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July 13, 2011
Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.705
Escalating Tensions in Lebanon following Indictment in Al-Hariri Assassination
By: E. B. Picali*

Introduction

On June 30, 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), charged with investigating the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, submitted an indictment to Lebanese Attorney General Sa'id Mirza, along with arrest warrants for four senior Hizbullah officials. Although the STL withheld the details of the indictment and the identities of the accused, various media outlets wasted no time in publishing their names, and Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah admitted, in a July 2 speech, that the accused were members of his organization.

Also on June 30, Prime Minister Najib Mikati's cabinet released its ministerial statement, Clause 14 of which concerns the STL, stating: "The government, out of respect for international resolutions, stresses its commitment to revealing the truth regarding the assassination of the martyr prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri and his companions, and it will follow the activities of the tribunal – which, in principal, was established to reveal the truth and to do justice, free from any politicization or vengefulness and in a manner that does not negatively impact Lebanon's stability, unity, and public safety."[1]

Dispute over the STL's Credibility and the Implications of Its Indictment

Clause 14 is at the center of an ongoing dispute between Lebanon's rival factions - the March 14 Forces on one hand, and the March 8 Forces and Mikati on the other. Not all agree, for instance, that the STL is apolitical, or that revealing the truth will not undermine Lebanon's stability and unity. Nasrallah's statements on July 2, to the effect that Mikati's government must not be asked to surrender the accused to the STL, and that, in any case, no one would succeed in doing so – only heightened tensions between the two rival camps and led to mutual accusations.

I. The Position of the March 14 Forces

At a conference convened several days after the submission of the indictment, the March 14 Forces accused Mikati's government of evading Lebanon's duty to do justice. They denounced the claim that revealing the truth would undermine Lebanon's stability, and expressed their faith in the international tribunal. The conference's closing announcement read:

"O, Lebanese, the time has come for truth and justice... We will not allow some [among us] to confront us with an exploitative and immoral equation, according to which justice constitutes a threat to public safety and will not be carried out in Lebanon even decades from now...[2] Allowing [the assassins] to escape punishment, a situation that has dominated our political life for decades, will legitimize further political assassinations and threaten public safety and coexistence [in Lebanon]!

"Our demand for truth and justice... is for the sake of a stable Lebanon and its enduring peace. Justice is the guarantee and hope of all Lebanese, and it provokes no one but criminals. Justice, especially in the hands of a capable and credible [agent], is now our primary means of defending Lebanon and preventing it from returning to the state it was in before the Cedar Revolution in 2005...

"O, Lebanese, you are now faced with a government that not only staged a coup against democracy, but which, in its ministerial statement, has renounced its commitment to [do] justice – a [pledge] undertaken by the Lebanese state before the Lebanese people and the international community..."

Several resolutions were reached at the conference, including to "ask the Arab governments and the international community not to cooperate with [Mikati's] government if it does not implement [U.N.] Resolution 1757 [establishing the STL]" and to "bring about the collapse of the government... unless the prime minister declares his commitment to implementing Resolution 1757."[3]

The March 14 Forces focused their attack not only on Mikati's government but on the prime minister himself, claiming that he had become a mouthpiece for Hizbullah and that Nasrallah, rather than Mikati, was now effectively running the country.

A statement issued by the Al-Mustaqbal faction said (in response to an announcement by the prime minister, to be quoted below): "The Lebanese, who are well aware that Prime Minister Mikati excels at changing his colors and hiding behind slogans of moderation and the middle path, are not surprised at the harsh blow he dealt this middle path today, or at his total conformity with the mentality and methods of the supreme leader of his government [i.e., Nasrallah]... It is amazing how you staged a coup against yourself, against history, against [your] surroundings, and against the very public that put you in parliament, in order to mouth Hizbullah's statements word for word and use them as a buttress in your attack on Sa'd Al-Hariri and the March 14 Forces."[4]

The March 14 Forces likewise responded to Mikati's statement, in an announcement that read: "...[Mikati] tried to use Clause 14 [of the ministerial statement]... to mislead the public [into thinking that] his government is concerned with doing justice and revealing the truth... [However,] it would seem that Prime Minister Mikati has nothing to do with the ministerial statement... Nasrallah's recent speech [of July 2] is more attuned with this ministerial statement than the prime minister's own remarks. This begs the question: Who is actually the prime minister of Lebanon?"[5]

II. The Position of Prime Minister Mikati

Prime Minister Mikati responded to the March 14 Forces' announcement the day after it was issued. A statement released by the prime ministry said that the March 14 Forces were using Al-Hariri's assassination as political leverage now that they had lost power, and stressed that Mikati and his government were committed to justice:

"[The closing announcement of the March 14 Forces' conference was] a brutal attack on the government and a personal attack on its head, Najib Mikati, using malicious deceptions meant to mislead the public and to unite it against the new government... The [conference's] participants once again exploited the assassination of the martyr Rafiq Al-Hariri and his companions to vent their wrath and enmity toward the government, for reasons known to all...

"Deceiving the public, the [conference] participants claimed that Mikati's government had renounced the demand for justice to which Lebanon had committed itself. But Clause 14 of the government's ministerial statement... emphasizes the [government's commitment to] revealing the truth and doing justice, via the tribunal, vis-à-vis the assassination of the martyr Al-Hariri... This has been confirmed by Mikati [himself] more than once..."[6]

It should be noted that Mikati's announcement made no mention of the issue of Lebanon's stability. However, in an earlier meeting with foreign ambassadors, he said that it was in the interest of all to uncover the truth and protect Lebanon against any threat to its security and stability.[7]

III. The Position of Hizbullah

Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who has often threatened to harm Lebanon's stability should the STL implicate his organization, has avoided such threats since the establishment of the new government. Instead, he has focused on accusing the March 14 Forces of harming the country's stability. In a July 5, 2011 speech marking Hizbullah's "Day of the Wounded," he said: "We in Hizbullah do not barter justice for stability... Nor will we accept such barter, as it constitutes a sort of admission of guilt."[8] In a speech broadcast July 2 on Al-Manar TV, he said: "We will not allow [the STL] to drag Lebanon into civil war... Allah willing, there will be no civil war among the Lebanese; there will be no civil war between Lebanon's Sunnis and Shi'ites... Some of the political leaders [i.e., the March 14 Forces] are planning for civil war, especially between Shi'ites and Sunnis."[9]

Whereas Mikati avoided explicitly accusing the STL, Nasrallah reiterated his allegation that the tribunal was political in nature and therefore unreliable. In a July 1 speech, he said: "The tribunal, its decisions, and their consequences for us are blatantly American-Israeli."[10] In a July 5 speech, he said: "No one in Lebanon disagrees that justice must be done... But is what is happening [now, in fact,] justice? Will the attorney general and the international tribunal, which is headed by a good friend of Israel, do justice?... What is happening now is not justice, but an [act of] great injustice. All those who support the unjust indictment support injustice and are renouncing truth and justice... The international tribunal is backing the true murderer, Israel."

Nasrallah added that "the claim that Israel did not murder Al-Hariri... is an injustice and a debasement. And all this is [happening] despite the fact that we have produced proof [of Israel's guilt]... [A further] injustice are the false charges of murder leveled at honorable people among the resistance." Nasrallah also accused his political rivals of failing to carry out justice: "Anyone who tries to stand up and say that Hizbullah, the March 8 [Forces]... or Najib Mikati's government are thwarting justice is wrong. You are the ones who are thwarting justice... You are the ones who are defending the injustice, and you are part of it."[11]

Nasrallah even accused Sa'd Al-Hariri of having forgone justice in order to stay in power. Addressing the March 14 Forces, he said: "Don't ask of Mikati and his government... to do what Sa'd Al-Hariri was willing to forgo [i.e., bringing his father's assassins to justice] in order to stay in power."[12] It should be noted that Mikati reiterated these remarks.[13]

Justice and Hizbullah's Arms

I. The Position of the March 14 Forces

The Al-Mustaqbal faction rejected the accusations against Sa'd Al-Hariri. In a statement addressed to Mikati, it said: "You and all your new allies know... that Sa'd Al-Hariri declared frankly, courageously, and responsibly that he wanted a reconciliation conference to save the country from schism and to start a new phase in which there is no room for the rule of arms... But that which brought you to the prime ministry [i.e., Hizbullah] considers itself above the country, the world, and justice."[14]

These statements alluded to one of the central bones of contention between Lebanon's rival factions, namely Hizbullah's arms. The issue was also addressed in the closing statement of the March 14 Forces' conference, which said: "The wave of political assassinations, murders, bombings, and terrorist operations that Lebanon has seen could not have reached such drastic proportions were it not for an atmosphere in which the use of illegal arms flourishes... After all [of our] bitter experiences, it is no longer acceptable for illegal arms to dominate the country... As [Lebanon's] national democratic opposition – and after the logic we heard yesterday [in Nasrallah's July 2 speech], a logic based dominating all the Lebanese [using] arms and power... we demand that, on July 5, 2011,[15] the prime minister clearly and directly announce before parliament his commitment to Resolution 1757, and declare that steps will be taken toward carrying out this resolution. Otherwise, he should depart, along with his government, and we won't miss them." The March 14 Forces resolved to continue "the struggle to [end Hizbullah's] supremacy that is based on arms... and to launch a political campaign – [both] Arab and international – aimed at freeing the [Lebanese] republic from the domination of weapons."[16]

II. The Position of Hizbullah

For Hizbullah, the issue of its arms is not on the agenda. It should be noted that even the guidelines of Sa'd Al-Hariri's government recognized the legitimacy of resistance. The issue of Hizbullah's arms was addressed in a June 28, 2011 article by Ibrahim Al-Amin, board chairman of the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, who is close to Hizbullah. He wrote: "...The Shi'ites... have opened their homes, businesses, schools, factories, and offices to hold as many missiles as possible. The resistance has no real difficulties in [finding] the sites and locations it needs to build up its strength. The people want these missiles aimed at Israel, whether in order to deter it and prevent it from further aggression, and whether in order to protect themselves in case of a conflict and aid Syria and the Palestinians...

"Despite the price it is paying for this, the Shi'ite sect is clinging more and more to [Hizbullah's] weapons, seeking thereby to defend its achievements. It seems that most [Shi'ites] have no other means of protection aside from arms. They fear that the enemy, Israel, is party to the plot [to disarm them], and that they must stand up to [this plot] as well as to those in [Lebanon] who oppose [their] arms. The Shi'ites, as a sect, do not consider using arms against domestic [enemies] to be a crime, but rather a necessity dictated by the circumstances. They believe that they must fight those [within Lebanon] who oppose [their] arms, just as they fight Israel...

"The commander of the resistance has become a symbol that epitomizes the [Shi'ite] stance. No one any longer has a problem with Hassan Nasrallah being the leader of the Shi'ites. Nabih Beri is in no sense competing with him for leadership. The [Shi'ite] cultural circles and clubs, and [their] associations, old and new, are likewise operating on the assumption that Nasrallah is above all criticism or doubt. One may criticize or disagree with Hizbullah, and criticize its leaders and the conduct of its members – but Nasrallah is the [uncontested] leader of the [Shi'ite] sect, and not just the leader of Hizbullah. His picture [hangs] in the homes of the communist, nationalist, and pro-Ahmad Al-As'ad[17] [Shi'ites alike,] as a matter of course...

"Nasrallah succeeded in uniting all [Shi'ite] social classes and groups behind his leadership: university professors and factory owners, clerks and merchants, farmers and laborers, the unemployed, and Lebanese living abroad. All came together to vote for the list that Nasrallah instructed [them] to support. He has become the leader of those who pray and of those who do not, of [women] who wear the chador and those who wear shorts...

"Whenever a Shi'ite attains a position of influence in the business world, in any private institution, or in any official role, other Lebanese assume that this is due to the strength of the resistance..."[18]

 

*E. Picali is a research fellow at MEMRI.

 

Endnotes:

[1] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 6, 2011.

[2] This is a reference to Nasrallah's June 2, 2011 speech, in which he said that nobody would be able to arrest the accused, even in 300 years.

[3] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 4, 2011.

[4] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 5, 2011.

[5] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 5, 2011.

[6] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 5, 2011.

[7] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), June 21, 2011.

[8] Al-Safir (Lebanon), July 6, 2011.

[9] Al-Safir (Lebanon), July 4, 2011.

[10] Al-Safir (Lebanon), July 4, 2011.

[11] Al-Safir (Lebanon), July 6, 2011.

[12] Al-Safir (Lebanon), July 4, 2011.

[13] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 5, 2011.

[14] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 5, 2011.

[15] The start of parliament sessions leading up to the vote of confidence in the government.

[16] Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 4, 2011.

[17] The Al-As'ad family is a central part of the anti-Hizbullah camp among Lebanon's Shi'ites.

[18] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), June 28, 2011.



 

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