamic… and who instill in people the delusion that democracy is the religion of the Lord of the worlds." This group, i.e. Hamas, has taken today to "savagely directing their light and heavy arms fire at the chests of true sheikhs and scholars and devoted mujahideen… they laid siege to a house of Allah and demolished it on the heads of those in it with their heavy arms [fire], thus trying to follow in the footsteps of the Jews and the Christians - and if they cannot achieve that, then at least to follow in the footsteps of the apostate Pervez Musharraf [who laid siege to the Red Mosque]…" The communiqué also accuses Hamas of defending the border with the Jews and arresting those who try to attack Israel; waging a campaign of false propaganda against the mujahideen; and fighting against the mujahideen in order to please foreign powers and get Hamas removed from the list of terror organizations.

Nonetheless, when the Monotheism and Jihad Group outline their resolutions, it remains deliberately ambiguous as to whether it will fight against Hamas at present (despite the clear labeling of Hamas as apostates). It says that "jihad is with the spearhead and with the tongue; we will wage jihad against the Jews and those who take their side with the spearhead, and against the hypocrites with the tongue and with arguments and proofs." Hamas, in their perception, may fall into the first category, but this is not made explicit. Much emphasis is placed on the current events being a tribulation that the mujahideen must bear with steadfastness. Only later in the communiqué, when the group urges members of Hamas' security forces to defect, does it warn, "If you do not, your fate is known: an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. The course of battles changes, oh democracy-worshippers." The most probable reading of this communiqué is that the Monotheism and Jihad Group is laying the groundwork for war against Hamas, but that for tactical reasons it is not planning to attack it in the near future. [21]

Independent Jihadist Clerics

The most important reaction from the jihadist religious leadership was a statement by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, who is probably the most influential jihadist cleric today. He does not have an organizational affiliation with Al-Qaeda (or anyone else); he was Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi's mentor in Jordan, but he did not approve of all of Al-Zarqawi's actions in Iraq, and recently a dispute has developed between Al-Maqdisi and ultra-radicals who claim to perpetuate Al-Zarqawi's legacy. [22]

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi

In a statement posted on his website on August 15, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi accused Hamas of behaving just like the Arab regimes. He notes that he himself and other jihadist sheikhs had repeatedly called on their followers not to clash with Hamas, and he asserts that the jihadists in Gaza had accepted this advice, but that Hamas for its part had not refrained from attacking the jihadists. He has harsh words about the events in Rafah: "The pure blood that flowed from Sheikh Abu Al-Nur Al-Maqdisi and his brothers today, and the blood of the brothers in Jaysh Al-Islam that flowed before - for no fault other than that they said 'Allah alone is our Lord, and we will not accept that his law be changed' - we will not forget this blood, and will not forgive those who spilled it. This is because it is not our right to do so…" In addition to the usual doctrinal criticisms, he accuses Hamas of running a dictatorship and considering those who refuse to ally themselves with Iran and Hizbullah to be "tenth-class citizens" whose lives are not respected. Nonetheless, and despite a ratcheting-up of his rhetoric, he writes in his statement that he continues to oppose fighting against Hamas. [23]

Another highly influential jihadist cleric who wrote about the events in Rafah was Abu Basir Al-Tartusi, a Syrian national living in London. Like Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, he wrote that he had counseled those who sought his opinion in the past to not enter into conflict with Hamas. He is explicit that the reason for this was merely pragmatic, stemming from Gaza's precarious regional situation and so as not to provide enemies with ammunition to use against both the jihadists and Hamas. But the events in Rafah led him to break his silence, and in his latest statement Al-Tartusi excoriates the Hamas movement.

Abu Basir Al-Tartusi

According to Al-Tartusi, Hamas - like the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood - is soft on Allah's enemies and hard on Allah's friends; it fights against the salafi jihadis because it does not want anyone else to speak for Islam, and in order to please the Iranians, the Arab regimes, the Crusaders, and the Jews. In destroying mosques and homes and arresting mujahideen it has done everything the Zionists do, and in addition has become a loyal defender of Israel's borders, just like the rest of its Arab neighbors - all this in addition to Hamas having adopted infidel democracy. In consequence, Al-Tartusi writes: "How long can I address my brothers and require them to bear things steadfastly and to refrain from demanding their rights and from [defending] that which is sacred, out of a concern for the general good and so as not to provide our enemies ammunition? [You,] the Hamas leadership, must know that there is a limit to people's willingness to endure iniquity and [the violation of] their rights and their blood, and if things get out of hand… you will have no one to blame but yourselves…"

Al-Tartusi then addresses members of Hamas' armed forces and tells them that the shari'a forbids them to remain in Hamas or to support them in any way. [24]

What is common to both Al-Maqdisi and Al-Tartusi is the divide between rhetoric and action. While both sharply denounce Hamas and impute to them acts of apostasy, neither has yet sanctioned fighting against them.

The Jihadist Forum Moderators

While the jihadist forum moderators are anonymous (or at best pseudonymous), they are among the most powerful people in the jihadist world. They are the gatekeepers, in that they control the degree of access one has to the public. Communiqués, books, and videos can be left in the general forum, promoted to a featured post or a banner, or, alternatively, removed; forum members often trust the moderators' judgment to give them an indication of the ideological conformity and importance of a given group.

The two most important jihadist forums are Shumukh Al-Islam and Al-Falluja; both took the unusual step of issuing statements of their own on the Rafah events. Shumukh Al-Islam's was a declaration of war: "We declare war on every tyrant who has taken democracy as a religion. We see no difference between the tyrants [of] Arab [states] who rule by something other than Allah's law and the tyrants in Gaza." [25]

The Al-Falluja statement called Hamas "the Hamas of apostasy and hypocrisy" and "dogs of the sons of Zion" and wrote that the Rafah massacre would go down in the history of massacres of the Palestinians. It was more guarded than the Shumukh forum, however: it still called on Hamas to "repent, before the day comes when repentance and regret are of no use." [26]

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The banner of the Al-Falluja jihadist forum

Another popular forum, Ansar Al-Mujahideen, added a fixed banner on its homepage reading: "It has been [10] days since the declaration of the Islamic Emirate in Palestine," and dedicated most of its other banners to reactions to the events in Rafah. [27] (This "Emirate" banner is patterned on a similar one that many forums have for Al-Qaeda's "Islamic State of Iraq").

The Shabakat Al-Mujahideen Al-Iliktroniyya forum issued a statement pledging allegiance specifically to the Emir of the newly-formed Monotheism and Jihad Group and calling on him to assume leadership of the Islamic Emirate. Since the Monotheism and Jihad Group has so far done nothing but issue two communiqués, this is a strong indication that there is a prior connection between it and the moderator(s) of this website. [28]

Grassroots Pressure on the Al-Qaeda Leadership

In the period preceding the events of the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque a clear gap had opened up between the Al-Qaeda leadership and the jihadist grassroots regarding Hamas. The clearest example of this divide came when Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid, senior Al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan, said that "we and Hamas share the same ideology and the same doctrine." This statement drew strong reactions on the jihadist forums, and led the influential jihadist cleric Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi to write an essay in response in which he expounded on the problems with Hamas and asserted that "we share neither the same ideology nor the same doctrine." [29]

In the wake of the events in Rafah the jihadist grassroots are more radical than ever with regard to Hamas. "Abu Shadia," a highly-ranked member of Al-Falluja, wrote a document called "Ten Practical Steps in Confronting Hamas." Among his proposed steps are preparation for military conflict and infiltration of Hamas' military wing. [30] In the thread where the Swords of Justice Brigade claimed to have kidnapped Hamas agents, many responded "slaughter, slaughter!" with some even urging the group to videotape the executions "Zarqawi-style." [31]

A vivid illustration of this divide was a meeting between jihadists and Hussein bin Mahmud, a sheikh whose true identity is unknown but who, unlike Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi or Al-Tartusi, is considered part of Al-Qaeda itself. The transcript of the meeting was posted by a member of the Al-Falluja forum called "rooooh," who has recently been Hussein bin Mahmud's conduit to the jihadist Internet:

"… The brother: What is your view on the brothers in the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque in Rafah?

"The sheikh: Regarding what in particular?

"The brother: Regarding their call [for the establishment of the Islamic Emirate].

"The sheikh: They surprised us by announcing this call in this way, just like they surprised everyone. It all happened quickly…

"Another brother: Some of the brothers compared this to the events of the Red Mosque [in Pakistan].

"The sheikh: You need to be familiar with the [various] considerations, the claims, and the reliability of the individuals before you reach a judgment… You have just judged without knowledge. You should have investigated and asked reliable scholars, and then judged…

"One of the brothers: Sheikh, we want to know your view on the matter.

"The sheikh: I don't have all the facts. But it seems to me that the brothers [at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque] were overly hasty…

"A brother: Sheikh, what should have been done?

"The sheikh: Clearheaded people should have mediated between the two groups [i.e. Hamas and those at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque] to stop this tragedy before it happened…

"A brother: The brothers on the [jihadist] forums pronounced Hamas and the Al-Qassam [Brigades, Hamas' military wing] apostates, as well as everyone who killed these brothers [at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque].

"The Sheikh: Hamas is going from bad to worse in its stance on the mujahideen, and we ask Allah to guide them…

"A brother: Sheikh, don't you think the brothers were right to pronounce Hamas apostates?

"The sheikh: I have told you time and again that takfir is not pronounced so easily. This is a pronunciation of takfir against individuals, and not just against a kind of behavior [in the abstract]. The brothers must not plunge into this without knowledge… Perhaps in this matter cowardice is better for one's religion than bravery.

"A brother: We want you to take a definitive position on the events.

"The sheikh: Wait to hear what your commanders [i.e. the Al-Qaeda commanders] say…

"A brother: Why should we wait for clarification when the matter is as clear as day?

"The sheikh: If you think the matter is as clear as day then don't wait for anyone. As for those who are like me, they will wait [for the Al-Qaeda commanders to express their view]…

"A brother: Some are calling to take revenge for the blood of the brothers.

"The sheikh: Take revenge on whom?

"A brother: On Hamas and the Al-Qassam [Brigades].

"The sheikh: If [the jihadists and Hamas] occupy themselves with one another, who will stand on the Gaza border and confront the Jews?..."

When pressed, Sheikh Hussein bin Mahmud then gave his opinion of Hamas, which in essence was that it was going down the wrong path and that it should be called back to the right one and hopefully work together with the mujahideen. Then he asked those at the meeting:

"The sheikh: What is your own view of the events?

"A brother: We are with the brothers in the [Ibn Taymiyya] Mosque, and have no respect for Hamas from this day on.

"The sheikh: Are you all of this opinion?

"(The brothers remain silent.)

"The sheikh: In any event, we will wait to hear what the [Al-Qaeda] commanders say…"

Hussein bin Mahmud's words were met with unprecedented criticism on the jihadist forums, where he has generally been very popular. The first time the transcript was posted, the criticism was such that the moderator took the unusual step of closing the thread to comments. [32]

Conclusion

The surprise uprising in Rafah has served as a powerful catalyst in turning Hamas into a primary enemy of the jihadists. The grassroots, as represented by the groups in Gaza and the jihadist forums, was already radical on this issue and adhered more closely to the views of the independent cleric Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi than to the Al-Qaeda leadership. Al-Maqdisi and the more established groups in Gaza are still wary of engaging in all-out war with Hamas, but a combination of grassroots pressure and continued Hamas measures against the salafi jihadis could push them over the edge.

If Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi is really behind the Monotheism and Jihad Group in Palestine, it could potentially emerge as a united jihadist faction that would be a more effective challenge to Hamas. The salafi jihadis obviously cannot compete in terms of material resources, but they will challenge Hamas ideologically and try to pry away rank-and-file members of its armed wing who are already sympathetic to the global jihad. Whatever the future developments in Gaza may be, the episode of the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque and its aftermath will likely force the senior Al-Qaeda leadership to either reverse course and take a harder line against Hamas, or else see itself cede authority on the issue to alternative jihadist leaders.

*Daniel Lav is director of the Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor.

Endnotes:

[1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), August 16, 2009; http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79199, August 16, 2009.

[2] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1729¶m=GJN, August 13, 2009.

[3] For instance, in his latest video Ayman Al-Zawahiri praised Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and 'Abd Al-'Aziz Al-Rantisi; http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=77119, August 3, 2009.

[4] For more on tensions between Al-Qaeda and Hamas see http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=2858%C2%B6m=IDTA&auth=c4449c50b819c5298cf70a7a81affc5d, September 15, 2008.

[5] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1286¶m=APT, June 9, 2009; http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1310¶m=APT, June 15, 2009.

[6] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=78531, June 13, 2009.

[7] http://www.janah.ps/archive/bayan/emara.doc.

[8] http://majahden.com/vb/showthread.php?s=0018958eb65c3894075d0c2b4d83326e&t=27724, August 16, 2009.

[9] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1575¶m=GJN, July 23, 2009.

[10] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1624¶m=GJN, July 30, 2009. These problems may have been the reason why the Global Islamic Media Front stopped carrying Jaysh Al-Islam's communiqués, though Jaysh Al-Islam claims that it was the one to dissolve the connection. http://alflojaweb.com/vb/showthread.php?t=69740, June 24, 2009.

[11] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=225¶m=GJN, May 11, 2007.

[12] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=284¶m=APT, June 27, 2007.

[13] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79303, August 16, 2009.

[14] http://www.palvoice.com/index.php?id=19492, August 16, 2009.

[15] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79289, August 16, 2009.

[16] http://www.shmo5alislam.net/vb/showthread.php?t=46969, August 16, 2009.

[17] Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi'ites, and Non-combatant Non-Muslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: Al-Maqdisi vs. His Disciple Al-Zarqawi, September 11, 2005.

[18] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=1039¶m=JT, April 30, 2009.

[19] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79349, August 16, 2009.

[20] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79327, August 16, 2009.

[21] http://al-faloja1.com/vb/showthread.php?t=79329, August 16, 2009.

[22] See Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi'ites, and Non-combatant Non-Muslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: Al-Maqdisi vs. His Disciple Al-Zarqawi, September 11, 2005; and http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=3368¶m=AJT, June 26, 2009.