In an article on the Afghanistan strategy announced December 1, 2009 by U.S. President Barack Obama, senior Indian editor M. J. Akbar criticized Obama for the strategy's July 2011 deadline, saying that it amounts to setting a date with theocracy.
Under the headline "Obama Sets a Date with Theocracy," Akbar, the author of several books, wrote that "the real war in Afghanistan is between modernity and theocracy, but the wrong side is winning that battle," as the Taliban present themselves as "God-fearing, honest, [and] clean."
Akbar also criticized Obama's policy of "strategic partnership with Pakistan," calling it "the biggest problem" and warning that providing U.S. money and weapons to the Pakistani elite will strengthen the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The leading Pakistani daily, the Lahore-based Daily Times, warned in an editorial titled "Cut and Run" that Obama's withdrawal deadline may lead to the emergence of the Taliban in Kabul. The paper noted that in view of the U.S. exit plan, "all Mullah Omar and his fighters now have to do is wait out the U.S. and NATO, and Karzai's regime will fall to them like an overripe plum."
The newspaper also warned that Taliban Emir Mullah Omar continues to maintain his relationship with Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and that the Haqqani Network, a key group of the Taliban continues to work openly with Al-Qaeda from its base in the Pakistani tribal district of North Waziristan.
Significantly, just before the South Waziristan military operation, which began October 18, 2009, the Pakistani Army agreed on a peace deal with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, the two important Taliban commanders who control North Waziristan.
Following are excerpts from M.J. Akbar's article and from the Daily Times editorial:
M. J. Akbar: "Obama Sets a Date With Theocracy"
"Obama is Not Interested in an American Victory in Afghanistan By 2011 – He is Interested in an Obama Victory in America in 2012"
"U.S. President Barack Obama is clearly a post-modernist commander-in-chief. He announced the date of defeat in the Afghan war on the day he sent more troops in the hope of victory. The day American forces begin to leave Afghanistan in 2011, as promised by Mr. Obama, the Taliban will begin their countdown to Kabul.
"It is now clear to the Taliban what has been obvious to many observers. Mr. Obama is not interested in an American victory in Afghanistan by 2011. He is interested in an Obama victory in America in 2012. He wants to campaign as the president who brought the boys home without giving the impression that he has been weak in the process.
"He inherited an Afghan war with some 10,000 American soldiers in combat. That figure has been short-tracked upwards to 100,000, partly because Mr. Obama purchased his way into the muscular pro-war segment of the American vote by criticizing Iraq and upgrading Afghanistan into the war of necessity. He is paying his dues to that section of American opinion by fighting a cosmetic war. The Taliban have often said that while NATO has a clock, they have time. In 2011, irrespective of ground conditions, the NATO clock will go into reverse sweep.
"The enigma of this Afghan war, the fifth against a Western power since 1840, is located exactly where it was in the other four. It lies in the meaning of victory and defeat. For the occupier, victory means subjugation of the ruling authority to its will. For the defenders, it means the departure of foreign troops from Afghan foreign soil. Afghan fighters in the 19th century did not want to shape the way the British Raj [rule] should be run, and they resented the idea that they should be told how Afghanistan should be run. In the 20th century, the jihadis did not want to destroy communism in Moscow (that they played a great role in actually doing so is incidental). They simply did not want communist soldiers in Kabul and Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif."
The Pakistani Elite "Will Have Unexpressed Reservations About America's War Against the Afghan Taliban – Since the Latter Have Been, and Will Continue To Be, Pakistan's Ally in the Geopolitics of South Asia"
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"The Afghan war of the 21st century could have been, and should have been, different, because a terrorist group with sanctuary from the Taliban provoked America. Eight years later, roles are reversing for the Taliban, and its allies have, increasingly, in the Afghan mind, begun to occupy nationalist space. Washington, DC, made a basic error at the outset, when it confused Al-Qaeda with the whole of Afghanistan, gradually shifting the focal point of the war. This was understandable in the heat of 2001, but less so with the passage of time. Privately, Gen. Pervez Musharraf would surely have suggested this, but subtleties were lost on the Bush White House.
"Mr. Obama may be erring in the other direction. He has announced the three pillars of his Afghan policy: A strategic partnership with Pakistan empowered by finance and weapons; the creation of a 'military condition' within 18 months that will enable 'transition'; and 'a civilian surge that reinforces positive action.' The third is the kind of gobbledygook that bemuses friends and consoles office-bearers of the speechwriters' union. Does Mr. Obama expect Afghan President Hamid Karzai to surge towards Kandahar in 2011, wafting on doves of peace?
"The biggest problem may lie in the first proposition. Pakistan does not have the good fortune of being 8,000 miles from Afghanistan. Islamabad's ruling elite, including the armed forces, will display full commitment in the war against Al-Qaeda, where and when it can be found, and against the Pakistani Taliban, because both are serious threats to the Pakistani state and system. But it will have unexpressed reservations about America's war against the Afghan Taliban, since the latter have been and will continue to be Pakistan's ally in the geopolitics of South Asia."
"Pakistan's War Within its Own Country Has Become, Willy-Nilly, America's War, but America's War in Afghanistan Has Not Become Pakistan's War"
"Pakistan's war within its own country has become, willy-nilly, America's war, but America's war in Afghanistan has not become Pakistan's war. Washington, for reasons unknown and incomprehensible, does not get this.
"In fact, America's primary partner in the war against the Afghan Taliban should be India, not Pakistan, since both nations have an ideological commitment against the forces of theocracy, as well as a strategic interest in keeping the Taliban out of Kabul. Pakistan has no such motivation.
"The best period in the troubled history of Pak-Afghan relations was when the Taliban were in power, since the Taliban looked at foreign policy through the prism of Islamic brotherhood rather than just the compulsions of national interest."
"The Real War in Afghanistan is Between Modernity and Theocracy – But the Wrong Side is Winning That Battle... While [America] Seeks Friends Across the World Who Reflect Its Own Values, It Makes Friends with Those Who Ruin Its Reputation"
"The real war in Afghanistan is between modernity and theocracy, but the wrong side is winning that battle. In the last eight years, for many Afghans, modernity has become synonymous with corruption, cronyism, and non-Pashtun warlords – the three hallmarks of the Karzai regime – while the Taliban have revived their image as God-fearing, honest, clean and able to offer stability and security in the villages.
"It is an American tragedy that while it seeks friends across the world who reflect its own values, it makes friends with those who ruin its reputation."[1]
Pakistani Daily: "Cut and Run"
"All Mullah Omar and His Fighters Now Have To Do is Wait Out the U.S. and NATO, and Karzai's Regime Will Fall To Them Like An Overripe Plum"
"U.S. President Barack Obama's much-awaited announcement of his new Afghan strategy has evoked alarm and disappointment in equal measure. Obama has committed to sending 30,000 additional U.S. troops, but also announced a withdrawal date starting July 2011. The thrust of his message is that the U.S. cannot fight an unending war in Afghanistan and therefore must seek an honorable exit. How honorable it may turn out to be, given the ground realities, is a moot point.
"As if the U.S. president's 'cut and run' strategy were not alarming enough, his NATO allies are even less willing to come forward with additional troops, some even [with] a continuing presence. The West as a whole then, led by the U.S., seems inclined once again to turn its face away from benighted Afghanistan.
"The 'sweetener' meant to make the virtual surrender to the Taliban, [which will come] sooner or later, more palatable trots out the fiction that in the period up to July 2011, the additional troops will train an Afghan army and police force capable of holding their own against the tough Taliban. Based on the track record of the last eight years in this respect, this seems unattainable. The numbers targeted have yet to be reached, and the quality of the trainees leaves much to be desired. They are by no stretch of the imagination capable of standing up to the Taliban and defending their country against an extremist takeover a la 1996. Nor are they likely to be, Washington's wishful thinking notwithstanding (actually, this may also be the attempt at justifying the impending abandonment of the Afghan people to their fate).
"The Pakistani military establishment, which has been working towards just such an outcome since 9/11 by attacking Al-Qaeda and saving the Afghan Taliban for a rainy day (one just arrived, courtesy of Obama), must be laughing all the way to the bank, followed closely by the Afghan Taliban. All Mullah Omar and his fighters now have to do is wait out the U.S. and NATO, and Karzai's regime will fall to them like an overripe plum."
There is No Sign that Mullah Omar...Has Abandoned His Alliance" With Osama bin Laden; "The Haqqani Shura, Based in North Waziristan, is Widely Believed To Be Openly Working with Al-Qaeda"
"The implications of such a scenario are scary for the region, the world, and most of all for Pakistan. There is no sign that Mullah Omar, despite publicly keeping his distance from Al-Qaeda since 9/11, has abandoned his alliance with his 'guest' of yore, Osama bin Laden. The Haqqani Shura based in North Waziristan is widely believed to be openly working with Al-Qaeda. That implies that if the Mullah Omars and Haqqanis are once again ensconced in Kabul (even two years from now), you could be excused for thinking that Osama bin Laden would not be too far away. The antediluvian regime of the extremists would once again be foisted by force of arms and with the backing of the Pakistani military establishment on the long-suffering Afghan people.
"Such a rejuvenated regime that hosts Al-Qaeda once again would threaten U.S. and Western interests globally. It may prove too wild a horse for our military establishment to ride, let alone control (remember Mullah Omar's intransigence in the face of Pakistani advice in 2001 to surrender, or at the very least expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan?). Even more worryingly, the restored Taliban rulers in Kabul may find irresistible the temptation to fish in the troubled waters in which Pakistan finds itself, by backing the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. After all, in comparison with ruined Afghanistan, control over a nuclear-armed Pakistan may be too mouthwatering to ignore."
"The U.S. and the West Have Proved Fickle Allies... Afghanistan is About To Be Left to Its Own Devices Once Again"
"The U.S. and the West have proved fickle allies. Their public at home has no stomach for foreign wars, especially after the shenanigans of Bush and Blair. Imperialism is passé. Afghanistan is about to be left to its own devices once again. The world may, however, once again live to regret it."[2]
Endnotes:
[1] Sunday Pioneer, India, December 6, 2009.
[2] Daily Times, Pakistan, December 3, 2009. The text has been lightly edited for clarity.
