In an article published in a leading Pakistani daily on the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan's then-military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf defended his decision to support the U.S.-led war against terror. Attacking Pakistani critics who have argued that his decision pushed Pakistan towards the brink, he said that Pakistan's refusal to support the U.S. would have harmed Pakistan's interests.
"India would have been delighted with such a response from us. This would surely have been a foolhardy, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests – our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause – would have been irreparably compromised. Indeed, we might have put our very territorial integrity at risk," he said.
In the article titled "I Stand By My Decision," Gen. Musharraf set out a series of demands made by the U.S. at that time to facilitate the U.S.-led invasion of the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. He said that except for some demands relating to Pakistani strategic installations, most of the demands were acceptable to him.
In response to a U.S. demand for "blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations," he wrote: "I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from all sensitive areas." This flight corridor involved the use of two airbases, at Shamsi in Baluchistan and at Jacobabad in Sindh provinces, according to the article.
Following are excerpts from his article:[1]
"It Was... Communicated to Me That 'If Pakistan Was Against the U.S., Then It Should Be Prepared To Be Bombed Back To the Stone Age'
"It was a day that changed the world. Pakistan was deeply affected by the event that took place 10 years ago today. Many in Pakistan believe that we might have been better off if we had not complied with the United Nations resolutions. I am afraid these critics have little or no knowledge of history and on-ground facts as they existed then. It may be instructive to revisit the events and the rationale behind our decision to comply with UN resolutions passed in the wake of that most traumatic event..."
"[My military secretary] came up to me during an important meeting with the Karachi corps commander and whispered that an aircraft had crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. As we watched in horror the second plane crashing into the second tower, I knew that the world as we knew it would change and I mentally braced myself for what I knew would be a make-or-break period in our history.
"Smoke from the burning aircraft fuel and the dust and debris from the largest building in the world made the scene look like a nuclear explosion. A multitude of thoughts raced through my mind. The world's most powerful country had been attacked on its own soil, with its own aircraft used as missiles. This was a great tragedy and a great blow to the ego of the superpower. America was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear. If the perpetrator turned out to be Al-Qaeda, then that wounded bear would come charging straight at us.
"Sure enough, the next morning the call came. My friend Gen. Colin Powell was absolutely candid: 'You are either with us or against us.' This was a blatant ultimatum. But forewarned is forearmed, and I was ready for this important call. Contrary to some published reports, [i.e.] that the conversation did not go into specifics. I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism, having suffered from it for years, and would fight along with his country against it. I had time to think through exactly what might happen next. It was also communicated to me that 'if Pakistan was against the United States then it should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.'
"I would also like to clear the notion that we accepted all the demands put forward by the U.S. We did not.
"A U.S.-India Nexus [Following 9/11] Would Obviously Have To Trample Pakistan to Reach Afghanistan; Our Airspace and Land Would Have Been Violated"
"I analyzed the situation and took stock of the potential realities. I made a dispassionate analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons. My complete focus was on ensuring that Pakistan was not at the wrong end of a long and bloody reprisal, and to try and steer it through that most turbulent period with as little damage as possible. I also wanted to do the right thing.
"What options did the U.S. have to attack Afghanistan? It wasn't possible from the north, through Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Nor from the west, through Iran. The only viable direction was from the east, through Pakistan. If we did not agree, India was ready to afford all support.
"A U.S.-India nexus would obviously have to trample Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. Our airspace and land would have been violated. Should we then have pitched our forces, especially the Pakistan Air Force, against the combined might of the U.S. and Indian forces?
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"India would have been delighted with such a response from us. This would surely have been a foolhardy, rash and most unwise decision. Our strategic interests – our nuclear capability and the Kashmir cause – would have been irreparably compromised. Indeed, we might have put our very territorial integrity at risk."
"The Upsurge of Religious Extremism Emboldening the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in China is Due to Events in Afghanistan and the Tribal Agencies of Pakistan"
"The economic consequences of confronting the United States and the entire West would also have been devastating. Pakistan's major exports and imports and investments are linked to the United States and the European Union. Our textiles – 60 percent of our export earnings – go to the West. Any sanction on these would have crippled our industry and choked our economy.
"China, our great friend, also has serious apprehensions about Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The upsurge of religious extremism emboldening the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in China is due to events in Afghanistan and the tribal agencies of Pakistan. China would certainly not be too happy if Pakistan sided with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
"Even the Islamic Ummah had no sympathy for the Taliban regime. Turkey and Iran were certainly against the Taliban. The UAE and Saudi Arabia – the only two countries other than Pakistan that had recognized the Taliban regime – had become so disenchanted with the Taliban that they had closed their missions in Kabul.
"This is how I analyzed the losses and harms we would suffer if we took an anti-U.S. stand. At the same time, I was obviously not unmindful of the socio-economic and military gains that would accrue to my country from an alliance with the West."
After 9/11, the U.S. Demanded That Pakistan "Cut Off All Shipments of Fuel to the Taliban... [And Pro-Taliban] Volunteers En Route to Afghanistan"
"On Sept 13, 2001, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, brought me a set of seven demands. These demands had also been communicated to our foreign office.
"1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives at your borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for bin Laden.
"2. Provide the United States with blanket overflight and landing rights to conduct all necessary military and intelligence operations.
"3. Provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence as needed and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbor them, including the use of Pakistan's naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on borders.
"4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases and internal security information to help prevent and respond to terrorist acts perpetrated against the United States, and its friends and allies.
"5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of Sept. 11 and any other terrorist acts against the United States and its friends and allies and curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends and its allies.
"6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
"7. Should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support for the Taliban and assist the United States in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.
"We Refused to Give Any Naval Port or Fighter-Aircraft Bases; We Allowed the U.S. Only Two Bases... And Only for Logistics and Aircraft Recovery"
"Some of these demands, such as 'curb all domestic expressions of support (for terrorism) against the United States, its friends, and its allies,' were ludicrous. How could my government suppress public debate when I had been trying to encourage freedom of expression?
"I also thought that asking us to break off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was neither realistic nor in our interest. The United States too would need us to have access to Afghanistan, at least till the Taliban fell. Also, such decisions are the internal affair of a country and cannot be dictated by anyone. We had no problem with curbing terrorism in all its forms and manifestations..."
"Thus, we had problems only with demands two and three. How could we allow the United States 'blanket overflight and landing rights' without jeopardizing our strategic assets? I offered only a narrow flight corridor that was far from all sensitive areas. Neither could we give the United States 'use of Pakistan's naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.'
"We refused to give any naval port or fighter-aircraft bases. We allowed the United States only two bases – Shamsi in Baluchistan and Jacobabad in Sindh – and only for logistics and aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. We gave no 'blanket permission' for anything.
"The rest of the demands we could live with."
"I Also Met With a Delegation from China and Discussed the Decision with Them [to Support the U.S.-Led War against Terrorism]"
"I took it to the cabinet. I met with a cross-section of society. Between Sept. 18 and Oct. 3, I met intellectuals, top editors, leading columnists, academics, tribal chiefs, students and labor union leaders. I also met with a delegation from China and discussed the decision with them. Then I went to army garrisons all over the country and talked to the soldiers. I thus developed a broad consensus on my decision.
"I am happy that the U.S. government accepted our counter-proposal without any fuss. I am shocked at the aspersion being cast on me: that I readily accepted all preconditions of the United States during the telephone call from Colin Powell.
"I have laid down the rationale of my decision in all its details. Even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not regret it. It was the correct decision and very much in the interest of Pakistan.
"As head of state, I faced many challenges and had to take many difficult decisions. This was easily the most difficult one. I am convinced that it was the right decision and I am confident the majority of my countrymen also think so. I can say, hand on heart, that in all matters I always kept the interest of Pakistan above all else..."
[1] The News (Pakistan), September 11, 2011. The text of the article has been lightly edited for clarity.
