November 20, 2014 Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1133

The IRGC-Affiliated Fars News Agency Reveals What The U.S. Is Demanding In Iran-P5+1 Negotiations

November 20, 2014 | By Yossi Mansharof and U. Kafash*
Iran, Iran | Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1133


On November 18, 2014, less than a week before the November 24 deadline of the extension of the Iran-P5+1's Joint Plan of Action, Iran's Fars news agency, which is affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), revealed what the American administration is demanding from Tehran in the nuclear negotiations. According to Fars, the demands are:

  • On the issue of uranium enrichment: Iran must cut to 500 kg its reserves of uranium that it enriched to 3.5%, stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility and transform it into a theoretical research facility, and stop conducting tests of advanced-generation centrifuges. According to Fars, there is now an oral agreement that Iran may maintain a reserve of two metric tons of uranium enriched to 3.5% and that it may operate 4,700 first-generation centrifuges.

  • On the plutonium track issue: Iran must switch the heavy water reactor at Arak (i.e. the plutonium track) to a regular reactor generating power using enriched fuel (i.e. the uranium track), and may not conduct research on reusing spent nuclear fuel rods, which would allow it to develop a nuclear bomb on the plutonium track.

  • On the missile issue: Iran must restrict the range of its missiles to a maximum of 150 km.

  • On the international conventions issue: Iran must join, and ratify, the international nuclear conventions and regulations, that is, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allowing snap inspections at every Iranian facility, including military ones.

  • On the sanctions issue: The sanctions on Iran will be lifted gradually over a period of up to 30 years.

Noting that Tehran had rejected the proposal outright, Fars, which represents the IRGC, called the Joint Plan of Action and the current U.S. proposal an American-Western plot aimed at dismantling the Iranian nuclear program. It should be noted that this Fars expose may not be the final American text, since it states that oral agreements have been reached on several issues.

Below are the main points of the Fars text:

What The U.S. Is Demanding From Tehran In The Final Agreement

"The U.S. emphases for a final agreement with Iran are as follows:

1. "The heavy water facility at Arak, which can manufacture plutonium and radioisotopes and generate electricity, is to be transformed into a regular power-generating facility that uses non-natural fuel (enriched fuel). This will mean the closure of the [heavy water, i.e. plutonium track] unit at Arak.

"In this framework, the Americans even rejected [a proposal] to reduce the [number of] fuel rods at the current Arak facility from 150 to 20. It should be noted that we are now nearing the end of the effective life expectancy of the Tehran reactor, and if the Arak heavy water facility is not activated soon, we will face a serious challenge in providing radioisotopes to treat nearly 1,000,000 patients in the country.

2.  "In the talks, an oral agreement has been reached on an enrichment capability of only 4,700 centrifuges, with a very small gas injection.

3. "Research and development of centrifuges will not proceed past first-generation centrifuges, and Fordow will become a [theoretical] research center where [actual] research and development is not conducted.

4. "There will be no research on the reuse of nuclear fuel rods.

5. "[Iran will] cut back reserves of 3.5% [uranium] from 8.5 [metric] tons to 500 kg. (According to some reports, an oral agreement was reached on two tons).

"There is also an option for extending the talks; a U.S.-Europe condition [for such an extension] would be [Iran's] oxidation [i.e. transforming the gas into powder] of a significant part of its 3.5% [enriched uranium] reserves.

6. "Iran will commit to signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol and will also accept more extensive supervision and visits [by IAEA supervisors] than [specified] in the additional protocols.     

7. "The maximum range of Iran's missiles will be 150 km.

8. "Iran will formally accept and ratify the CTBT convention for the comprehensive prevention of nuclear testing.

9. "It should be noted that the supervision mentioned in the CTBT convention completely contradicts the independence and security of its member states of this convention. Under its clauses, in addition to permission to take aerial photographs the supervisory team can freely arrive at any site in the country to carry out its tasks - even to the President's bureau etc. 

10. "The normalization of the Iran dossier will take a very long time (30 years).

"Clearly, the West hopes that when the [current] generation [in Iran] that promotes Iran's nuclear rights in [Iran's] social and political arenas is replaced, Iran will be stopped from advancing its nuclear industry due to the wearing out of its nuclear facilities and parts, and due to [a situation in which] Iran will lag behind with out-of-date technology.

"The measures taken by the U.S. at the Geneva talks, and the eight clauses in the final agreement with Iran, constitute a strategic plan with three phases:

a) "stopping the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program

b) "rolling back the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program

c) "dismantling the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program.

"It appears that the phase of stopping [the program] has been implemented with the Joint Plan of Action [the Geneva document]. In order to extend the talks and the phase of [Iran's] surrender, the phase of setting back [Iran's nuclear program will now be implemented. The third phase (that is, dismantling Iran's nuclear program) will effectively be implemented over a period of 10 to 20, even 30 years, on the pretext that this is the period of quarantine [on Iran that is required] for the sanctions to be removed."


*Y. Mansharof is a research fellow at MEMRI; U. Kafash is a research associate at MEMRI.

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