Liberal Pakistani Commentators Denounce The Sharif Government For Negotiations With The Taliban

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (image courtesy: Pakistantoday.com.pk)

On January 29, 2014, the center-right government of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a four-member committee to hold negotiations with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with the goal of the talks being to end the cycle of jihadi violence in Pakistan. This was followed by the TTP spokesman announcing a committee of prominent Pakistanis through whom the TTP has begun holding the negotiations. Negotiators in both committees are known for pro-Taliban sympathies.[1]

In the initial days of the talks, it appears that negotiating points may include: exchange of Taliban prisoners in Pakistani jails for a number of prominent Pakistanis and soldiers in the captivity of the TTP; a ceasefire requiring the Pakistani military to cease any deployment of troops, and the TTP promising not to launch attacks; the ambit of talks being confined to the areas of conflict, which might mean the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) and possibly parts of the adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province; implementation of sharia rule in the agreed territory, which will expectedly offer sanctuary to Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters in Waziristan; and more.

Liberal writers and commentators in Pakistan have slammed the Sharif government for essentially legitimizing the TTP through these talks. In an article, Dr. Mohammad Taqi, a columnist with the Lahore-based Daily Times newspaper, argued that the talks mean the Pakistani state's surrender to the jihadi forces. I.A. Rehman, well-known human rights campaigner, expressed concern in an article that the TTP might stake larger claims to territory by asking for the implementation of sharia rule across Pakistan. Zahid Hussain, an author and journalist, argued that the TTP is a banned terrorist group, and that holding talks with it is a violation of the Pakistani constitution.

In a satirical article, respected commentator Ayaz Amir imagined what a likely settlement with the TTP could look like, and whether it will involve naming the country's roads and parks after the jihadi commanders. Salman Akram Raja, a lawyer, noted in a piece that whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the Pakistani society is already in the embrace of the country's jihadi forces, especially since the 1980s era of jihad against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan around which time the Pakistani military dictator General Ziaul Haq led a campaign of Islamization of Pakistan, and the Pakistani mind was abandoned in favor of sharia.

Excerpts from articles by these writers are given below.

Mohammad Taqi: "The History Of Talks Between The Pakistani State And The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan … Has Repeated Itself A Good 14 Times As A Grave Tragedy"; "No Nuclear-Armed State Has Been Humiliated Quite So Thoroughly At The Hands Of Some Armed Thugs"

The following are excerpts from Dr. Mohammad Taqi's article:[2]

"The history of talks between the Pakistani state and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) … is long, and has repeated itself a good 14 times as a grave tragedy. This time around it is playing out as a farce. No nuclear-armed state has been humiliated quite so thoroughly at the hands of some armed thugs, as is happening in Pakistan. Whatever the outcome of this dialogue melee, the state has disgraced itself monumentally, perhaps even irreparably, along the way. By comparison, [Pakistan Army's] Corps Commander Peshawar, Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, garlanding the Taliban thug Nek Muhammad Wazir [who first organized the Pakistani Taliban around him] after signing the 2004 Shakai peace deal, may look majestic today.

"If Prime Minister (PM) Mr. Nawaz Sharif's idea of privatizing the negotiations was to have some sort of a plausible deniability or to keep his government's involvement low key, the TTP checkmated him in one shrewd move. The TTP took everyone, including its most allied allies, by surprise when it pulled the emissary/arbitration committee rabbit out of the negotiations hat. If Mr. Sharif's idea was to merely exhaust the dialogue option and ultimately put the onus of any failed parleys on the TTP, the latter has put that hot potato back in his hands. A committee announced by the PM in parliament … simply cannot be considered an informal body and expected to have a low profile. The PM has to own his committee's success and/or failure. Once the PM decided to carry out a dialogue it would have been better to appoint government officials for formal discussions…

"On the other hand, if the PM's four-member committee was supposed to be an exploratory team for establishing proximity with the terrorists via a track-two, the open announcement may have defeated that purpose. Historically, several journalists, spies, and bureaucrats have served as emissaries and even ambassadors. There is nothing wrong as such in picking non-politicians for negotiations…

"To his credit, a member of Mr. Sharif's committee, the veteran journalist Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai, is perhaps the most reasonable voice in a matter that increasingly looks like the dialogue of the Taliban, by the Taliban, and for the Taliban. In an interview … Mr. Yousafzai hoped to persuade the TTP towards a ceasefire. He also spoke about getting, apparently through to the PM, the Pakistan army and the U.S. drones to stop hitting TTP targets, but quite ominous was his expectation that the TTP would demand hundreds of hardened terrorists released. Equally worrying was his complete silence over any obligation for reparations by the TTP for the atrocities it has committed against thousands of civilians all over Pakistan, especially in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. And therein lies the rub: Mr. Sharif has started an open-ended process without defining the brief he has given his committee, and what it means for those already affected by terrorism and those who will be in the future. Neither Mr. Sharif nor his team apparently knows what their bottom line is."

"The Public's Opinion Had Gradually Been Shifting Towards A Decisive [Military] Action Against The TTP"; "The Terrorists Virtually Control The Narrative Through Violence Against The Media And Via Their Highly Visible Partisans Within Its Ranks"

"The public's opinion had gradually been shifting towards a decisive [military] action against the TTP until Mr. Nawaz Sharif's speech [announcing the formation of the committee] in the National Assembly pulled the rug from even under his own feet. He may have bought some time to buttress his Punjab fortress against the expected counterattack from the TTP-allied jihadis there, but that reprieve will not be long-lasting. The TTP pounced on the opportunity Mr. Sharif provided them by backing down from what they perceived was an imminent action. The terrorists have been playing the Sharif government like a fiddle while bombing innocents to smithereens, like Tuesday's attack in Peshawar's Shia-populated Risaldar Street [on February 4, 2014]. The intensely focused TTP seems like the only ones out there who know exactly what they want, including from their dialogue ruse, and how to accomplish it.

"The terrorists virtually control the narrative through violence against the media and via their highly visible partisans within its ranks. Mr. Sharif has not just ceded time to the TTP to reorganize, but also [ceded] precious political space which he may find difficult to recapture in the near future. The sly TTP is not leaving much to chance. It did not hesitate to test the allegiance even of its ideological granddaddy Maulana Samiul Haq and its most vociferous advocate, chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) Mr. Imran Khan. The PTI chief has since tried to weasel out of his well-earned nomination as the TTP's confidant. His party turned down the TTP nomination via a statement that 'appreciates the trust reposed in its chairman.' I suspect this might not be the last time the TTP will hold Mr. Imran Khan's feet to the fire… The TTP's fellow travelers will not be able to backtrack this late in the game; they will have to pay up.

"The Pakistani state, under Mr. Nawaz Sharif, seems to be on all fours now. The fear of a backlash in Punjab appears to have kept Mr. Sharif from doing anything to stem the bleeding in the three other provinces and FATA. However, more disconcerting is how he has gone about doing it. If the PM had been fumbling before, his delegating responsibility to people outside parliament in a speech made in that august house, suggests he has dropped the ball completely. Mr. Nawaz Sharif might muddle through this tragic-comic round of talks, but the humiliation the Pakistani state has suffered on his watch will not wash off easily."

I.A. Rehman: "An Issue On Which Complete Clarity Is Required Is The Territorial Limits Of The Bargain; The Taliban … Have No Right To Tell Islamabad How The Rest Of The Country Is To Be Governed [i.e. Under Sharia Or Not]"

The following are excerpts from I. A. Rehman's article:[3]

"A strong desire for an end to terrorism should not lead anyone to underestimate the difficulties that the negotiating teams constituted by the prime minister and the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are likely to face, because securing peace can sometimes be a more challenging task than making war. There is no doubt that public unity in support of negotiations cannot be taken for granted. The prime minister assumed personal responsibility for the initiative, and one wonders whether it would not have been better to take at least the leaders of the various parties in parliament into confidence…

"The mandate of the official committee is not clear. The committee is supposed 'to carry the dialogue process forward.' That could mean anything from preparing the ground for substantive negotiations to securing agreement on issues in contention. Nothing has been said about the committee's competence to accept any conditions the Taliban might put before agreeing to discuss substantive issues. Quite a few hurdles can be seen at this preliminary stage. The Taliban's keenness to have drone strikes stopped and get their men released from detention and Islamabad's desire for the cessation of terrorist activity altogether are some of the easily visible stumbling blocks…

"While the two negotiating teams look at the possibilities of 'taking the dialogue process forward,' it is fair to assume that promoters on both sides are already busy exploring the possible contours of a compromise. That is the most crucial part of the present exercise. The government has unduly emphasized the Taliban's acceptance of the constitution as the basic condition for a settlement. Unless they choose to deny that the tribal area is a part of Pakistani territory, albeit administered differently than the rest of the state, the Taliban should have little difficulty in meeting this demand. They can say that they respect the constitution to the extent the state has applied it to them. They cannot be blamed for not extending all provisions of the constitution to their areas.

"Pakistan is in no position to satisfy the Taliban demand for an end to drone attacks. [Jamaat-e-Islami emir] Syed Munawar Hasan has given an indication of the Taliban thinking that in the event of refusal by the United States to stop drone raids, Pakistan should snap all ties with it. This will be like asking an addict of 60 years' standing to stop taking drugs [i.e. American aid] immediately. The prime minister's backroom advisers will not find it easy to tackle this question.

"An issue on which complete clarity is required is the territorial limits of the bargain. The Taliban, if they can prove that they enjoy the trust of the population of FATA, may be free to discuss the system of administration appropriate for their special relationship with the state, but they have no right to tell Islamabad how the rest of the country is to be governed [i.e. under sharia or not]. The toughest task for the official negotiators will be to tell the Taliban of the limits to their cultural autonomy in FATA. The creation of workable political, administrative, and judicial institutions in FATA can be discussed but in that area, too, the government will have to take a stand that the basic rights of the vulnerable sections of society, especially women and minorities, cannot be compromised…."

Zahid Hussain: "It Will Be Disastrous If The TTP Is Allowed To Take Control Of The Tribal Belt And Enforce Its Own Version Of The Sharia System There, As Is Being Suggested By Members Of The Government's Negotiating Team As Well As Some Political Leaders"

The following are excerpts from Zahid Hussain's article:[4]

"Now that the Taliban too have nominated their representatives for the negotiations, a state of shambles is unfolding. With both teams more or less standing on the same side of the divide, it is virtually a dialogue within outlawed militant outfits. The government has walked straight into a trap, with the Taliban dictating the rules of the game. Now it will be extremely difficult to extricate the country from this intensely dangerous situation. It is a farce that has gone too far. It is all the more theatrical since Nawaz Sharif has set up a four-member team to negotiate with the militants. The team he chose is an interesting mix of a highly controversial ex-intelligence officer, a retired diplomat, a senior journalist and one of his special assistants. Given the soft spot most of these members apparently have for the militant cause, it was not difficult to get the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) endorsement of the team. The militants could not have wished for a better committee packed with fellow travelers…

"So, no big deal; allow the TTP to establish an Islamic emirate in the tribal territory. Never mind if the militants want to extend their rule further to the surrounding districts of KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. Absolutely no harm if Swat is handed back to Mullah Fazlullah and let the TTP control a part of Karachi as well; after all, they're our brothers. And why must we create problems for the militants if they are helping their Afghan brethren undertake 'jihad' against the foreign forces in Afghanistan and hosting holy warriors from other Muslim countries. After all, they are fulfilling their religious obligation. It doesn't matter if suicide bombers kill some more women and children and continue to blow up schools. 'Give peace a chance,' don't we all agree? This argument goes on…

"The TTP is a proscribed terrorist organization, and it is in violation of the constitution for the state to engage with it. The outfit has declared war on Pakistan and has claimed responsibility for attacking security installations and killing our soldiers. The government would be legitimizing all those terrorist actions by unconditionally negotiating with them. There is no indication that the group is willing to give up violence and accept the nation's constitution. What the militants really want is the rolling back of the state's authority from the area of their operation. It has taken the lives of thousands of soldiers to re-establish the writ of the state in most of the tribal territories, and pulling back will have disastrous consequences for the country and regional security.

"One of the myths bought by many of our political leaders is that the TTP is fighting for the democratic and economic rights of the tribal areas. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The fact is that the tribal people have suffered much more through rising Taliban militancy. The militants have slaughtered hundreds of maliks [tribal chieftains] and many more have been killed in suicide bombings on tribal jirgas. The atrocities have forced the people to flee their homes in the conflict areas. It will be disastrous if the TTP is allowed to take control of the tribal belt and enforce its own version of the sharia system there, as is being suggested by members of the government's negotiating team as well as some political leaders. The people of the tribal areas would be the biggest victims of any such deal. Surrendering to terrorists never brings peace. Conceding to the TTP's demands would lead to the unravelling of this state. And it will not just be the tribal areas when the entire country is under threat."

Maulana Fazlullah, emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Columnist Ayaz Amir: "There Will Have To Be A Redrawing Of Geographical Lines; The Durand Line [i.e. Afghan-Pakistan Border] Is Dead, And Even If Not, After A Taliban Settlement It Will Have Become Irrelevant"

The following are excerpts from Ayaz Amir's article:[5]

"As iron is not to be made from straw, or protein extracted from cabbages. We might as well turn to realism and consider the outlines of a settlement [between the TTP and the government] which could save our leadership from taking difficult decisions and stop the Taliban from breathing down our necks. The first thing is form and symbolism, for which it becomes absolutely necessary that the state of Pakistan should tender an unconditional apology to the Taliban for any action taken against them.

"Since it is not in the Pakhtun or Afghan culture to be content with … verbal feasts, the apology, to be acceptable [to the TTP], would have to be accompanied by a sizeable compensation package. If five billion dollars in record time could be found, from depleted coffers, for a business tycoon and company - the independent power producers who in the effect they are having on the economy are perhaps deadlier than the Taliban - the Taliban are likely to hold out for nothing less than 10 billion dollars. Even then they will say they are doing us a favor. If a settlement is what we want there is no getting round this problem.

"The Race Course Ground Rawalpindi should be named Hakimullah Mehsud Shaheed Memorial Park; Ayub National Park should be Baitullah Mehsud Shaheed National Park; and Benazir Bhutto International Airport would be appropriately named Commander Nek Muhammad Shaheed International Airport [i.e. all predecessors of current TTP emir Maulana Fazlullah]. Other countries have their memorials for fallen soldiers in parks and other open spaces. Pakistan would be one of the few countries in the world where a memorial for fallen soldiers in our Taliban wars is within the secure confines of General Headquarters [GHQ of Pakistan Army]. The Taliban will have no fear that any memorial erected by them will come under terrorist attack…

"There will have to be a redrawing of geographical lines. The Durand Line [i.e. border between Afghanistan and Pakistan] is dead, and even if not, after a Taliban settlement it will have become irrelevant. As a successor to the Durand Line the new line will have to be along the Indus [which divides Pakistan and] which in any case is a permanent Afghan demand, no Afghan government accepting the British annexation of the Frontier or the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The advantages of this will be three-fold: the Taliban will have something to think about, Afghanistan will be happy, and Pakistan's Punjab-centric leadership will the readier be able to devote all energies to the uplift and progress of Punjab [in what would remain the non-Taliban Pakistan]…

"The Taliban not being overly given to paperwork, Pakistani citizens wishing to cross the Indus - say, to buy chappals [slippers] from Charsadda, gur [jaggery] from Mardan or naswar (snuff) from elsewhere - may not require any form of paper visas. But some kind of a toll, we can be reasonably certain, they will have to pay; the Taliban, as noted above, not believing in the concept of free lunches. Troops will have to vacate forward areas. This is a given, and without it there can be no agreement. From the seven tribal agencies all troops gone, FATA clearly coming under a new jurisdiction, that of the Islamic Emirate of North and South Pakhtunistan [comprising of both parts of Waziristan]."

"Like What Happened In Nepal Where Elements Of The Communist Insurgency Were Incorporated Into The Regular Nepalese Army, There Will Have To Be A Similar Arrangement Here, The Taliban Not Becoming Part Of The Pakistan Army But Receiving Their Salaries From The Defense Budget"

"Like what happened in Nepal where elements of the communist insurgency were incorporated into the regular Nepalese army, there will have to be a similar arrangement here, the Taliban not becoming part of the Pakistan Army but receiving their salaries from the defense budget - the sticking point being the numbers involved, [with] the Taliban inflating the number of fighters so to be paid and us asking them to be reasonable.

"Peshawar as a fighter airbase will become redundant. Against which potential threat will we be defending our western skies - the Taliban, Afghanistan, Russia? If, however, for old time's sake, for reasons of nostalgia, the air force insists on having a presence in Peshawar it should not be past the skill of our negotiators to make the Taliban agree to some special arrangement for this. The armor and artillery schools [of Pakistan Army] at Nowshera can easily be shifted this side of the Indus, there being enough suitable locations in Punjab to house them. Even the SSG (Commando) Centre at Cherat shouldn't present much of a problem, there being enough training camps in Azad Kashmir [controlled by Pakistan] where it can be shifted. In a sense this would be also appropriate as our special services then would be spiritually (if not actually) closer to the liberation of Kashmir, the unfinished business of our birth and existence [as Pakistan].

"The one clearly good thing in all this is that our nuke capability - the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty - will not be disturbed, our research laboratories and missiles located in the safe confines of Punjab. In Chagai, Baluchistan, only [nuclear] tests are carried out. The core paraphernalia remains under safe lock and key in northern Punjab [the province that rules the rest of Pakistan], the rugged martial best from where comes most of our army recruitment. Some other sticking points: the Taliban are likely to insist on (a) a free hand against the [Shia] Hazaras of Baluchistan whom they consider to be beyond the pale of the true faith [and have been killing recently]; (b) a special dispensation for the Taliban-dominated areas of Karachi, including the collection of revenue and the setting up of jirga-style courts; and (c) a special status for Jaish-e-Muhammad seminaries located in southern Punjab.

"As a self-respecting nation, however, we have to draw red lines somewhere and make it clear to the Taliban that apart from the territories beyond the Indus, our sovereignty in the new Pakistan cannot be a subject of negotiation. The first new Pakistan came into being after the birth of Bangladesh [erstwhile East Pakistan, in 1971 when Pakistan divided]. After the Emirate of North and South Pakhtunistan this will be the second new Pakistan. To be sure, to keep up the spirit of conciliation we can listen to their point of view on all matters, but the ultimate decision has to be ours. And, yes, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa will definitely sound out of place. The new name of the fabled territories beyond the Indus will have to be Taliban Pakhtunkhwa.

"Thus from the ashes of despair will arise the new Pakistan, at peace within, at peace along the Indus Line, and forging a new relationship with the traditional enemy to the east, India. The entrepreneurial spirit of Punjab finally unchained, the new Punjabi bourgeoisie coming into its own and exploring new vistas of development - taking good care, however, to ensure that wealth produced, wealth acquired, is parked safely not here - perish the thought - but overseas… The four wise men chosen to initiate talks with the Taliban thus have their work cut out for them. May the angels show them the way and speed them on."

Salman Akram Raja: "The Negotiations With The TTP Will, Possibly, Result In A Significant Decrease In Terror Incidents; However, By Then Pakistan Would Have Moved Several Warm Degrees Closer To The Taliban Embrace"

Following are excerpts from Salman Akram Raja's article:[6]

"The negotiations with the TTP will, possibly, result in a significant decrease in terror incidents. However, by then Pakistan would have moved several warm degrees closer to the Taliban embrace. The negotiating committee named by the TTP is a declaration of the political territory the TTP already occupies in mainstream, settled Pakistan. The brilliant Taliban have displayed the ability to project soft power with the same facility that they deploy in blowing up human limbs or delivering severed torsos.

"Let's face it, the broad objectives of the TTP have wide support in Pakistani society, regardless of political affiliation. Just try asking around: do you want sharia, abolition of interest, no fahashi [indecency in culture]? It does not matter for the emotive pull of a slogan what its implementation would mean in practice. As the negotiations proceed the horror TTP has evoked will mellow. They will appear increasingly reasonable, misunderstood - even wronged. Their actions will appear as acts of war morally equivalent to what was done to them. As the will to resist sags, captives [i.e. Pakistanis] learn to admire their captors.

"So far the TTP's methods have grated against the traces of civilization that cling on to a brutalized collective psyche. As the mind closes, these traces diminish. Civilization and culture are not geological facts that survive under layers of time-inflicted dust. Cultures are fed by beliefs. Cultures can and do get mauled. Much that was unacceptable becomes justified. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government's assault on the launch of Malala's book [by cancelling the book launch event at the University of Peshawar], the inability to condemn let alone punish [liberal Punjab Governor] Salman Taseer's murderer, the inevitability with which yet another report of an atrocity against a 'minority' is received off the screens in our living rooms. Mindlessly we mumble about foreign hands and conspiracies. These are the building blocks of the rising edifice of terror in our midst."

"The Base Prejudices That The Pakistani State Fosters Are Now Being Built Upon By Different Shades Of Non-State Actors [i.e. Jihadists]; Increased Literacy … Delivers Increasing Numbers [Of People] To The Clutches Of Hate-Filled, Anti-Democracy Literature…"

"Decades ago the Pakistani mind was abandoned. The Cold War years saw international support for the stifling of intellectual diversity among the people [of Pakistan as the government worked for enforcement of sharia in the country]. This suited the Pakistani establishment's nation-building project. State curriculum and public discourse fed by Urdu op-eds and state TV sought to drown all dissent or discovery under a cloak of religiosity. This project continues even though the world has moved on. A few months ago the Punjab government banned the teaching of comparative religion in the province by any school, public or private. Are other provinces doing better? Is what is taught in schools in Sindh a celebration of the richness of the human project, of which Sindh was an early exemplar?

"The base prejudices that the Pakistani state fosters are now being built upon by different shades of non-state actors [i.e. jihadist forces]. Increased literacy, of the rudimentary sort, delivers increasing numbers [of people] to the clutches of hate-filled, anti-democracy literature that is freely distributed on footpaths, outside mosques, and through the internet. Most of this is in Urdu and other indigenous languages. An aural attachment to religion through poems and music is being replaced by bright-lined literate fundamentalism. The divide between 'us' and 'them' becomes starker. The 'elite' continue to write and read English op-eds that have minimal impact on Pakistani society. The 'elite' do so because that is all they can bring themselves to do. Hate, frothing as well as subtle, meanwhile has a walkover…

"So what is to be done? What does one tell someone like my fourteen-year-old daughter who wishes to work for the ethical treatment of animals? 'Humans who do not care about non-human animals are a waste of space,' she tells me. Peter Singer, professor of bio-ethics at Princeton, author of Animal Liberation, 'is so awesome.' What world does she live in? A cocoon of our making. Centuries ago one Shah Hussain broke through the cocoon of his pretenses. He quit the madrassa and the students that gave him status and fed his ego. Shedding the maulana's [i.e. cleric's] robe he put on ghungroos [ankle bells], took Madho Laal the Hindu boy as his companion and hit the countryside, singing and dancing. His peers condemned his subversion. Thus was born the Sufi order of the malamatiya - those to be condemned. His lament 'mai ni mai kinnoon akhaan ...' (oh mother who should I tell of my pain) is now sung out to us as one of Sufism's greatest hits. We nod along with no pain in our hearts.

"The time has come to feel the pain that awaits our children…. The ninth-century Abbasids set up the greatest translation program the world was to know for centuries. Their Darul Hikmah made available the resources of Greek philosophy and much else that nurtured the then nascent Muslim civilization. What our state will not do, we must. The mind must awaken if we are to save our children from what will overtake all of their dreams. Our state and large parts of our society will condemn us but we will have to break out of our cocoons. There is no way around engagement with the Pakistani mind - our betrayed self."