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December 1, 2010 Special Dispatch No. 3410

Lebanese Columnist: If Understandings Not Reached in Two Weeks, or if Indictment is Issued in Al-Hariri Assassination, Hizbullah Will Implement Secret Plans, Possibly Including Targeting of Lebanese Leaders, UNIFIL

December 1, 2010
Lebanon | Special Dispatch No. 3410

In an article published today (November 30, 2010) in the daily Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hizbullah, Lebanese columnist Fida 'Itani states that there are two more weeks to reach understandings between Hizbullah and the March 14 Forces, and that if the indictments in the Al-Hariri assassination case are issued before these understandings are reached, Hizbullah will set in motion secret operational plans that have been prepared in advance. He explains that this will not lead to civil war, because Hizbullah will act against individual leaders, while the Lebanese military will restrain Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces. However, 'Itani does mention that "the worst-case scenario" may come to pass vis-à-vis UNIFIL, if international forces try to intervene.

'Itani also notes that Hizbullah's strategy in the recent years has been one of outward expansion, to the East and the West, and hints that harming Hizbullah in Lebanon will cause extremist groups to emerge around the world - groups that "that do not follow any coherent political rationale" and will make the world miss Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda.

Following are excerpts from the article:[1]

Hizbullah Took Advantage of Ahmadinejad's Visit to Carry Out "Special Maneuvers"

"In the middle of last summer, Hizbullah's top leadership disappeared and became unavailable, and stopped following the day-to-day management of the party [i.e., Hizbullah]… They held a series of closed meetings, in which the party examined the situation and the options, and formulated plans for the next stage. The [party] heads signed the operational maps and documents [detailing] all the options for the next stage. The details of the plans and options naturally remain secret. Afterwards, the party heads went back to their routine tasks.

"A few days later, the various sectors began to receive orders: They must [all] prepare for the next stage, taking all options into consideration. Each sector must go to work and refresh all its dossiers on special and emergency situations, and the ways to deal with them… This activity took little time, [because] everything is always ready, but the plans still need to be refreshed from time to time. The novelty was that the range of options grew wider for all the sectors…

"Over the latter part of the summer, all the sectors did their homework. [This meant reaching] full preparedness for [any state] - peace, emergency, or war - in all the sectors: the political, financial, media, party, popular, medical, security, and military [sectors], as well as the resistance. Everything was ready.

"Then, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah began to broadcast a series of speeches on the [expected] indictments, the international tribunal, the false witnesses, and the struggle against Israel, the U.S., and the local spies…

"Then the party took advantage of the Iranian president's visit in Lebanon to employ all its forces from a number of sectors. Special maneuvers were repeated several times, some of them administrative and others on the ground, to drill carrying out some of the action plans, in preparation for the worst-case scenarios.

"Today it has become clear that the March 14 Forces are buying time with honeyed speeches, and that the Al-Mustaqbal faction is using its people in the media to try to derail the debate by means of loud and attention-grabbing political reactions and fireworks -- [all] meant to lead the resistance to the guillotine based on evidence that is no more than statements by false witnesses and transcripts of phone conversations. Hizbullah, the military intelligence [apparatus] and the Media Ministry proved the extent of Israel's involvement in [creating this evidence], thereby proving [this evidence] groundless."

If Understandings Not Reached in Two Weeks, Hizbullah Will Set Its Plans in Motion

"In the coming days, the two main sides in the conflict, namely Syria and Saudi Arabia, are to exchange suggestions for resolving it - a stage that is to last ten days according to some, and two weeks according to others. [Afterwards,] the time for talk will be over. If U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jeffery Feltman succeeds in pressuring the [the international tribunal] into speeding up [the process] and issuing indictments against Hizbullah [by the end of] December, Hizbullah's leaders will refuse any attempt to contact them regarding the internal situation [in Lebanon], and will break out a series of pre-prepared plans and begin implementing them on the ground. However, if the issuing of the indictments will be postponed until next March, as Saudi Arabia has promised the Syrian leadership, the political conflict will enter a new phase, calm and stable, but more difficult for the March 14 Forces…

"However, some stress that the extension granted [to the sides to continue their mediation] efforts will not last more than 15 days. There is an assumption that, during this time, the Syrian leadership will present the Saudi leadership with Hizbullah's suggested solution. But that is not so. [This period is intended] for reaching final understandings on the main issues under contention… Should these efforts fail to yield the desired results, Hizbullah will know that it has presented everyone with decisive evidence [that Hizbullah was not involved in the assassination]. In that case, the stage of waiting for the indictments will be very unique [in character].

"Hizbullah is relying on tried and true tactics to keep its secrets, and it knows more than it is revealing. It has the same figures, documents and intelligence data that is available to some of the other countries in the region regarding certain issues that gravely concern it, especially with regards to the attack it is facing in Lebanon.

"The tactic of maintaining secrecy is also applied to [certain] plans, scenarios, and operational moves that Hizbullah means to implement regarding each of the main issues. Therefore, leaks [from Hizbullah] are very rare. The few people who know what has been prepared are the ones who signed their names to the written plans and maps, which will remain secret until the time comes..."

There Will Be No Gunmen on the Streets; Hizbullah will Target Lebanese Leaders

"However, based on the unfolding of the struggle and on [past] experience, and [based on] the little information that has been leaked by the Hizbullah leadership and by people who have met with these top leaders, several points can be stressed, in ascending order of dangerousness:

"1. The attempt to involve the Palestinian forces in [Lebanon's] internal struggles - [is] a bad idea that will not be realized…

"2. Should [Samir Geagea's] Lebanese Forces be involved in any operation of a military, security, or intelligence nature, [Michel Aoun's] Free National Current and Hizbullah will not intervene, directly or indirectly. It is the Lebanese military that will play a significant role in suppressing any unusual events [involving Geagea's] Lebanese Forces…

"3. Some in the Al-Mustaqbal leadership imagine that there will be presence of Hizbullah gunmen on the streets [in areas] with a Sunni majority. They have been raising [all sorts of] creative ideas of drowning Hizbullah and its warriors in a quagmire of civil strife, so as to tarnish its glory as a resistance movement… But the warriors will not be directly present in the streets. They will carry out flash operations against specific leaders…

"4. The state of the Lebanese sects is such that it does not allow anyone to harp on the theme of fitna [civil strife] and frighten Hizbullah with [warnings about] spontaneous sectarian reaction. Especially since the mid-level cadres which were counted upon to incite [the masses] with sectarian [propaganda] – [such as Sheikh 'Omar Bakri and Lebanese Mufti Muhammad Rashid Cabaña] -- have withdrawn [from this activity] completely…

"5. The worst-case scenario is that sanctions will be imposed on Lebanon at the request of the U.S., in order to compel it to hand over [the individuals] named by the international tribunal's indictment as responsible for Al-Hariri's assassination. This scenario involves an attempt to create internal problems and start a process of internal erosion, while putting pressure on the [Lebanese] citizens… If the country is placed under siege, the internal conflicts in Lebanon will be enough to rapidly lead to civil war…

"6… In the Al-Mustaqbal camp, there are those who think that Saudi Arabia's current situation – [namely] King Abdallah's illness and the assumed decline in the influence of his son, Prince 'Abd Al-'Asia – will necessarily advance [the cause] of the axis that wants the indictment published as soon as possible, according to the pace [dictated by] the U.S… In meetings with senior American officials, and during discussions on the major issues, the Saudis expressed their fear of [facing] many [additional] defeats in the region, especially [their fear] of losing all their investments in Lebanon, after they have already lost their political investments in Iraq…"

The Worst-Case Scenario Regarding UNIFIL has been Taken into Account

"7. Six Western embassies, including those of four countries that participate in the international emergency forces [i.e., UNIFIL] operating in South Lebanon, have carried out security drills [and practiced] evacuating leaders, civilians, diplomats, and soldiers through Lebanon's border with Israel -- a move which required a lot of preparation, especially since it necessitates opening the border crossings between these two enemy countries. This is something the leadership of the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah] will not allow, because it is determined to keep the borders closed, even if this necessitates opening fire…

"8. Any attempt to implement the options of international [intervention] in Lebanon will lead to the realization of the worst-case [scenario] regarding the international emergency forces [i.e., UNIFIL], as Hizbullah deputy secretary-general Sheikh Na'im Qassem once said, when he pointed out that Hizbullah would fulfill its commitment to protect these forces, but that after the issuing of the indictments, nobody would be able to predict the reaction of the residents towards the [UNIFIL] forces.

"9. Reliance on any kind of force, pressure, coercion, or sanctions in order to compel Lebanon to surrender wanted Hizbullah members to the international tribunal will lead to further deterioration of the central government in Lebanon, and will increase the security vacuum…"

Weakening Hizbullah Will Engender Radical Movements Worldwide

"Finally, Hizbullah's strategy in the recent years has been directed outward. After completing its moves within the country, it began expanding outward, to the East and West. Even if Allah allows the West and its allies in Lebanon to deal a severe blow to Hizbullah and the Lebanese resistance, weakening or eliminating its central leadership will cause repercussions in more than one place around the world. Then we will again hear about the [emergence of groups called] 'Global Jihad Organization II' or '[Organization of the] Oppressed III,' or of other groups that do not follow any coherent political rationale, and [the world] will miss Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda..."

Endnote:

[1] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), November 30, 2010.

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