The High Peace Council was set up in October 2010 (Image courtesy: tolonews.com)
A recent article in a leading Afghan newspaper examined the status of the Afghan government's so-called talks with the Taliban and other militant groups and the prospects of peace in Afghanistan. The article is important in view of the Afghan government's own efforts for peace with the Taliban, especially the setting up of the High Peace Council (HPC) under former President Burhanuddin Rabbani to directly talk to militant groups.
Moh'd Mehdi Rezaie, the author of the article titled "Reconciliation with Taliban and Prospects," noted that currently the Taliban are now in a better situation than in the past, and in fact may no longer be dependent for support on foreign sanctuaries in Pakistan. The article was published in the Daily Outlook Afghanistan, an English-language newspaper. It should be noted that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban's shadow government) has consistently denied that they are engaging in any peace talks.
Arguing that the best path to stabilizing Afghanistan is to strengthen the government and reduce corruption in the country, Rezaie noted: "The most important component of any viable plan to stabilize the country should be to strengthen the rule of the government of Afghanistan and extend its reach throughout the country. For this purpose, it is a foregone conclusion that we must improve the governance – and not only the government – in the country, reduce corruption, and make the government into a legitimate representative of our national diversities and aspirations."
Following are excerpts from the article:[1]
"It is Safe to Assume that the Taliban Leadership will Continue the Battle Since … They Believe They are Winning"
"The myriad groups that are called under the umbrella name of insurgency, including the Taliban and the Quetta Shura, have so far not shown any real willingness to seriously negotiate. Talking and negotiating with the Taliban and the broader insurgency is increasingly proving to be a pipedream that was a figment of imagination of some desperate Western capitals and an Afghan government that continues to be detached from the realities on the ground. The insurgency, with the winter behind it, is set to erupt again with renewed force and tenacity, as has been the case year after year.
"There was a rather sudden hue and cry raised in the Western capitals and media about the need to open paths of talks, dialogue, and reconciliation with the Taliban as the principal insurgent group. American and British politicians and military commanders steering the war here in Afghanistan expressed doubts regarding the prospects of a military victory over the Taliban, and started talking of negotiations and reconciliation. The subsequent High Council for Peace, established by President Karzai, raised the hopes of reining in the Taliban insurgency and bringing peace to the country almost overnight. But the realities are quite different.
"Afghan insurgencies, throughout history, have been resilient and been able to endure for long [times], turning conflicts into protracted wars of attrition in which the offending armies have exhausted themselves and eventually withdrew. The Taliban will be, no doubt, resilient and will be in it for the long haul. It is safe to assume that the Taliban leadership will continue the battle since they see no tangible benefit in abandoning a battle which they believe they are winning."
"The Taliban, At Present, are More Determined Than at Any Time over the Past Decade"
"The declaration at the NATO summit in Portugal last November affirming that NATO will end its combat mission in Afghanistan by 2014 and will take up supportive roles afterwards has come as a morale booster to the Taliban leadership, as well as their rank and file. They are sure to deem this announcement as an endorsement of their belief that the time is not far when NATO and its allied forces will leave Afghanistan. This is despite the fact that the U.S. has already made it clear that it intends to remain in Afghanistan militarily, although in much reduced numbers, for an indefinite period of time beyond 2014.
"The construction of mega-large military bases around the country at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars for the stationing of U.S. military troops is only one among many indications that the U.S. will militarily remain in Afghanistan well beyond 2014. Military forces from other NATO member countries also will remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014, although they are likely to end combat missions and instead take up supporting roles, as announced in the Lisbon Summit.
"The mistaken temptation in Western capitals and Kabul to think that it is possible to persuade the Taliban to give up fighting and abandon the war by means of offering them concessions and privileges is strong. President Karzai, in his public speeches, has many times even gone to the extent of putting emotionally-charged requests to the Taliban leadership to abandon violence. But the bitter fact remains that the Taliban, at present, are more determined than at any time over the past decade in pressing ahead with their insurgency. The recent sharp increase in suicide attacks and killing of civilians – attacks in Kabul's city center mall, Kunduz, and Jalalabad's Kabul bank – indicate that militants are determined to continue with the war."
"The Taliban, Today as Opposed to a Few Years Ago, are No Longer as Dependent on Sanctuaries and Support… from Across Our Borders as They were a Few Years Ago"
"What is being observed in recent years is the increasing Afghanization and indigenization of the Taliban insurgency in the country. The Taliban, today as opposed to a few years ago, are no longer as dependent on sanctuaries and support provided to them from across our borders as they were a few years ago. Today, the Taliban insurgency is becoming increasingly Afghanized and indigenized. In many swaths of our rural areas, it is increasingly our own Afghan population that is providing cadres for recruitment and support to the insurgency. This has made the task of defeating the insurgency by military means much more difficult.
"This is one of the main reasons as to why the West's strategy of building popular support for the government and wooing the Taliban militants is failing. As the current state of affairs stand in the country, persuading the Taliban to sit at the negotiation table is nothing more than wishful thinking. Weaning away dubious militants in the hundreds on the grounds that they claim they are insurgents and calling it an achievement in the way of bringing peace to country does nothing more than delude ourselves.
"Negotiation and reconciliation with the Taliban can be possible only when the root causes of the problems are recognized. This, apart from strong political will on the part of all the countries and actors, involves setting the right mechanisms in place and working out the modalities of the negotiations in close collaboration and consultation with those countries that are direct stakeholders in the Afghanistan conflict.
"The most important component of any viable plan to stabilize the country should be to strengthen the rule of the government of Afghanistan and extend its reach throughout the country. For this purpose, it is a foregone conclusion that we must improve the governance – and not only the government – in the country, reduce corruption, and make the government into a legitimate representative of our national diversities and aspirations.
"In any conceivable plan, the international support to the Afghanistan government, security forces, and people should continue for many years to come if the international community and Afghanistan are to achieve these goals. Building capable Afghan security forces should continue and be expedited and the resources allotted for that increased. These are the only alternatives to a grim fate that might be awaiting the country, should the international community and the Afghan government fail in this project."
Endnote:
[1] Daily Outlook Afghanistan (Afghanistan), March 21, 2011. The text of the article has been lightly edited for clarity.
