The following are excerpts from a speech by Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. IRINN TV aired this speech on September 20, 2005. TO VIEW THIS CLIP VISIT: http://memritv.org/clip/en/864.htm.
To view a page of MEMRI TV clips devoted to Iran 's defense program, visit: http://memritv.org/clip/en/135.htm.
Larijani: "The IAEA regulations and Article 3 of the [Additional] Protocol state that countries should inform the IAEA 180 days before carrying out further material conversion. In our case, this means we need to inform the IAEA 180 days before injecting the material [UF6] into the centrifuges. Nothing more. We have not injected material at Natanz. The stories about Iran operating secretly for two decades are nothing but stories. Establishing the UCF is not an infringement, and neither is Natanz.
"The important thing is what we do, and not the deceitful theory of reading others' intentions. This is also a new thing – they say: 'We know that Iran 's intention is to pursue nuclear weapons.' Do you have a device that reads intentions? This is the same theory as America 's theory of preemptive measures. [ America ] has said: 'Because we suspect someone's intentions, we should take preemptive measures against him.' The interesting thing is that the Americans have nuclear weapons. They used them in the war against Japan, and yet they still think it's necessary to read the intentions of a country that has peaceful nuclear technology.
"This aggressiveness is unacceptable in today's world. You have pressured North Korea for two years and consequently, it withdrew from the NPT and IAEA. What did you do after these two years? You accepted North Korea 's nuclear program. In other words, you agreed that North Korea would have nuclear technology and uranium enrichment, but that it would not be diverted to the production of weapons. You could have achieved this from the start. You simply applied too much pressure on it. Western countries should learn a lesson from the experience of the North Korean nuclear dossier. Applying such pressure is like going against an entire nation.
"I recommend once again that you pay attention to the conduct of North Korea. After two years of dealings with North Korea, what have you got? You have accepted North Korea 's nuclear technology in the field of uranium enrichment. So accept ours now. We have no problem. We don't want anything else.
"What Iran is saying is very clear and very peaceful: We will not turn towards military nuclear technology. We accept the NPT regulations, and we are willing to negotiate with all the countries and to share [our nuclear program] with other countries. This is a very peaceful approach. If there are countries that do not want to listen to peaceful language, and if they want to threaten Iran, and to impose on Iran regulations in the IAEA that are beyond the [Additional] Protocol and the NPT, or to refer Iran's dossier to the Security Council – Iran will have serious doubts about implementing the [Additional] Protocol. Moreover, [ Iran ] will have no hesitations about enrichment. Therefore, these obstacles are not welcome. In my opinion, any reasonable person will understand that although Iran proposes these peaceful conditions, if you want to use aggressive language, Iran will have no choice but to protect its technological accomplishments by withdrawing from the NPT and from the regulations of the [Additional] Protocol, and to begin enrichment."