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July 29, 2010 Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 627

Will Russia Be the Superpower That Will Stop Iran from Going Nuclear?

July 29, 2010 | By A. Savyon*
Iran | Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 627

Introduction

On May 17, 2010, the presidents and foreign ministers of Iran, Brazil, and Turkey met in Tehran and released the Tehran Declaration. While the declaration itself concerned an enriched uranium exchange deal, the publicized meeting and signing of the declaration visibly marked a development more extensive and significant than a mere exchange of uranium. The event was meant to show Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's success in recruiting Turkey and Brazil to form a new axis, as an alternative to the existing world order, and to challenge the status of Russia, not only of the U.S., in the region. It marked a turning point for Russia's relations with Iran.[1]

Since the Tehran Declaration was issued – and following Ahmadinejad's May 26, 2010 statement that Russia is clearly positioning itself as an enemy of Iran, as evidenced by its stance vis-à-vis the Tehran Declaration and by its statement, prior to the U.N. Security Council vote on further sanctions on Iran, that it supports such sanctions – it has become apparent that Russia has adopted a new and confrontational approach vis-à-vis Iran. The signs climaxed in two warnings issued by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev regarding Iran's capability to become a military nuclear power.

In his first statement, on July 12, 2010, made to foreign ambassadors in Moscow, Medvedev referred for the first time to the possibility that Iran was nearing the point where it could produce nuclear weapons.

In his second statement, three days later, Medvedev retracted his first statement, clarifying Russia's stance vis-à-vis Iran's possession of nuclear weapons. At a July 15 joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Medvedev said that Russia had information from "open sources and from special services that deliver relevant reports, [and this information] shows that these [nuclear] programs are being developed." He continued, "I have said many times that Iran is our relatively active and historically proven trade partner... But this doesn't mean that we are indifferent to the way Iran develops its nuclear program, and we are not indifferent to the military components of this program. In this aspect, we expect the appropriate explanation from Iran."

He also urged Iran to cooperate fully with the international community vis-à-vis its nuclear program, saying, "Iran should have enough courage to begin full-fledged cooperation with the international community, even if it does not like some questions that are being asked."[2]

On July 24, 2010, Ahmadinejad responded to these warnings, claiming Russia was "taking its cue from Western countries, whose policies are aimed at isolating Iran." On July 26, 2010, the Russian Foreign Ministry replied to these statements harshly: "The recent public statements by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, which distort Russia's objective approach and our independent, constructive policy towards the Iranian nuclear program..., are absolutely unacceptable to us," the ministry said. We believe that instead of fruitless and irresponsible rhetoric, the Iranian leadership should take specific, constructive steps towards settling the situation as soon as possible, which Russia and the Iran Six have been insistently calling for."[3]

Further Russian steps against Tehran included:

1. Support for sanctions against Iran in the U.N .Security Council, on June 9, 2010

2. Harsh warnings to Tehran issued by senior Russian officials in response to Ahmadinejad's May 6 statements, reminding him of the historically unequal power relations between Russia and Iran. The statements also reminded Iran that it was a "problem" for Russia the superpower, and that Russia's role is to solve problems in the region.[4]

3. An announcement by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that the sanctions resolution prohibiting sales of weapons to Iran also applies to Russia's S-300 missile defense systems deal with Iran.

4. Medvedev's criticism of Tehran's lack of transparency regarding how much enriched uranium it possesses. He said, "If the information from the American secret services [i.e. CIA director Leon Panetta's assessment that Iran can produce a nuclear bomb within two years if it decides to do so] is confirmed, it would make the situation more tense,"[5] and that if that were the case, Russia might need to re-examine its position on the matter.[6]

5. According to the Iranian daily Ebtekar, Russia is pressuring Brazil and Turkey to stop supporting Iran in the nuclear crisis, in exchange for incentives that they would receive.[7]

The worsening of Russia-Iran relations in recent weeks has regional and international ramifications. This paper will discuss possible ways in which this conflict could develop, and will examine the ramifications of such developments.

The Background to the Emerging Conflict

The emerging conflict stems primarily from two parallel processes:

1. Change in the global and regional balance of power. U.S. President Barack Obama is pushing a policy of reaching out to the Muslim world – and in particular to extremist Islamic elements, with the aim of negotiating with them. However, extremist Islamic leaders are not cooperating with Obama's policy of appeasement, and as a result are gaining strength.

2. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's efforts to create a Shi'ite-Sunni Islamic bloc, comprising Iran, Syria, and Turkey, with the addition of other rising forces from the developing world, such as Brazil, thus challenging the old world order.

It must be emphasized that Ahmadinejad and the Iranian leadership do not dare to make a move against China and Japan, whom they need, because of Iran's extensive trade relations with both of them. Also, in ideological terms, China and Japan represent Eastern powers, as opposed to Iran's Western rivals.

These two processes – the shifting regional power balance and the formation of a Shi'ite-Sunni Islamic axis – actively threaten Russia's traditional hegemony in the region and make inroads on its traditional sphere of influence, in the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Additionally, the traditional allies of the old order in the Middle East – primarily Saudi Arabia and Egypt – have also been harmed by the shift in the power balance.

Both Russia and the U.S. have in recent years implemented their Iran policy along a continuum of cooperation versus confrontation. For the past few years, Russia has used Iran as a bargaining chip against the U.S. to its political and economic advantage, paying the U.S. back in Iranian currency. But the two processes mentioned above have caused Russia to shift its position, into one of confrontation with Iran. Indeed, in light of President Obama's position towards Iran – and even more so in light of the potential for a new axis that will threaten Russia's security and its regional and international interests – it has become apparent that Russia has the greatest interest, regionally and internationally, to contain Iran on the nuclear level.

In another important development, Russia has expressed its willingness to cooperate with NATO forces in Afghanistan. No matter what strategic considerations motivated Russia to make this decision, it will clearly have far-reaching implications on the ground, because it positions Russia as Iran's rival in Afghanistan – a region that the latter regards as part of its traditional sphere of influence. It should be noted that IRNA, Iran's official news agency, called on Russia to remember that Moscow and Tehran have a common interest to prevent the eastward spread of NATO, but Russia did the opposite in aligning itself with NATO.[8] IRNA also made a veiled threat by reminding Russia that Iran could instigate unrest among the Muslim population of the Caucasus and Central Asia, stating: "...If Iran is weak and not independent, most Muslim republics, such as Chechnya, Ingushetia, and the Dagestan Republic, will not remain stable. The Russians are aware of the role Iran plays in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia..."[9]

Also, in its relations with Iran, Russia draws a distinction between the strategic nuclear level, which Russia sees as a direct threat, and its continuing trade relations with Iran – that is, selling it weapons systems, oil and gas, and completing and operating the Bushehr reactor. The latter activities are considered to be on the conventional, tactical level, and therefore sustainable.

Ramifications

In our assessment, the more Ahmadinejad promotes his efforts, on both on the nuclear level and the ideological messianic revolutionary level, and as the U.S. continues to back down from confronting extremist Islam, Russia will be increasingly faced with a need to protect its regional and security interests on its own.

Under these circumstances, Russia is likely to again draw closer to the Sunni Arab countries, which are also showing concern about where the Obama administration is headed, and thus are reinforcing Russia's power and prestige in the Middle East vis-à-vis the U.S.

Thus Russia, more so than the U.S. or Europe, can be seen as interested in and capable of preserving the status quo in the Middle East, preventing Iran from going nuclear, and likewise stopping it from laying the groundwork for the new axis that it is trying to establish and to lead.

Appendix: Reactions in Iran to the Developing Conflict with Russia

1. Ahmadinejad: Anyone Participating in U.S. Measures Against Iran Is Our Enemy – In a July 23, 2010 speech, Ahmadinejad said that Russian President Medvedev's statement was proof that Russia was joining the U.S. anti-Iran propaganda campaign. He added that Russia's Iran policy had taken a U-turn, but that "even if all the corrupt [forces] in the world gathered and enlisted their propaganda force, wishing to set back the Iranian nation, even the tiniest bit – they should know that they will take this wish to their graves." Ahmadinejad said that anyone who participates in U.S. measures against Iran will be considered to be an enemy of Iran, and will receive a crushing response.[10]

2. Iranian FM: Medvedev's Statements "Unrealistic" – At a press conference that he called during his visit to Spain in July 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki called Medvedev's statement "unrealistic" and added, "We do not know what is hiding behind this statement, but we demand our rights and we will settle for nothing less."[11]

3. Iranian Majlis National Security Committee Chairman: Russia Is Being Misled – Iranian Majlis National Security Committee chairman Alaaeddin Boroujerdi expressed reservations regarding Medvedev's statements, saying that Iran expects Russia, as a superpower, not to be misled by false information provided by Western intelligence services. He said that the Russians know very well that Iran's nuclear activity is for peaceful purposes.[12]

4. Ebtekar Daily: Moscow is More Concerned About Iran's Nuclear Program Than It Is About Any Other Country – The Ebtekar daily wrote on July 18, 2010: "Moscow is more concerned by Iran's nuclear program than by all the other forces, and considers Iran to be a security problem if it continues to become stronger." The paper predicted that Moscow would, in line with its Iran policy for the last 20 years, "continue to play with Iran" and would not fully keep its promises to it, as reflected by the holdups in completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The paper added that the proximity of Russia's and the U.S.'s positions, and the increased cooperation between them, is based on their agreement to prefer joint action when their mutual needs are concerned. It added that Russia, in coordination with the U.S., has asked Turkey and Brazil to stop supporting Iran in the nuclear crisis, and concluded that these two would comply with Moscow's request in exchange for incentives that they will receive. It predicted that because of the understandings between them, Russia and the U.S. will refrain from fully implementing the road map that was signed recently by the Russian and Iranian energy ministers, and will place restrictions on Iran in nuclear, military, and oil and gas industry matters.[13]

5. Ebtekar: Medvedev's Anti-Iran Statements Are Because "His Mother's Jewish" – In an article titled "The Reason for the Change in Russia's Position is Mevedev's Mother" in the Ebtekar daily, Iranian researcher Hassan Beheshtipour wrote that Medvedev's recently stated anti-Iran position stems from the fact "that his mother is a Jew, so he is attracted to the Zionists and to his origin – but this attraction was hidden until now." Beheshtipour called on Iran's Foreign Ministry to summon the Russian ambassador for reprimand, and to express to him Iran's protests against Medvedev's statements. He added that Russian officials had previously made similar anti-Iran statements, but that they had never yet been heard from the Russian presidential level.[14]

6. Majlis Member: Russia, U.S. Close to Forming Dangerous Cabal Against Iran – Majlis National Security Committee member Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh called Medvedev's recent statement "extremist" and "hostile to Iran," adding that this showed that Russia and the U.S. are close to forming a cabal that poses danger to Iran. He concluded that "there is an agreement in the higher Russian echelons with the Americans... vis-à-vis strategic areas." He called on Iranian regime leaders to study the matter seriously and to consider how to fight Russia in practical terms, taking into account Russia's past hostility to Iran as manifested by its arming Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). He said that Russia is aware that Iran is not seeking to obtain a bomb, but is allowing itself to be join the Western propaganda. He added that Russia's support for sanctions against Iran, its failure to transfer the S-300 missile defense system to Iran, and Medvedev's statement show that "there are very serious changes in Russia's position towards Iran."[15]

7. Majlis Member: Russia Fears a Nuclear Iran – Majlis National Security Committee member Mohammad Karami-Rad accused Russia of attempting to sow Iranophobia in the region. He called Medvedev's statements "false and worthless," saying that they reflected ignorance about Iran's nuclear program and emanated from Russian anger at Iran because the latter chose Turkey and Brazil, not Russia, for its uranium exchange deal. He said that Russia would not tolerate a nuclear Iran, and called on Medvedev to reconsider his words and not muddy the waters of Russia-Iran relations.[16]

8. IRGC Weekly: Russia Is On the Decline, Brazil and Turkey Are On the Rise: An article in Sobh-e Sadeq, the weekly of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), called Russia's support for the anti-Iran sanctions a "strategic mistake" that is damaging it greatly day by day. The article explained that because of its support for the anti-Iran sanctions, Russia had lost power in its international relations; from a superpower equal to the U.S., it had become a second-rate country. The article said that the decline in Russia's status was reflected in Medvedev's treatment by representatives of various countries at the June 2010 G8 and G20 conferences, where he remained on the sidelines. In contrast, it said, Brazil's and Turkey's international status had strengthened, due to their opposition to the sanctions. It added that Russia's Iran policy would cause it further heavy damages, and that the U.S. too would demand further concessions from it. Nevertheless, it stated, Russia apparently has already begun to back down from its hostile stance towards Iran, after realizing that this strategic mistake had caused it great damage – and this is why it has announced that the Bushehr reactor would start operating this summer, that it opposed unilateral punitive steps against Iran by the U.S. and the EU, and that it was committed to its military agreements with Iran and to continued political and economic relations with it.[17]

9. IRNA: Medvedev's a Rookie; Iran Can Maintain Stability in Muslim Republics – And Therefore Is More Important to Russia Than the U.S. – The official Iranian news agency IRNA noted that "the Cold War-era relations between the two superpowers, the U.S. and Russia, have changed, entering a new phase, and the countries' foreign ministers are pushing the reset button in their relations. Apparently, the Russian president, who has little understanding of Middle East and Persian Gulf issues, does not receive accurate intelligence, and has tied his political fate to relations with the U.S.... The senior Russian diplomats know that the level of relations between Moscow and Tehran are higher in every other instance, since if Iran is weak and not independent, most Muslim republics, such as Chechnya, Ingushetia, and the Dagestan Republic, will not remain stable. The Russians are aware of the role Iran plays in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and see it as influential and crucial. Those in Russia who are wise and experienced are well aware of this issue, and stress it."[18]

10. Academic Tells Regime: Nuclear Issue Less Important than Iran's Relations with Russia – Reformist Tehran University academic Sadeq Ziba-Kalam said that Medvedev's statement shows that there is no fundamental contrast or hostility between the U.S. and Russia. He stated that Russia would not sacrifice the many interests it shares with the U.S. and the E.U. for the sake of Iran's nuclear program, and that it would be a great mistake on the part of the Iranian regime to subordinate its foreign policy to its nuclear program and thus to sacrifice the many interests shared by Iran and Russia – including military and security cooperation, energy cooperation, Caspian Sea affairs, and the republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. He added that Russia sought to preserve its situation as a facilitator in Iran's relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and does not want competition for this role from Turkey, Brazil, or any other country.[19]

11. Ebtekar: U.S.-Russia Deal Against Iran – In an article titled "Behind the Scenes of the Russia-U.S. Understandings Against Iran," the Ebtekar daily wondered whether the haste in which the U.S. and Russia struck a spy exchange deal in July 2010 was due to an deal between the two countries, under which Russia would step up the pressure on Iran and "would take a tough and rare stand vis-à-vis its nuclear program" in exchange for other incentives from the U.S. The paper added that Medvedev's most recent statements back up this assessment.[20]

* A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project.

Endnotes:

[1] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 610, "The Iran-Turkey-Brazil Nuclear Agreement: In the Iranian Perception, a New World Order Led By Iran," May 17, 2010, The Iran-Turkey-Brazil Nuclear Agreement: In the Iranian Perception, a New World Order Led By Iran

[2] RIA Novosti (Russia), July 15 2010.

[4] See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 614, "Ahmadinejad Threatens Russia, Receives Response," May 27, 2010, Ahmadinejad Threatens Russia, Receives Response

[5] RIA Novosti (Russia), June 28, 2010.

[6] Yahoo News, June 27, 2010.

[7] Ebtekar (Iran), July 18, 2010.

[8] IRNA, Iran, July 13, 2010.

[9] IRNA (Iran), July 13, 2010.

[10] Fars, Iran, July 23 and 25, 2010.

[11] Fars, Iran, July 13, 2010.

[12] Mehr, Iran, July 13, 2010.

[13] Ebtekar, Iran, July 18, 2010.

[14] Ebtekar, Iran, July 22, 2010; also in an interview with the Iranian news agency Mehr, July 17, 2010.

[15] Abrar (Iran) July 15, 2010.

[16] Aftab (Iran), July 14, 2010.

[17] Sobh-e Sadeq (Iran), July 12, 2010.

[18] IRNA (Iran), July 13, 2010.

[19] Ebtekar (Iran), July 20, 2010.

[20] Ebtekar (Iran), July 14, 2010.

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