Introduction
Recent months have seen the Somali militant jihadi group Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen (henceforth Al-Shabab) and the Kenyan jihadi group Muslim Youth Center (henceforth MYC) strengthening their ties, as manifest in the ascendancy of MYC leader Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali within Al-Shabab's ranks, the publication of the Swahili-language jihadi magazine Gaidi Mtaani, and increased threats from Al-Shabab and MYC against Kenya.
MYC Behind Extensive Funding, Recruiting, And Training Of Mujahideen In Kenya
MYC, commonly known as Pumwani[1] Muslim Youth (PMY), was officially established in 2008. Initially founded as a community-based organization to provide, among other things, religious counseling to youth, it has since been accused of openly supporting and recruiting fighters for Al-Shabab. Information about the MYC and its ties with Al-Shabab was presented in UN Monitoring Group reports on Somalia and Eretria published in 2011[2] and 2012.[3] According to these reports, MYC is responsible for extensively funding, recruiting, and training networks within Kenya in towns such as Eldoret, Garissa, and Mombasa. It should be noted that MYC maintains a presence beyond Kenya's borders – in Somalia, Tanzania, and possibly other East African countries.[4]
The reports state that in 2009, MYC organized secret jihad training sessions for "young children" at a Nairobi mosque. They also implicate the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC) as a chief facilitator in funneling Kenyan money to Al-Shabab. Additionally, the reports mention Al-Misbah, a weekly newsletter published locally by MYC, which includes pro-Al-Shabab and pro-Al-Qaeda material. For example, one issue contained an article by slain radical Yemeni-American cleric 'Anwar Al-Awlaki titled 44 Ways of Supporting Jihad.[5] It is noteworthy that both UN Monitoring Group reports were subsequently dismissed by MYC as have been fabricated by the "Great Satan" (i.e. the U.S.) and the Kenyan government.[6]
MYC "jihad training" at Sir Ali Muslim Club, Nairobi, September 2009[7]
October 2009 issue of Al-Misbah[8]
MYC's pro-jihad message is readily apparent, for instance on the group's Twitter account (@MYC_Press) and its blog (themovingcaravan.wordpress.com). On its Twitter account, MYC actively engages those opposed to its radical message, at times even threatening them with retaliation. For example, in a July 29 post, MYC wrote: "In Kenya, the kuffar [infidel] fears to go to the bars, church, and bus stops. We are locking down Kenya insha'Allah." One user responded to the post by writing: "I was in [a] church that was full of worshipers in two services... Your rumors can be proved wrong." MYC, in turn, responded with a threat: "You can't say you haven't been warned... Al-Shabaab are coming after you..."
MYC uses its blog, among other things, to express its support of Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, and the global jihadi movement in general in its fight against the Crusaders. For example, shortly after the February merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab,[9] the MYC issued a statement on its now-defunct blog, mycnjiawaukweli.blogspot, welcoming the "long overdue" merger while announcing the establishment of Al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA). It added that MYC members were pleased to be part of "this great union," and hoped Allah would grant the mujahideen in Kenya the strength to "set jihad alight" in the country. The statement noted that thanks to the merger, the kuffar could never again say that Al-Shabab was defeated or that Al-Qaeda was weak, declaring: "We are now multiplying from East to West and from North to South..."[10]
Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali – The "Exceptional Mujahid"
Known as the Sheikh from Majengo,[11] Sheikh Iman Ali attended the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), graduating sometime in 1997 or 1998. He went on to work as an engineer for the Shell and Mobil oil companies.
It was his leadership and mobilization skills, however, that brought him to the attention of many in Pumwani when, in 2007, he led a coup against the Masjid Pumwani Riyadha executive committee, leading to the ouster of five of its members over allegations of corruption and mismanagement of the mosque's development programs. As secretary to the planning committee responsible for the construction of the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, Iman Ali moved to overthrow the committee after accusing some committee members of pocketing proceeds from several properties the mosque owned in Nairobi's Gikomba Market. It was following that incident that Sheikh Iman Ali was declared Emir of MYC.[12]
Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali
Iman Ali traveled to Somalia to join Al-Shabab in 2009, apparently after on invitation from the latter. It was not until January 2012, however, that his status within the movement became public, with his appearance in one of Al-Shabab's videos. Though he resides in Somalia, Iman Ali continues to oversee the operations and activities of the mujahideen in Kenya, and to offer them "critical guidance."[13] Since his 2009 departure from Kenya, MYC appointed several Emirs to oversee its Kenyan affairs. As of July 2011, these individuals included Jafar Ismail, Ismail Abubakar (aka Amiir Mzungu), Abass Mwai, and Idriss Nyaboga.[14]
Sheikh Iman Ali's importance vis-à-vis MYC was best described in one of the group's blog posts, where he was referred to not only as an "exceptional mujahid," but also as a blessing sent by Allah. It said he could be expected to follow in the footsteps of other "exceptional" individuals like Fazul Mohammad and Saleh Ali Nabhan[15] – a former Al-Qaeda operative in East Africa and a top Al-Shabab commander, respectively – both of whom have been tied to multiple terrorist attacks in Kenya in the 1990s and 2000s.
While with Al-Shabab, Sheikh Iman Ali is believed to have facilitated the influx of many other Kenyans to fight alongside the group in Somalia. Kenyans, it should be noted, reportedly constitute the largest contingent of non-Somali fighters within Al-Shabab. Iman Ali's ability to mobilize funds for Al-Shabab was probably one of the factors that contributed to his ascent within the group's ranks. Months after his departure to Somalia, allegations were made against the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque that its committee had been channeling funds to terror cells; however, the mosque denied links with Al-Shabab.[16]
Iman Ali's influence has extended beyond Kenya and East Africa, with some reports suggesting he was behind the recruitment of the British terror suspects Samantha Lewthwaite and Jermaine Grant.[17] Lewthwaite (aka Natalie Faye Webb), the widow of one of the terrorist involved in the July 7, 2005 London bombings, is currently on the run, after Kenyan police issued an arrest warrant against her over suspected links to a terrorist cell planning attacks in the country. She is believed to have crossed the border into Somalia. MYC has expressed their admiration of Lewthwaite, giving her the nickname "Dada Mzungu" (roughly translating to "our foreign sister"), and describing her as one of Allah's warriors and a role model for other Muslim women to emulate.[18] Lewthwaite is believed to be behind one of the posts published on MYC's blog.[19]
Sheikh Iman Ali Appears In Al-Shabab Video: The Laws Of War Apply To Kenya
As noted earlier, Sheikh Iman Ali's first public appearance in an official Al-Shabab video production came in January 2012, with his almost hour-long Swahili-language message calling upon Kenyans to support their fellow Muslim brothers in Somalia.[20] The video is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was delivered entirely in Swahili with English subtitles, indicating that its main target audience lies in Kenyan, where both Swahili and English are wildly used. Secondly, though posted online on January 8, 2012, the video was dated December 2011, coinciding with Kenya's military incursion into southern Somalia, which commenced several months earlier. Thirdly, the video reveals Iman Ali's status within Al-Shabab, considering that it found it fitting and proper to allocate an almost hour-long propaganda video to him. Moreover, the video was produced by Al-Kataib, Al-Shabab's official media company, and disseminated on jihadi forums under its name. This fact also indicates the importance Kenya and Kenyans have in Al-Shabab's eyes. Fourthly, the video reveals at least some of the characteristics of Sheikh Iman Ali that would appeal to his followers: a calm and charismatic individual who possesses a solid understanding of the basic Islamic concepts typically associated with the Salafi-jihadi doctrine, such as tawhid (monotheism) and al-wala' wal-bara' (loyalty to Islam and Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslims).
Finally, the video attempts to frame the grim situation of Kenya's Muslims as part of a global campaign targeting Muslims elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Thus, Iman Ali and, by extension, MYC as a group, render Kenya a legitimate jihad front. This is apparent when Iman Ali speaks about Kenya as dar al-harb, the "Abode of War" where the laws of war apply and whose population are considered belligerents and therefore legitimate targets. The obligatory nature of jihad in Kenya was reiterated several months later in the jihadi magazine Gaidi Mtaani (see below).
It is noteworthy that Al-Shabab appealed to and focused on Kenya well before Sheikh Iman Ali's public appearance in early 2012. For example, in November 2010, the group released a recruitment video, subtitled in English and Swahili, aimed at recruiting fighters from Kenya, East Africa, and the West.[21]
Al-Shabab Issues Gaidi Mtaani, First Swahili Jihadi Magazine, As Part Of Increasing Efforts To Appeal To Would-Be Kenyan Jihadis
Gaidi Mtaani, the first Swahili-language jihadi magazine, was first published online on April 4, 2012, and a second issue released on June 30, 2012, consisting of 15 and 28 pages, respectively. The magazine signals Al-Shabab's mounting efforts to appeal to Kenyans. It is noteworthy that the magazine was not published through Al-Shabab's official account on top Al-Qaeda forums; however, from the information presented thus far, it is safe to assume that the magazine is the product of the increased collaboration between Al-Shabab and MYC.
Both issues contain previously released Al-Shabab material, in addition to anti-Kenyan propaganda. The magazine names its editor as one "Abu Sayf," and provides a contact email ([email protected]) and Twitter account (@gaidimtaani).[22] Unlike other jihadi publications such as Inspire, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) English-language magazine, Gaidi Mtaani does not list a public key to be used in encrypting correspondence.
The first issue of Gaidi Mtaani includes an interesting article in English titled "Leveling the Scales," written by one "Abu Usama." The article centers around the consequences of last year's Kenyan military incursion into Somalia, which it says will result in direct attacks within Kenya. These attacks, the article warned, will be of greater magnitude than the 1988 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The article also describes potential retaliatory action aimed at harming Kenya's fragile economy, including attacks targeting tourists, especially Europeans, as well as attacks on shopping malls and bars.
Front page of Gaidi Mtaani I
MYC Warns Of "Countdown" To Retaliatory Attacks Against Kenya
In Al-Shabab's view, its hostility toward Kenya and its threats against it are the result of Kenya's political support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government; its military intervention in Somalia; its training of Somali militiamen to fight Al-Shabab; and its collaboration with the West in fighting Islam and Muslims.[23] Al-Shabab's threats should not be taken lightly, considering its increased ties with MYC and the resonating potential of its message among the large Somali diaspora living in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi. On the other hand, MYC has made it clear that Kenya is its main focus in the arena of global jihad, and that the group's future activities inside and outside Kenya will be limited to jihad for the sole purpose of liberating Muslim brothers in Somalia in particular, and East Africa in general under the banner of AQEA.[24]
A recurring theme utilized by MYC in its threats against Kenya is the latter's "humiliating" actions, whether committed directly by the Kenyan authorities or via the country's collaboration with West, against Kenyan Muslims. For example, following the July 2012 U.S. designation as terrorists of three Kenyans – Sheikh Aboud Rogo, Sheikh Abubakar Shariff, and Omar Awadh Omar –MYC issued a statement in support of the former, calling them "activists." In the statement, the group promised that its coalition with Al-Shabab would continue to confront the kuffar in East Africa "until the Islamic flag is raised high in every capital."[25]
In another statement, also in support of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, MYC said that many of its members were "prepared to sacrifice ourselves for Islam, either here in Kenya or across the border in Somalia, and be elevated to Jannah [Paradise]."[26] Probably the most alarming message relating to the feasibility of MYC committing attacks inside Kenya emerged following the killing of Samir Khan, a prominent Kenyan Islamic preacher (not to be confused with the late American AQAP senior operative), which MYC blamed on the Kenyan authorities. In the statement, MYC promised to target the Kenyan authorities with an entirely new level of "creativity to cause pain and suffering," adding that Khan's execution was only one step closer toward the "ordained countdown [to retaliation]." The statement said Khan should expect MYC's martyrs to join him soon in Paradise, and asked him to welcome them.[27]
Whether Al-Shabab or its sympathizers in MYC will be able to execute large-scale attacks inside Kenya remains unclear. From their point of view, such an attack depends not only on the operational preparedness of its perpetrators, but also on the local and regional political atmosphere; on Kenyan involvement in Somalia, militarily or otherwise, whether direct or indirect, continuous or intermittent; Al-Shabab's ability to prevail against the ongoing multi-national military campaign being waged against it; and the mounting international pressure against Al-Shabab and MYC. Moreover, retaliatory action is contingent upon satisfying the general Islamic shari'a principle of jalb al-masalih wa-dar' al-mafasid ("bringing about beneficial circumstances and avoiding harmful ones"), i.e. weighing the potential advantages of such an attack against the potential disadvantages.
The Bigger Picture: Al-Shabab's Quest To Remain Relevant In East Africa
Al-Shabab's growing ties with MYC should be looked at as part of the former long-term strategy to remain relevant on both the local and regional scene. Al-Shabab sees itself as the defender of true Islamic values and the spearhead of the Muslims' fight against the Crusaders in Somalia and in East Africa. Similar views were expressed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri in his address following the merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab, in which he envisioned Somalia as the fortress of Islam and jihad in East Africa.[28]
The significance of Al-Shabab's merger with Al-Qaeda is questionable, at least in the context of the support the latter can provide to the former. Al-Qaeda's top leadership has been practically eradicated in the past year, with several of its top commanders killed in Waziristan. It is possible, therefore, that the former merger is cosmetic at best, intended to boost both Al-Shabab's and Al-Qaeda's morale.
Moreover, any perceived benefits from the merger must be balanced against the increased international pressure that can be expected against the now official Al-Qaeda group in Somalia, as well as a greater likelihood of U.S. drone strikes against Al-Shabab's leadership. Still, the organization's resilience throughout the years, the support it enjoys among the local populous, Somalia's strategic location, Al-Shabab's geographical proximity to their jihadi brethren in AQAP, and the weakness of Somalia's TFG are all parameters that must be taken into account when determining Al-Shaba's future in Somalia.
As previously mentioned, MYC announced the formation of AQEA following Al-Shabab's merger with Al-Qaeda. It is important to note, however, that no such entity was officially endorsed by either Al-Qaeda or Al-Shabab. Contrary to other official Al-Qaeda affiliates such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and AQAP, the use of AQEA by MYC can be seen as an attempt by the latter to express solidarity with what it perceives as its two big sister groups – Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda. It also demonstrates MYC's regional aspirations.
MYC is not the only group in East Africa known to maintain ties with Al-Shabab. One other group alleged to maintain such ties is the Tanzanian Ansaar Muslim Youth Center (AMYC), which is based in Tanga, Tanzania and headed by Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan.[29] In addition, individuals from Kenya, Tanzania, Eretria, and Sudan have been linked to Al-Shabab.[30]
*M. Khayat is a research fellow at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] Pumwani a large Nairobi suburb.
[4] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, August 1, 2012.
[6] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, July 27, 2012.
[11] Majengo is a slum outside Nairobi.
[12] Africareview.com, January 30, 2012.
[13] Themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, April 2, 2012.
[15] Themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, June 1, 2012.
[16] Africareview.com, January 30, 2012.
[17] Daily Nation (Kenya), January 22, 2012; The Telegraph (U.K.), February 29, 2012.
[18] Themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, July 5, 2012.
[19] Themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, June 20, 2012.
[22] As of this writing, Gaidi Mtaani's Twitter account is protected, such that only confirmed followers have access to its Tweets and profile.
[24] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, July 27, 2012.
[25] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, July 6, 2012.
[26] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, May 19, 2012.
[27] themovingcaravan.wordpress.com, April 19, 2012.
