On October 16, 2010, an Afghan website published an article by a leading Afghan government adviser, examining the stakes involved in the Afghan war and its possible outcomes, and arguing for the U.S. to continue its role in Afghanistan. The article, written Dr. Davood Moradian, a senior adviser to the Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan, was published on the Afghan website tolonews.com.
In the article, Dr. Moradian warns against "pessimistic narratives" such as conversations in the media about the withdrawal of U.S. troops in July 2011 and peace talks with the Taliban. He stresses that the international community must continue to build a positive narrative about the war in Afghanistan.
The writer warns that the Pakistani intelligence's role in sponsoring terrorism in Afghanistan and the wider region is a "fundamental issue" that needs to be dealt with. Calling for the Pakistani military leaders to be treated like the Qods Brigade of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) [that is, it should be declared a terrorist organization and there should be sanctions against it], he notes: "Pakistan's military-intelligence agencies are involved in sponsoring terrorism in Afghanistan and the region and yet, it is treated as a respected partner by the international community."
Following are excerpts from the article:[1]
"[Afghan] Armed Forces have Earned the Right to Be Proud of Their Achievements and Sacrifices in Afghanistan, Particularly Since President Barack Obama's Election"
"On the 9th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil in September 2001, Afghanistan has reemerged once again as one of the most critical foreign policy issues for the U.S. government, think tanks, and public at large. Sadly, the bad news, particularly in recent weeks and months, [is regarding issues that] have contributed to growing voices in the U.S. and elsewhere of the impossibility of the mission in Afghanistan. We are struggling in the battle of perceptions both in Afghanistan and outside. But as with many other walks of life, the reality is far different from the perception.
"In the case of Afghanistan, in reality, we have made significant progress in many sectors and areas; and certainly our armed forces have earned the right to be proud of their achievements and sacrifices in Afghanistan, particularly since President Barack Obama's election. Unfortunately in and on Afghanistan, there are far more pessimistic voices than optimistic ones…
"Afghanistan is becoming the U.S.'s longest war and a very expensive undertaking, as well as a very frustrating and tiring conflict for us in Afghanistan. Yet, we are not in a position to answer fundamental questions about the conflict in Afghanistan. Neither in Kabul, nor in Brussels, nor in [Washington,] DC is there a reasonable consensus about the nature of the Afghan conflict or the definition of the end state. Unfortunately, now the growing focus is on 'when' this undefined mission should end. In another words, rather than contemplating the 'why' and 'what,' we are often thinking and working on 'when' and on often politically-derived deadlines. The 'why' and 'what' questions should inform the questions on 'how' and 'when."'
"Afghanistan… [is] a Critical Component of the Regions of the South and Central Asia and [Key to] the Transformation of the Islamic World"
"In answering to the question of why the U.S., or for that matter the international community, are in Afghanistan and what are the main drivers of the Afghan conflict, there are a spectrum of answers and views, from an extremely minimalist and reductionist view of anti-terror and anti-Al-Qaeda perspective to a little more significant view of the counter-insurgency (COIN) community to a more realistic advocates of nation-building to the strategic view of regional transformation and global governance.
"The author subscribes to the latter view, which sees Afghanistan as a critical component of the regions of the South and Central Asia and [key to] the transformation of the Islamic world. The anti-terror, the COIN, and/or nation-building perspectives are parts of the bigger picture.
"Prior to making the case for the strategic importance of Afghanistan for the region and the process of transformation of the Islamic world, one is obliged to remind our American friends, and for that matter the beneficiaries of the Cold War, of their moral responsibility towards the Afghan nation who facilitated the demise of their ideological rival, the communist bloc, by paying the heaviest price in blood, suffering, and displacement.
"Painfully, we were left abandoned when the mission was accomplished in the late-1980s to the forces of extremism, criminality, and the region's meddling. As the Polish foreign minister stated many times, the free world has a moral obligation towards the Afghan people."
"[Failure in Afghanistan] would Give the International Jihadists Another Global Victory Who Can [then] Proudly Claim Credit for the Defeat of Two 'Infidel' Superpowers"
"There can be only two end states for Afghanistan: A secure, prosperous, moderate, and democratic Afghanistan - or metaphorically the Turkey of the East - or secondly, the Somalia of Asia. The Somalization of Afghanistan remains a distinct possibility with the following consequences: A bloody civil war and the ensuing proxy war of Afghanistan's neighbors, which will then accelerate the process of territorial disintegration of the country and its domino effects on Pakistan, Central Asia, China, Iran. and India. It would give the international jihadists another global victory, who can [then] proudly claim credit for the defeat of two 'infidel' superpowers [including the USSR] in less than three decades in one place [Afghanistan].
"Very few believe that the international community and the U.S. can afford another Central Africa type of conflict system in the heart of Asia. Unlike the Africa conflict system, our region happens to have three nuclear powers of India, Pakistan, China, and an aspiring one Iran. Unlike the African conflicts, which are mainly ethnicized and local, our region is the home of global jihadist movements and a haven for the drug mafia.
"The consequences of the Somalization of Afghanistan, therefore, will not be confined to our border and even to our immediate neighbors, but it will certainly encapsulate faraway regions of the world. September 11 showed us that such a scenario is not an academic projection or a war game exercise."
"Pakistan is a Collapsing State with Hundred of Nuclear Weapons and a Growing Radicalized… Population; a Stable Afghanistan will be a Key Asset"
"Another end state is a secure, prosperous, moderate, and democratic Afghanistan, or the Turkey of the East. If one looks at the map of the region, Afghanistan is located in the heart of four important geo-strategic regions: Central Asia, South Asia, China/Far-East, and the Middle East. These four strategic regions present unprecedented natural and human potentials as well as significant security challenges. A stable Afghanistan, therefore, can play an important role in both utilizing the opportunities as well as managing the challenges.
"For example, Pakistan is a collapsing state with hundred of nuclear weapons and a growing radicalized society and population. A stable Afghanistan will be a key asset for the international community to manage a collapsing and radicalized Pakistan.
"On the other hand, China and India's rising power and status can play a very important role in stabilization of Pakistan and the region's development. This can only happen by integration of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Central Asia, China, and the Middle East via trade, commerce, transit, and energy networks, or the recreating a new version of the Silk Route. Regional cooperation in the fields of trade, transit, transportation, and other economic activities needs a stable Afghanistan.
"A stable Afghanistan can also play an important role in protecting Central Asian states from an expansionist Russia, by linking these states with the South Asia and the Middle East security and trade structures. In short, Afghanistan is as important and strategic as the Strait of Malacca in South East Asia."
"We are Not Asking for a New Status, Or a Jeffersonian Democracy, but a New and Updated Version of Our Historical and Geo-Strategic Status and Position"
"Another important role of Afghanistan is its place in the ongoing transformation of the Islamic World. The Islamic nations have not been fully accommodated or integrated into the global system. Many in the Islamic world are struggling to make sense of their relations with modernity, globalization and the Western world. Unfortunately, the U.S. has few bridges with the Islamic world. A stable and moderate Afghanistan is the natural bridge between the two worlds, and a member of the alliance of moderation in the Islamic world alongside Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bosnia, and Tunis.
"Alongside Iran, the Afghan society is progressively transforming towards a secular and moderate society mainly as a backlash against the theocratic experiences of mujahideen and the Taliban, unlike places such as Pakistan, Central Asia, and Egypt, where we see the gradual Islamization of societies in response to bitter authoritarian and failed secular regimes.
"The view of Afghanistan as the Turkey of the East contradicts conventional and popular views of the country. Many of us characterize and know Afghanistan as the graveyard of empires, or in the words of UK Defense Secretary a 'broken 13th-century,' xenophobic and tribal society. Although for many Afghans, it can be glorifying to see their country as the graveyard of the empires, but for the students of history, it is a myth and fiction that has been shaped by uniformed reading of history. A part from a handful of adventures, the territory that is known as Afghanistan has always been either a center or part of various empires.
"One good example is the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom that was established after Alexander the Great's adventure to Asia. It was the first ever model of the East-West co-existence and inter-action. Our vision for Afghanistan as a crossroads and a bridge is derived not only from our geography but also from our history and culture. So, we are not asking for a new status, or a Jeffersonian Democracy but a new and updated version of our historical and geo-strategic status and position. Furthermore, our demographic feature is another driver for a new Afghanistan. Nearly 2/3 of our population is below the age of 30 and mainly disconnected and alien from their parents' past experiences and expectations…"
"Either a Hasty Disengagement or an Honorable Exit will Accelerate the Process of Somalization [of Afghanistan]"
"The United States holds the key in either the Somalization of Afghanistan or the revival of the Silk Route, where Afghanistan will have a strategic place and role to play. Either a hasty disengagement or an honorable exit will accelerate the process of Somalization. On the other hand, the U.S.'s long-term and comprehensive engagement with Afghanistan will ensure and push forward the revival of the silk Route. Such an engagement need not be solely military or expensive. It needs to be a smart and a principled one.
"The U.S.'s soft power and its rich non-governmental sectors and resources such as universities and foundations need to be further utilized, alongside mobilizing domestic and regional resources. Fortunately, and despite growing frustration and impatience, the goodwill of the Afghan people and absolute commitment of the Afghan government for a strategic partnership with the U.S. remain strong and solid.
"As with all nations, the United States is known to possess certain characteristics as well as some hubris. The idealistic can-do-spirit and the eternal optimism of the U.S.' natural and national characteristics have achieved impossible tasks and missions, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, defeat of communism [during the Cold War], or the election of President Obama.
"If the U.S. remains committed to these values, Afghanistan will join the list of U.S.'s achievements of challenging tasks. But if it fails to resist its impatience tendency needless to say what will happen. We all should remind ourselves of President [Ronald] Reagan's characterization of this great nation, when he said, 'America is too great for small dreams."
"Pakistani Generals Must be… Treated Like Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Corps [Guards] Quds Commanders; If Not, There will Not be Any Prospect for Success in Afghanistan"
"Another fundamental issue is the role of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment. Based on the most liberal definition of terrorism, and all open source information, the Pakistani military-intelligence agencies are involved in sponsoring terrorism in Afghanistan and the region, and yet it is treated as a respected partner by the international community.
"As Dr. [Rangin Dadfar] Spanta, Afghanistan's National Security Adviser, characterized Pakistani's army, 'It is the main aggressor of the Afghan conflict,' and thus responsible for the killing of hundreds of the U.S., Afghan, and the coalition soldiers.
"At the very least, Pakistani generals must be viewed and treated like Iran's Islamic Revolutionary [Guards] Corps Qods Brigade. If not, there will not be any prospect for success in Afghanistan."
"[T]he Prevailing Corruption and Nepotism in Our State Institutions… Needs to be Forcefully Confronted by the Afghan Government"
"The issue of governance and corruption is another important priority to our joint mission. We are really grateful for the Obama administration to recognize corruption as a fundamental issue. For a number of years, this discourse was almost absent from the list of our priorities. However, a successful anti-corruption drive can only pay dividend when in it is contextualized, de-politicized, and institutionalized in realities and institutions of Afghanistan.
"The New York Times editorial board's crusade against the Afghan corruption is not the most effective way to this end.
"This issue can also be seen from rather a controversial perspective. We are faced with three insurgencies in Afghanistan, or three Shuras [decision-making centers]: the ISI-directed Quetta Shura, the Kabul Shura, and the Washington Shura. Unfortunately, there is no agreement about the role and the proportion of responsibility of each Shura.[2]
"The Kabul Shura is the prevailing corruption and nepotism in our state institutions, which needs to be forcefully confronted by the Afghan government. Lack of strategic patience, short-termism, politicization of governance, public demonizing of Afghan state institutions, failure to explain adequately the mission to the American people, and appeasement of Pakistan's military-intelligence are the main sins and vices of the Washington Shura…"
"[P]essimistic Narratives Such as July 2011 Withdrawal… Corruption, Civilian Casualty and Peace with the Taliban have Generated… Pessimism in Afghanistan and Elsewhere"
"In light of growing uncertainty and pessimism, there is an urgent need for (re)articulating a new constructive mega narrative for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, existing destructive and pessimistic narratives such as the July 2011 withdrawal, transition, corruption, civilian casualties, and peace with the Taliban have generated significant amount of negative energy and pessimism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
"Only by articulating a positive mega-narrative, we can prevail in the battle of perceptions and ensuing success on the ground.
"The outcomes of the two end states for Afghanistan have well been articulated by the following observation by a student of the Kabul University:
"'If the world exports us terrorists, we will send them back more committed and ruthless terrorists as well as with dozen kilograms of hashish and opium. But if the world helps us, we will export new generation of Zoroaster, Maulana Jalal Din Balkhi [poet Rumi], Avicenna, [Islamic reformer] Jamaluddin Afghani, [Gandhian Afghan leader] Padshah Khan, and juicy Kandahari pomegranates and premium Herati saffron."'
Endnotes:
[1] www.tolonews.com (Afghanistan), October 16, 2010. The text of the article has been lightly edited for clarity.
[2] The reference to Quetta Shura means the executive council of the Taliban run by the ISI, or Inter-Services Intelligence of the Pakistani military.
