Pakistan Air Force (PAF) base at Kamra was attacked by the Taliban in August 2012
Given below are excerpts from two articles by Taj M. Khattak and Shahzad Chaudhry of the Pakistani military, examining transformation of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Khattak is a retired vice admiral and former Vice Chief Of Pakistan Navy while Shahzad Chaudhry retired as an air vice marshal in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
Khattak's article titled "The Kamra fallout" was published following the Taliban attack on the Pakistan Air Force base at Kamra in August 2012. However, Chaudhry's article titled "The Changing Taliban" was published in July 2012.
Following are excerpts from Admiral Khattak's article:[1]
"On 9/11 [In 2001], Al-Qaeda Was Believed To Constitute Around 400 Members"; That Number Has Shot Up Many Times Over, Counting Its Sympathizers Like The TTP; No One Knows The Exact Number"
"During the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, President [Lyndon B.] Johnson's top US commander, stood before TV cameras on the grounds of the U.S. embassy in Saigon with gaping holes in compound wall, trying to remain as composed as possible as he grasped the enormity of what had happened. To his countrymen back home, he looked completely out of touch with reality as, only days earlier he had declared the offensive a failure. That moment, however, was a defining one in the history of insurgency warfare, because it redefined some basics: 'The psychological space in an adversary's mind is more important. The transitory tactical advantage is of less significance and never the ultimate objective in an insurgent's tactical actions.'
"The above lessons were driven home again recently by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as it breached the parameter wall of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at the PAF Base at Kamra [in Attock district of Punjab province] and exposed our helplessness to stop them from attacking wherever and whenever they want to. On 9/11 [in 2001], Al-Qaeda was believed to constitute around 400 members. That number has shot up many times over, counting its sympathizers like the TTP; no one knows the exact number.
"It has been nearly seven years since the TTP declared war on the state of Pakistan. After earlier attacks on the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi [in October 2009] and the Pakistan Naval Aviation Base Mehran at Karachi [in May 2011], the TTP attacked Kamra base for the third time [in August 2012]. The base figures prominently in the country's nuclear deterrence paradigm, and the attack came on the most sacred night of the Islamic calendar during which the Prophet Muhammad … is believed to have received divine revelation in a cave with which began the religion of Islam. When it was over, both sides declared their dead to be 'martyrs.'
"It sent ripples across powerful capitals of the world already hostile to Pakistan. No one was surprised when the usual concerns about weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands were voiced, which had to be rebutted strongly by the foreign ministry. The base personnel acquitted themselves well in containing the damage, but the fuller psychological impact and any affects on the PAF's capability have yet to emerge."
"A Large Majority In Pakistan Is Convinced That Suicide Attacks Are A Result Of Separation From Society Of Vulnerable Individuals By The Religiously Bigoted, A View Which Might Be Subjective As It Is Not Based On Any Research"
"An immediate effect of the Kamra attack was the closure of cell phone services during and prior to Eid-ul-Fitr [August 19, 2012] by the ministry of interior, though some other unsavory reasons are also being attributed to this action. While some order and rationalization in regulating pre- and post-paid mobile phone is warranted, it should be known that, in neighboring Afghanistan, the Taliban routinely employ this very strategy with mobile phones towers going off the air in nearly half the country every day for up to twelve hours. This conveys a message to all as to who is in charge, besides denying their adversary nearly half the period in a month to track their movements. One hopes the interior ministry will handle this with extreme care and not slide the country where the TTP wants it to.
"In an important speech only days before the attack, [Pakistan Army Chief] Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani described 'absolutism' as being the genesis of organized anti-state violence. Clearly, undercurrents of undiluted religious convictions, and their imposition through the sword, go right back to the beginning of Islamic history.
"It doesn't therefore worry the suicide attackers in the least that taking one's own life is forbidden in their faith. It is clearly stated in the Koran, 'O ye who believe... (do not) kill yourselves, for truly Allah has been to you Most Merciful. If any do that in rancor and injustice, soon shall we cast him into the Fire.' (4:29: 30). The taking of a life is allowed only by way of justice (i.e. the death penalty for murder) but, even then, forgiveness is better. 'Nor take life – which Allah has made sacred-except for just cause...' (17:33). The above noble message of the faith needs to be propagated from every pulpit of mosques across the country during every Friday prayers, but isn't.
"A large majority in Pakistan is convinced that suicide attacks are a result of separation from society of vulnerable individuals by the religiously bigoted, a view which might be subjective as it is not based on any research. Robert Pape, an American professor of political science, presents a different view after studying nearly 315 suicide attacks spanning over a quarter of a century and suggests that suicide attackers' actions stem from [a] logical military strategy, not so much their religion – specially Islam. This view merits a closer examination in order to strategize countermeasures and need not be ignored out of hand."
"In Afghanistan, The U.S. Lost Its First 1,000 Soldiers In Nearly Nine Years And Crossed The 2,000 Mark … [In August 2012] In Just 27 Months; Gen. John R Allen, Commander Of The ISAF Forces, Apparently Misses Its Significance"
"After the Kamra attack, highly placed government officials spared no efforts to explain that there was no security lapse, a line which ironically had also been parroted during Mehran incident. As reported in the press, at least four out of nine terrorists striking Kamra received logistic assistance from the adjacent village. In its simplest meaning, there is a security lapse the moment an unauthorized person leaps over the compound wall of a restricted area with mala-fide intent. So, what else was it if it was not a security lapse? These officials are not naive, but whenever they see prospects of heads rolling, they go into denial to keep their own on the shoulders….
"Much has been made of prior threat warnings issued by the ministry of interior but those familiar with such reports might agree that these are just about as generalized as the weekly horoscope and serve little purpose other than the spooks clearing their yardarm. That said, obtaining precise intelligence information and efficient follow up are never easy even for the most well resourced intelligence outfits, as recently revealed by a former FBI agent Ali Soufan in an interview. Almost a year before 9/11, the CIA had a tag on two terrorists who continued to live in San Diego without any action taken against them and later crashed one of hijacked aircraft into the Pentagon. He called lack of communications between the FBI and the CIA as 'China Wall.' Evidently, getting wiser after the event is not a phenomenon restricted only to this part of the world. The 'China Wall' between our Intelligence Bureau (IB) and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistani military] is well known and needs to be brought down.
"In the interview, Ali Soufan reveals that the alleged planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, was subjected to water-boarding 183 times, yet he lied about Al-Kuwaiti, the man whose cell call eventually helped track Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Most suspects crack after the second or third water-boarding session….
"In Afghanistan, the U.S. lost its first 1,000 soldiers in nearly nine years and crossed the 2,000 mark early this month [August 2012] in just 27 months. Gen. John R Allen, commander of the ISAF forces, apparently misses its significance and has resolved to plough on regardless. A similar resolve has been expressed by Pakistan's prominent civil and military leaders in the face of repeated failures, helplessness and the increasingly bold attacks by the TTP…."
Following are excerpts from Shahzad Chaudhry's article:[2]
"The Enemy In This War Has Changed Face Over Time"; "While Mullah Omar Was The Declared Head Of The Taliban, He Was Never Pursued With Any Intensity By The U.S."
[TTP's Emir for Swat and Malakand region] Maulvi Fazlullah was evicted from Swat in 2009 after a copybook operation by the Pakistan Army. While thousands supporting the rebel cause were arrested, Fazlullah made good his escape to FATA [nearby Federally Administered Tribal Areas] where he was followed, eventually landing across the border in Afghanistan's Nuristan and Kunar provinces. It is from here now that he pursues the Pakistan Army with ruthless tactics of abducting soldiers on posts and patrol and slitting their throats to cause fear, a tactic first brought to the region by the Uzbeks headed by Tahir Yuldashev.
"In 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama granted a frugal surge of 33,000 troops to General Stanley McChrystal against his much larger demand, the general chose to modify his mission. He vacated the distant outposts strung along the border regions and in the rural areas, preferring instead to defend major towns in force.
"This is when most adjoining regions of FATA on the Afghan side went outside the writ of the Afghan government and became a freeway for the movement of Taliban militants of all hues. These regions include the bordering provinces of Nuristan and Kunar where Fazlullah now reigns, and Paktia and Paktika from where Jalaluddin Haqqani conducts operations in Afghanistan. This move by McChrystal not only ceded critical space to the Taliban, it also rubbished any pretensions of an anvil-and-hammer strategy that was popularly propounded when the U.S. and Pakistan resumed their operational focus on fighting the war in 2008.
"The enemy in this war has changed face over time. What began as a war against Al-Qaeda soon had the Taliban in its cross hairs. And, while Mullah Omar was the declared head of the Taliban, he was never pursued with any intensity by the U.S. Instead, it is the Haqqanis who caught America's fancy. Though they remain the most vilified, they have yet to be proscribed by the U.S. And while the U.S. has engaged drone targets with abandon in Pakistani space, for most part, the Haqqanis have been spared attention. As things stand in this war today, Al-Qaeda, America's original target, is neutralized; and the Taliban, America's newer quarry, specifically in the shape of the Haqqanis, remain the most visible entity."
"The Taliban Are A Loose Group Of Afghan And Pakistani Affiliates Who Have Coalesced Around The Haqqanis And Continue To Offer Resistance To Nato/Isaf When Working In Tandem"
"The broader formulation: the Taliban are a loose group of Afghan and Pakistani affiliates who have coalesced around the Haqqanis and continue to offer resistance to Nato/Isaf when working in tandem. They also target the Pakistani state when acting independently based on their Pakistan-specific agenda.
"The Quetta Shura, as Mullah Omar's group is called, has chosen to remain obscure even while its affiliates contest the presence of foreign forces on its behalf. The Haqqanis on the other hand have stuck to their part of the mission.
"Money, too, has played its part. With Al-Qaeda, when funds were aplenty, groups mushroomed under its umbrella to act as its foot soldiers. When its influence waned and diffused to other regions in the larger Middle East, the Taliban became the paymasters for most small groups. While contributions did come from religious and individual charities around the world, the funding was liberally augmented by the drug trade, and by taxing the movement of men and material through the regions under Taliban control. This attracted smaller groups to the Taliban (read the Haqqanis) and added impetus to operations against foreign forces.
"Three specific groups with Pakistani roots form this augmented force: the Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan under Hakimullah Mehsud, the Maulvi Fazlullah group, and splinters from at least three major sectarian/Kashmiri outfits [e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami]. Two others, the Mangal Bagh group and the Tariq Afridi group are more local in influence but will offer their services to the Taliban in the wider franchise for a suitable quid pro quo."
"The Religious Mantle That Al-Qaeda Claimed, And Mullah Omar Inherited, Is Now Pinned On The Haqqanis, For They Remain The Most Visible Entity Continuing Their Defiance Of The International Forces"
"There is little likelihood that any of these groups is driven by genuine ideological motivation. Instead, money has spawned their growth. To supplement their resources, these groups resort to frequent abductions for ransom, carjacking and other crimes, major or minor. Such criminality will be easier to handle when the garb of ideological underpinning is removed from under the umbrella below which these groups claim relevance in the local communities where they operate.
"The religious mantle that Al-Qaeda claimed, and Mullah Omar inherited, is now pinned on the Haqqanis, for they remain the most visible entity continuing their defiance of the international forces and are thus easier to characterize as the bearers of the ideological tradition that first spawned the Afghan effort against Nato/Isaf. With the exit of the Haqqanis from Pakistan's tribal areas the Pakistani state will have an easier qualification to pursue these groups as criminal outfits and not as insurgent groups which can engender a different reactive dynamic altogether.
"Fazlullah's forays against the Pakistani state are emblematic of the same approach. As the war approaches its end in Afghanistan, he hopes to establish his credentials by cowing the state into some accommodation. His objectives remain pretty obvious: relevance, power to influence and domination of the region of his influence, and thus the ability to tax the freedom of all who will live under his lien. While he pursues his own motives with the Pakistani state, unbeknown to him or perhaps in convenient cahoots, he paves the way for a more heinous agenda of those external elements that wish for Pakistan to remain in the muddle even as war winds down in rest of the region.
"If Pakistan neglects these developments it does so at its own risk and that is why it is imperative to stop Fazlullah from his deadly mission. The state's full power must be brought to bear against him. It is essential that the war must now cease and all foreign groups residing in Pakistan exit our regions. That remains our best chance to cleanse our tribal regions from convolutions that have evolved with time…."
Endnotes:
[1] The News (Pakistan). August 28, 2012. The original English of articles in this dispatch has been mildly edited for clarity and standardization.
[2] The Express Tribune (Pakistan), July 5, 2012.
