Introduction
The first report in this series (MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm) reviewed the declaration of independence of the State of Azawad and the developments that immediately followed the declaration, focusing primarily on Azawad's domestic scene.
The following report focuses on Azawad's battle with Islamist terrorist organizations, which, acting in the service of neighboring countries opposed to an independent Azawad, aim to destabilize the nascent country and the MNLA. These organizations' first target was the presidency of Azawad, located in the transitional capital of Azawad, Gao.[1]
On June 27, 2012, Gao was set ablaze. Heavily armed contingents of the Al-Qaeda splinter group Monotheism Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO; in Arabic, "Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya") and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), seeking to gain control of the city, attacked the headquarters of the Transitional Council of the State of Azawad (CTEA), the provisional government of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).[2]
The attack followed the killing of a Songhai[3] city councilman in Gao, in which the Malian media and Islamist groups accused the MNLA. The MNLA, for its part, expressed certainty that MUJAO and AQIM had assassinated the Songhai councilman with an aim to spark ethnic conflict, by inciting the black Songhai population against the Tuareg-led MNLA, thereby weakening the MNLA politically and military, so that the organizations could take control of Gao and destabilize all of Azawad. Such a destabilization of the region, the MNLA claimed, would serve the interests of Algeria and Mali, which wish to prevent Azawad from being officially recognized by the international community.
Although during the battle the MNLA lost control of Gao to the Islamist movements, it claimed to have weakened the AQIM leadership by killing prominent commander in the AQIM's Sahara branch and Al-Mulathamin Brigade head Mokhtar Belmokhtar[4] (though it remains unclear whether Belmokhtar is in fact dead).
Now, the MNLA is preparing to fight back. But with the Islamist movements in Azawad (MUJAO, AQIM, Boko Haram, and Ansar Al-Din) benefitting from support from Algeria, Mali, and Qatar, the MNLA has asked the international community to back it in fighting the jihadis in Azawad and ridding the country of terrorism.[5]
The Killing Of A Songhai – The Pretext For The Attack On The MNLA
On June 25, 2012, unidentified gunmen in Gao shot and killed Idrissa Oumarou,[6] a city councilman and teacher and a member of the Songhai people.[7] Oumarou had reportedly left his home after receiving a phone call in the middle of the night. The Malian newspaper Journal du Mali reported that the Songhai man, who was gunned down while he was riding his motorbike, was taken to hospital by armed Islamists "playing the role of the police."[8]
The killing immediately sparked tension among Gao's Songhai population, as pro-Malian activists and Islamists spread rumors that the MNLA was responsible for the killing, while describing the Islamists as having tried to save Oumarou by bringing him to hospital. On June 26, a demonstration was held in downtown Gao, in front of the CTEA headquarters, protesting the killing of Oumarou, with demonstrators carrying Malian flags and black jihadi banners.[9] According to Malian media outlets, the pro-Malian group Nous pas Bouger[10] was one of the promoters of the demonstration. The group, which has direct links to the Malian government in Bamako,[11] took advantage of the occasion to stir up the local population against the MNLA, demanding reunification with Mali. It is worth noting that just a few days before the killing, Nous pas Bouger declared that its members in Gao sought to play a role in effecting the reunification of Mali, promising to wage a psychological war against the MNLA.[12]
Jihadis at the June 26, 2012 demonstration in Gao. The still, along with the one below, is taken from a pro-Islamist propaganda video posted on YouTube.[13] The video bears the name "Askia," the same name used to refer to rulers of the Songhai Empire. The subtitles read: "The mujahideen intervened to protect the population."
A car bearing the black jihadi flag, with Songhai demonstrators on board. The subtitles read: "The mujahideen's solidarity with the demonstrators."
On the day of the demonstrations, a member of Nous pas Bouger told the Malian press that the MNLA had killed the Songhai city councilman because he was opposed to the partition of Mali. The same source said that the MNLA had opened fire on demonstrators, allegedly killing one protestor. The MNLA, for its part, denied the allegations and accused MUJAO and AQIM of orchestrating Oumarou's killing, and of intentionally generating chaos during the demonstration in order to discredit the MNLA and spark socio-ethnic tension.
MUJAO, an Al-Qaeda splinter group mainly engaged in drug trafficking and kidnapping, was established and is based in the region of Gao. The group comprises militants from Gao (Songhai and Moors[14]) as well as non-Azawadis from Algeria and Niger. The movement's leader is Hamad Ould Mohamed Khairou, a Mauritanian citizen who was previously a militant in AQIM. Also among MUJAO's leaders is Ali Maiga, a Songhai who is head of Gao's Islamic police.[15]
Hamad Ould Mohamed Khairou[16]
The Tuareg media outlet Toumast Press[17] reported that the Nigerian group Boko Haram had also attempted to take advantage of the protest, and that members of the pro-Mali militia Ganda Koy[18] had joined the demonstrations. The presence of Ganda Koy would suggest intent on the part of the Malian government to spark an ethnic war, setting the Moors and Songhai against the Tuareg with an aim to persecute and eliminate the Tuareg population, after the model of the militia's war against the Tuareg in the 1990s.[19]
According to Toumast Press, the June 26 protest ended with no major clashes, though some protestors were injured: "During the demonstration, the 'axis of evil' did all it could to push the MNLA to fire against the crowd, which was under orders from MUJAO and Boko Haram. The MNLA's professionalism made it possible to disperse the crowd without any major harm to the civilian population."[20]
Demonstration in Gao. Poster reads: "Free Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal."[21]
On the evening of June 26, the CTEA officer for Azawadis Abroad, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Action, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, released a communiqué reading: "Yesterday, a teacher in his 50s was killed in Gao by unknown persons who allegedly tried to steal his motorcycle. However, he was most probably killed with premeditation, with an aim to incite the local population against the MNLA. At this moment, we still do not know the identity of the criminals, but we strongly condemn the ignoble assassination, which was exploited by certain armed groups to stir up the Songhai population against their Tuareg brothers in the MNLA.
"The march, organized today in Gao, toward the governorate where the CTEA is located, was entirely under the control of the armed groups... We know that there is an international coalition against the liberation of Azawad, and we also know that all means will be used to prevent [Azawad's independence], even if it means killing the population or imposing the shari'a on civilians who have courageously expressed their categorical rejection of the Islamist groups located in Azawadi territory..."[22]
Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, CTEA officer for Azawadis Abroad, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Action[23]
The same evening, the MNLA's official website published a similar communiqué by CTEA Information and Communications Officer Moussa Ag Assarid denouncing the Islamists for attempting to spark sectarian violence: "The MNLA and the CTEA strongly condemn these villainous acts, which have brought back into question all the work toward social cohesion and national reconciliation among all Azawadis that we commenced over the last months, and which was beginning to yield encouraging results... The regrettable events of these two days are certainly the indirect actions of the Malian authorities and certain allies of Mali... [which have collaborated] with the jihadi groups in Azawad for several years."[24]
The Battle Of Gao
Another demonstration against the MNLA was held June 27, 2012. This time, pro-Malian and Islamist groups came seeking direct confrontation. Protesters, along with MUJAO and Boko Haram activists, crossed MNLA security barriers set up to protect CTEA headquarters, which were occupied by civilians and a few military personnel protecting the governorate.
According to Toumast Press,[25] civilian protestors then stepped aside, while MUJAO and Boko Haram militants began attacking the headquarters with heavy weapons. MNLA media office chief Bakai Ag Hamad Ahmed reported in a communiqué[26] that Islamist militants hid inside a Toyota Hilux bearing the symbol of the Qatari Red Crescent, which gained them access to the headquarters. Once inside, the Islamists militants got out of the vehicle and attacked the CTEA building. Gao locals also reported seeing persons in cars bearing the Qatari Red Crescent fighting alongside MUJAO militants. These cars allegedly came from Niger's capital, Niamey.[27] Indeed, on June 25, 2012, AFP reported that four members of the Qatari Red Crescent had been in Gao since June 23, under the protection of the MUJAO.[28] The Qatari government denied any connection to or involvement in the clashes with the MNLA.[29]
A view of the city of Gao.[30]
During the Islamist attack on the CTEA headquarters, the Orange and Malitel telephone networks, and even the Thuraya satellite telephone network, were jammed, making it impossible for the MNLA to call for help. Toumast Press points out that the Islamist militants involved do not have the technology required to jam a satellite network, and suggests that the operation was supported by some countries (see below).
A Toumast Press report[31] described the development of the battle between the MNLA and the Islamists militants from MUJAO, Boko Haram, and AQIM: "Taken by surprise, and attacked on all sides, the roughly 20 fighters ensuring security to the [CTEA] presidency fought with courage and bravery. Despite their small numbers and lack of suitable weapons, these fighters almost managed to crush the MUJAO and Boko Haram terrorists.
MNLA fighters[32]
"After learning of its allies' defeat, AQIM quickly set out to the battlefield, taking along an impressive amount of weapons, with which it would have been possible in but a few minutes to destroy the presidency of Azawad [i.e. the CTEA headquarters], had the bravery of a small group of MNLA fighters [not prevented this]. The over-armed brigade of AQIM was led in person by AQIM's number one [man] in the Sahel, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The perfect organization of the MNLA fighters allowed [them] to kill more than 20 terrorists, including their leaders. Seeing that more than 100 terrorists were arriving on the battlefield as reinforcements, the small group of MNLA fighters decided to vacate the presidency and join the bulk of the Azawadian troops in the Fihroun camp [near the Gao airport]."[33]
MNLA Communications Officer Mossa Ag Attaher explained in a communiqué that unlike the Islamist militants, the MNLA's fighters protecting the CTEA headquarters made every possible effort to avoid using heavy weapons, taking into consideration that the building is located in Gao's city center. MNLA fighters arriving at the Fihroun camp close to the airport, he said, tried to draw the clashes outside the city, but MUJAO's jihadis opened fire in the middle of the city's streets, endangering the civilian population. The MNLA was hence forced to withdraw back to the military camp, which, Ag Attaher reported, is still occupied by MNLA fighters – contrary to the international media's assertion that "MNLA fighters had fled" it[34] (see Appendix).
During the battle, MNLA chief of operations Colonel Bouna Ag Attayoub[35] was killed, along with three other MNLA fighters, after they were reportedly betrayed by non-Tuareg fighters, allegedly Moors, who had infiltrated the MNLA. When the fighting commenced, these same non-Tuareg fighters turned their guns on Colonel Bouna and the three others, joining the fight on the side of MUJAO and AQIM. On July 1, CTEA Information and Communications Officer Moussa Ag Assarid reported that the body of Colonel Bouna and the other corpses of the MNLA fighters had been desecrated.
MNLA fighters. Sixth from the right is Colonel Intallah Ag Assayid,[36] an MNLA commander in the Gao region[37]
Toumast Press reported that on the evening of June 27, the Malian army started advancing toward the small town of Boni,[38] in Azawadian territory, but then returned to their base in Sevare, in Malian territory. The MNLA leadership called on the small group of MNLA fighters in Gao to go to Gossi – a village situated in a strategic area in the Timbuktu region, 85 kilometers south of Gao and 1,000 kilometers from Bamako – in order to avoid, for the moment, clashes with the Malian troops, who were accompanied by the pro-Malian militia Ganda Koy.
The Presumed Death Of Prominent AQIM Commander
Mokhtar Belmokhtar[39]
As mentioned above, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM's key commander in the Sahel, was reportedly killed by the MNLA during the fighting in Gao. Belmokhtar, among the most prominent commanders from Algeria, began his jihadi career in Afghanistan in the 1990s. He continued his terrorist activities in Algeria in 1993, joining the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) – which was created by the Algerian Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS)[40] – and later became the Sahara/Sahel commander of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which would later become AQIM.
The Kabyle website siwel.info reports that an MNLA fighter contacted by phone confirmed that Belmokhtar was "hit in the chest by a burst of gunfire shot by the brave officer Bouna Ag Attayoub, colonel of the Azawad Liberation Army." Colonel Bouna was subsequently gunned down by Islamist militants in response to the attack on their commander.[41] The website also reported that Belmokhtar's vehicle was destroyed by an MNLA rocket. In a June 29 communiqué, CTEA Officer for Information and Communication Moussa Ag Assarid[42] likewise confirmed that Belmokhtar had been killed. Siwel.info further reported that the corpses of two AQIM chiefs, the Algerian Belmokhtar and an unidentified Mauritanian, were brought to Gao's morgue on June 28.[43]
AQIM, however, denies that Belmokhtar was killed, as does the anti-MNLA online forum kidal.info. The website's moderator, Moustapha Dahi (ethnically a Moor, who refers to himself simply as an Arab) claims that Belmokhtar was seen on the afternoon of June 28 in downtown Gao, and that several people shook his hand.[44] On June 30, the Mauritanian news agency Agence Nouakchott d'Information (ANI) received a communiqué allegedly from Belmokhtar.[45] The agency, however, was not convinced that the letter had, in fact, been penned by the leader of AQIM, noting that this would be the first time an AQIM communiqué was signed "Khaled Abou Al-Abbas," one of Belmokhtar's aliases.[46] Indeed, the communiqué seems to be a ruse on AQIM's part meant to rob the MNLA of a key victory. The communiqué further claims that AQIM's main purpose in Gao is "maintaining the people's security, preserving public interests, and seeking to prevent any friction between the various military formations in the city as much as possible, considering the backgrounds and historical strife in the region." It further purports that AQIM's military action did not mark a declaration of war against the MNLA.[47]
Change In CTEA President's Policy
On June 26, CTEA President and MNLA Secretary-General Bilal Ag Cherif[48] was injured and immediately evacuated to Burkina Faso's capital, Ouagadougou. Ag Cherif was apparently attacked by a non-Tuareg who initially feigned siding with the MNLA, though other sources claim Ag Cherif was hit by stray friendly fire while trying to disperse the demonstration.
In the days prior to the fighting in Gao, Ag Cherif was criticized by MNLA members for having signed a memorandum of understanding with Ansar Al-Din on May 26, 2012.[49] The criticism centered around the notion that the MNLA, as a secular movement, must not compromise with the Tuareg-dominated Ansar Al-Din, which promotes shari'a law and has links with AQIM. MNLA members felt that Ag Cherif, in trying to prevent a fratricidal war between Tuaregs, was endangering the fight for a free Azawad, given the fact that Ansar Al-Din's leader Iyad Ag Ghaly did not state independence from Mali among his goals.
CTEA President Bilal Ag Cherif[50]
Ag Cherif's policy has been to maintain the status quo, convinced that tribal links and interests will prevent armed conflict between the MNLA and Ansar Al-Din, and keep Azawad stable, considering that Ag Cherif, Ag Ghaly, and Ansar Al-Din deputy Alghabass Ag Intallah all belong to the Ifoghas tribe.
CTEA Vice President Mahamadou Djeri Maiga, a Songhai, managed to escape the fighting in Gao. After Islamists took over the governorate, he announced to the media that the MNLA had lost the battle in Gao, but not the war. He then asked the international community to back the MNLA, in order to prevent the Islamists from taking control of Azawad.[51]
Following the Gao battle, the MNLA is no longer willing to negotiate with Islamist movements. Furthermore, despite limited resources, the MNLA seeks to move ahead with the liberation of Azawad, with or without the help of the international community.
Divisions Within Ansar Al-Din
While the MNLA fought the Islamist movements in Gao, Ansar Al-Din held an unusual meeting in Kidal, during which Ansar Al-Din's Tuareg fighters called on the movement's leader Iyad Ag Ghaly[52] to take action. According to Toumast Press,[53] Ag Ghaly replied by stating that Ansar Al-Din had only two choices: to fight alongside MUJAO, Boko Haram, and AQIM, or to act as a mediator and put an end to the fighting. In no case, he said, would Ansar Al-Din fight alongside the MNLA. The Tuareg fighters, chilled by the position taken up by Ag Ghaly, himself a Tuareg – considering that in Gao, their brothers, cousins, friends, and fellow tribesmen were being attacked and killed – began to walk out of the meeting, and headed toward Gao to come to the aid of their Tuareg brothers in the MNLA. Ag Ghaly, however, managed to block all of Kidal's exits, knowing that if they reached Gao they would join the MNLA.
Even before the fighting in Gao, relations within Ansar Al-Din were tense. Some Tuareg fighters had already left the movement, believing that Ag Ghaly was not truly interested in Azawadi independence, but was rather biding his time until he could hand the region back to Mali as part of an agreement that would profit him and his close supporters. Toumast Press reported on a rift within the movement's leadership, citing disagreements between Ag Ghaly and his deputy, Alghabass Ag Intallah,[54] who is said to be more flexible toward the MNLA.[55]
Moreover, Ag Intallah's father, Ifoghas amenokal (tribal leader) Intallah Ag Attaher, has for months been urging his son to leave Ansar Al-Din, fearing that foreign non-Azawadi groups may attempt to take control over Azawad. It is unclear whether Alghabass, who up to this point has been driven by opportunism, will seek to reach a compromise with Mali and hand the region back to it in exchange for profitable conditions – or will stand up for the interests of the dominating Ifoghas tribe, to which he belongs and in which he is expected to replace his father as amenokal. Considering the latter expectation, he is likely to strike a compromise with AQIM militants only if the interests of his tribe are ensured and if it is given a predominant role in Azawad.
Ansar Al-Din did not participate actively in the battle of Gao. However, it is an important partner of AQIM and MUJAO in fighting to take control over the three Azawadi regions: Kidal,[56] Gao, and Timbuktu. Before the events in Gao, the MNLA controlled the area surrounding Timbuktu's airport, which is 10 kilometers from the city, itself controlled by Ansar Al-Din and MUJAO, with some areas held by the National Liberation Front of Azawad (FLNA). The latter is an Arab militia that opposes the MNLA, but its political agenda is unclear. Kidal was divided between the MNLA and Ansar Al-Din, whereas Gao was controlled by the MNLA and MUJAO.
After the battle of Gao, the MNLA withdrew from the major city centers, and has since been preparing to reconquer the areas it lost. The MNLA has not yet attacked Gao, because the Islamists have taken hostage several Tuaregs, both civilians and MNLA personnel, and will execute them if attacked. Indirect negotiations are currently underway to effect the release of the hostages.
The Algerian And Qatari Presence In Azawad
A few days prior to the fighting in Gao, Tuareg media outlets reported on the Algerian and Qatari presence in Azawad. For example, as noted, on June 25, AFP reported that four members of the Qatari Red Crescent were seen in Gao, under the protection of MUJAO, and on June 27, locals reported that cars marked with the Qatari Red Crescent were seen fighting alongside MUJAO. According to Toumast Press, the week before the June 27 battle, at least two high-ranking officials in the Algerian Army were in Gao to train MUJAO.[57]
It is worth noting that on June 25, the Algerian media reported that an Ansar Al-Din mission was received in Algiers by Algerian President Abelaziz Bouteflika.[58] Furthermore, Toumast Press reported that MNLA fighters wounded in the Gao battle sought medical treatment in Algeria but were refused admission to a hospital in Tinzawatene, just across the border in Algeria. According to the Azawadi news agency, the Algerian authorities stated they would only treat fighters belonging to Ansar Al-Din, and not those from the MNLA.[59] In addition, siwel.info claims that Qatar and Algeria are financing jihad groups in Azawad. [60]
Epilogue: All-Out War Against Islamist Terrorists
Siwel.info reports that MNLA fighters are engaged in an all-out war against AQIM, and that the MNLA is deeply enraged following the killing of Colonel Bouna Ag Attayoub. An MNLA fighter told the website that "from now on, notwithstanding what politics might say, a comprehensive war will be waged against Islamist terrorists, whomever they may be, because no negotiation or understanding is possible with Islamist groups. These people must be fought."[61]
Toumast Press further reported that despite setbacks, the morale of the MNLA's fighters remains high, and that they are united in the goal of ridding Azawad of any terrorist presence. It stressed that the MNLA was calling on the international community to help it in fighting the jihadi groups and to ensure the success of its fight against terror.[62]
APPENDIX: MNLA Communications Officer Mossa Ag Attahar On The Situation In Gao[63]
"Clarification Regarding The Situation In Gao:
"Today, AFP announced that 'MUJAO occupied the headquarters of the MNLA.' The news had also been taken up by certain Western, Malian, and Algerian media. They announced that the MNLA had suffered a serious defeat to MUJAO, and that 'MNLA fighters had fled, [while] others were killed and yet others arrested.'
"We [wish to] clarify the following:
· "The CTEA's headquarters were occupied by civilians and not by the military. The MNLA's military headquarters are located in Military Camp No. 1, and not within the governorate's premises.
· "Casualties were not limited to the MNLA's ranks, though I will abstain from any macabre body count. The near future will reestablish the facts.
· "MUJAO terrorists received support from several units of AQIM, and one [of AQIM's] chiefs was killed by MNLA fighters. We will confirm the identity of the killed terrorist at a later stage.
· "MNLA's fighters who were protecting the headquarters tried as much as possible to avoid the use of heavy weapons, considering the fact that the headquarters are located in the city center.
· "MNLA's fighters, once they arrived in the vicinity of the military camp close to the airport, tried to move the clashes outside the city, but MUJAO's jihadis opened fire in the middle of the streets, endangering the civilian populations and forcing the MNLA to withdraw inside the military camp, which is still occupied by MNLA fighters – contrary to AFP's assertion that the 'MNLA fighters had fled.'
"It should also be clarified that the [terrorist] forces present in Azawad are not limited to the physical presence of armed groups. There is also the logistic, financial, and media support offered by certain foreign powers, which back without reservation the Islamist groups operating in our territory, while they outrageously denigrate the only democratic movement in the country.
"Where is the international community, which has not stopped asking the MNLA to 'better define' its position vis-à-vis Islamism and to pursue the fight against Islamism? What support does it offer the MNLA in this new war that we are conducting against the narco-terrorists of MUJAO? Where is the international press, which is supposed to promote liberty and democracy? Yes, where are all these schoolmasters?
"With or without the help of the international community, the MNLA will fight to the end against the enemies of Azawad, and will never abandon the fight that was started for the freedom of the people of Azawad. At this very moment, some of the MNLA units stationed along Azawad's borders are coming back toward the interior of the territory in order to wholly liberate the city of Gao from the Islamists of MUJAO, who are terrorizing the population. This is a new phase of the war which has been imposed on us by the enemies of our people. We will carry it out with courage and determination, and we hereby raise a call to the peoples who are our brothers and our friends to show the MNLA mass support, with all means available.
"Glory to our martyrs of yesterday and of today.
"Viva free and democratic Azawad.
"Mossa Ag Attaher
"MNLA Communications Officer"
*Anna Mahjar-Barducci is Research Fellow for North African Studies at MEMRI.
Endnotes:
[1] Reports in the international media about Azawad either lack primary source materials or are deliberately ignoring them, as part of what seems to be regional as well as Western opposition to the creation of the new State of Azawad, despite the fact that the MNLA is a pro-Western, secular movement that fights terrorism. This MEMRI report, like the previous report, MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm,, seeks to balance the reporting on the region by including primary source materials coming from the region.
[2] On June 7, the MNLA established the 28-member CTEA. The CTEA's president is MNLA Secretary-General Bilal Ag Cherif, and its vice-president Mahamadou Djeri Maiga, a Songhai and likewise a member of the MNLA. See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[3] The Songhai (also spelled Songhay or Sonrai) are a people living in West Africa. The Songhai Empire dominated the western Sahel in the 15th and 16th centuries. According to the Malian census, the Songhai people are a majority in Azawad. However, the data may be incorrect, in light of the Malian government's attempt to downplay the number of Tuareg in Azawad, for political reasons. It must be also taken into account that at least a million Azawadi Tuareg, many of them refugees, live in the diaspora.
[4] Abdelkader Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as "Belaouer" or "Laouer" i.e. "the one-eyed," Khaled Abou Al-Abbas, and Mister Marlboro), an Algerian jihadi (b. 1972), is a former Algerian soldier with experience in training camps in Afghanistan. See http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml.
[5] For more on the MNLA, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[6] Idrissa Oumarou Maïga was a city councilman for the rural community of Gounzoureye, in the Gao Cercle in the Gao region, and a member of the political party Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali, Adéma), of which transitional Malian President Dioncounda Traore is also a member. Maïga was also a teacher and director of the Chateau upper-school in Gao.
[7] While according to Toumast Press, the Malian media and the Islamist movements were accusing the MNLA of killing the Songhai city councilman in order to "steal [his] motorbike," the news agency pointed out that "just one of the MNLA's vehicles would have fetched more money than the sale of 100 vehicles similar to the one [belonging to] the late Maïga."
[8] Journal du Mali (Mali), June 26, 2012.
[9] Mnlamov.net.
[10] Journal du Mali (Mali), June 26, 2012.
[11] Xinua (China), June 21, 2012.
[12] Xinua (China), June 21, 2012.
[13] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ve8EXTrp0uE.
[14] The term "Moors" (maures in French) refers to Arabic speakers, many of whom define themselves as Arabs. Most Moor tribes reside in Azawad and Mauritania. They can be fair-skinned (bidân) or dark-skinned.
[15] http://www.essor.ml/regions/article/affrontement-entre-groupes-armes-a
[16] Alakhbar.info.
[17] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[18] The Patriotic Malian Movement Ganda Koy, better known simply as Ganda Koy (also spelled Gandakoy, "Masters of the Land"), was established in the 1990s to fight the Tuareg in their uprising in Azawad. Ganda Koy was founded by Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, former head of Mali's State Security and a former minister. The movement is lead by the charismatic Imam Mohammed n'Tissa Maiga. Ganda Koy is a Songhai militia that openly advocates the extermination of the Tuareg people and the "white" Moors (see Endnote 14, above). The militia defines the Tuareg as thieves, bandits, predators, and genetically inferior people. "The armed rebel-bandits are racists, slave-owners... Gangsterism is the normal state of being for a Tamashek [i.e. Tuareg]. They are a foreign body in [our] social tissue," said the Ganda Koy in the 1990s, as reported by Le Monde Diplomatique. The Malian media in its articles on the Tuareg echo the same Ganda Koy's discriminatory discourse: Tuareg people are presented as a primitive stage of humanity that can never constitute an organized society or administer a territory. Ganda Koy was responsible for "pogroms" against the Tuareg population between 1994 and 1996. In recent years, a new group, Ganda Iso (also spelled Ganda Izo, "The Sons of the Land") emerged in Azawad, with the goal of fighting against the Tuareg secessionists. Ganda Iso likewise comprises Songhai militants. Both groups, Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso, are highly active in the Gao region. See http://toumastpress.com/autres/lettre-ouverte/748-lettre-ouverte-s-e-hama-ag-mahmoud-rfi.html; Helene Claudot Hawad, 'Négrafricanisme' et racisme," Monde Diplomatique, April 1995.
[19] In June 1990, the second Tuareg rebellion broke out, the first one happened in 1963.
[20] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[21] AFP, malijet.com, June 26, 2012.
[22] Tamazgha.fr, June 27, 2012.
[23] Siwel.info.
[24] Mnlamov.net.
[25] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[26] Azawad Press (Azawad), June 30, 2012.
[27] Mauripress.info, July 1, 2012.
[28] Jeune Afrique (Paris), June 25, 2012.
[29]Azawad Press (Azawad), June 30, 2012.
[30] Essor.ml.
[31] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[32] Tamazgha.fr.
[33] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[34] Siwel.info, June 28, 2012.
[35] Colonel Bouna Ag Attayoub was a high-ranking official in the Malian Army who deserted to fight in the MNLA. As part of an anti-Azawad propaganda campaign, the Malian media posted photos online of the dead bodies of Attayoub and the other three MNLA fighters.
[36] Intallah Ag Assayid is from the Chamanamass tribe (the same tribe as Bouna Ag Attayoub) and is the grandson of the former Chamanamass tribal chief. Intallah Ag Assayid, Assalat Ag Habi, Mbareck Akli, Hassan Habri (all Colonels or Commandants), and others, all from the Chamananass tribe swore to avenge the death of Colonel Bouna. The Chamanamass who is a tribe living in the Gao region are along with the Idnane, the most opposed to Ansar Al-Din's leader Iyad Ag Ghaly and to the jihadist groups. It is believed that currently, it is the Idnanes and Chamanamass (armed and civilians) who are the most targeted in Gao.
[37] Malijet.com.
[38] Boni is a village in the Mopti region, five kilometers south of the main road that links Mopti to Gao.
[39] http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=5921¶m=GJN
[40] Mohammed Samraoui, a former colonel from the Algerian army, who defected to Germany in 1996, describes in his 2003 book Chronique des annees de sang ("Chronicles of the Bloody Years") how in the spring of 1992, the Algerian army's upper echelon decided that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which had won the first round of elections, constituted a threat to their own power and should be eliminated. The fight against the Islamists was also an opportunity to get rid of other "enemies" of the Algerian regime, such as human rights activists and Kabylie's Amazigh (Berber) leaders, who were also accused of being on the "payroll of France." As an example of the hysteria that prevailed in the army during those years, Samraoui reports Gen. Smail Lamari, head of the counter-intelligence division of the DRS, as having said: "I am ready to kill three million Algerians, if that is what it takes to maintain the order that the Islamists are threatening." In this context, the DRS became involved in the creation of GIA, which committed the most atrocious crimes in the country's history. In 1992, the media reported on Moh Leveilley, who headed GIA, as one of the most dangerous Islamist terrorists. Samraoui recounts that he personally met Moh, who served as the first "emir" of GIA, which was "created in the DRS." Samraoui wrote: "Moh was an agent of the secret service, 'fabricated' to become their Islamist puppet and to commit terrorist attacks to terrorize the population. He was finally killed by the same security forces... in 1992. He was just one of the many 'DRS emirs' to be placed at the head of GIA and removed once their mission was accomplished." Mohammed Samraoui, Chronique des annees de sang, Editions Denoël, 2003, pp. 162-168.
[41] As mentioned, Toumast Press reported that Colonel Bouna was killed by non-Tuareg fighters who had infiltrated the MNLA, swearing allegiance to the Azawadi flag, and then turned against the movement by fighting alongside AQIM and MUJAO. The website Tamazgha Press claims that Bouna and Belmokhtar found each other face to face during the fighting, and that Belmokhtar, who was shot in his chest by Bouna, managed to kill the colonel just before dying himself. See Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012; Tamazgha Press (France), June 28, 2012
[42] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 29, 2012.
[43] MNLA media office chief Bakai Ag Hamad Ahmad reported that the body of an AQIM activist known as Inki, "a Telemsi Arab" from the Gao region, was also brought to Gao's mortuary. Inki was allegedly mourned by a jihadi blog. Azawad Press (Azawad), June 30, 2012; elkhebar.info, July 1, 2012; siwel.info, June 28, 2012.
[44] Kidal.info, June 28, 2012
[45] ANI (Mauritania), July 1, 2012. The communiqué was published in Arabic by Sahara Medias (Mauritania), on July 1, 2012. It was also translated into English and published on the Ansar Al-Mujahideen English Forum.
[46] ANI (Mauritania), June 30, 2012.
[47] ANI (Mauritania), July 1, 2012.
[48] For more information on Bilal Ag Cherif, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[49] Ibid. http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[50] Tuareg sources report that Bilal Ag Cherif, who is allegedly 35 years old, may be even younger.
[51] Slateafrique.com, June 28, 2012.
[52] For more information on Iyad Ag Ghaly, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[53] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012
[54] Alghabass Ag Intallah was briefly a member of the MNLA, before joining Ansar Al-Din. To read more on Ag Intallah, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.848, "MNLA: The Fight For A Secular State Of Azawad," June 19, 2012, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6462.htm.
[55] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 9, 2012.
[56] Kidal is the area of influence of the Ifoghas tribe, to which, as mentioned, Iyad Ag Ghaly, Alghabass Ag Intallah, and Bilal Ag Cherif belong.
[57] Toumast Press (Azawad), June 28, 2012.
[58] Le Matin DZ (Algeria), June 25, 2012
[59] Toumast Press (Azawad), July 2, 2012.
[60] Siwel.info, June 3, 2012.
[61] Siwel.info, June 28, 2012.
[62] Toumast Press (Azawad), July 1, 2012.
[63] Siwel.info, July 2, 2012.
