On the first anniversary of the assassination of Hizbullah operations officer 'Imad Mughniyah, the editor of the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, Ibrahim Al-Amin, who is close to Hizbullah, published a comprehensive editorial on Mughniyah's life and his role in Hizbullah. The article reveals new details about Mughniyah's involvement in Hizbullah's preparations before the 2006 Lebanon War, in the rebuilding of the movement's strength after the war and the investigation and assessment of the war's outcomes, in Hizbullah's preparations for its next confrontation with Israel, and in the transmission of Hizbullah's expertise to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
Following are excerpts from the editorial, and from a previous article by Ibrahim Al-Amin on Mughniyah's role in preparing the Palestinian forces in Gaza for the war:
Preparing for the 2006 Lebanon War
"During the six-year period [between Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the 2006 Lebanon War], Mughniyah led the greatest development process in the history of the resistance during his time, training thousand of fighters, deploying them along the [Lebanon-Israel] border using special methods of camouflage, and introducing new methods of warfare [to be used] on the battlefield. Along with hundreds of hand-picked [fighters], he worked to deploy Hizbullah's missile force in a way that would [best] allow it [to] fulfill its function, and [oversaw] the digging of tunnels, the construction of military bases, and the establishment of dozens of observation points, concealed and unconcealed… [He] honed the abilities of the resistance [forces] through detailed study of the procedures and operation methods of the occupation army. At that time, [Mughniyah] headed an intelligence apparatus [whose activities will remain secret] for many years to come, but which had a hand in [various] victories and achievements.
"After the successful abduction [of the three Israeli soldiers] in the Shab'a Farms area in autumn 2000, and the successful [prisoners] exchange deal in January 2004, Hajj 'Imad [Mughniyah] waited for the [subsequent] mediation efforts [between Hizbullah and Israel to bear fruit]. Since there were still prisoners in the [Israeli] jails, it was decided to carry out another kidnapping. In July 2006, [Hizbullah] successfully carried out Operation Fulfilled Promise [Hizbullah's name for the July 12, 2006 kidnapping of the two Israel soldiers], and then the [2006 Lebanon] War broke out..."
Rebuilding Hizbullah's Strength after the War
"'In six months we accomplished what [previously] took us six years to do.' So said Mughniyah nine months after the end of the [2006] Lebanon War, referring to the measures taken by the resistance to rearm and restore its strength. From the very first day after the end of the insane war launched by Israel against Lebanon, Hizbullah's leaders were all engaged in caring for [the refugees] driven from their homes and in assessing the damages. Mughniyah, for his part, visited his comrades in the resistance - officers and soldiers - and handled the issue of the wounded and killed. At the same time, he was [already] formulating [plans] to recruit thousands of new resistance [fighters], as part of an intensive work plan for regaining all the arms [and resources] lost during the war. In Hizbullah's August 2006 victory rally, [Hizbullah Secretary-General] Hassan [Nasrallah] felt confident to announce to the [attending] masses that Hizbullah's missile arsenal was already larger than it had been during the war."
Drawing Lessons from the Outcomes of the War - Long before Israel's Winograd Report
"… Within a few weeks [from the end of the war], Mughniyah formed dozens of [investigation] committees, which scrutinized every point and every confrontation [between the two sides], documenting as many of the battles as possible and reconstructing what befell each of the resistance units - those that directly took part in the fighting and those that [only] assisted and stood by in the areas where no fighting occurred. Teams were appointed to go over the testimonies and conduct investigations in order to draw lessons from [Hizbullah's] successes and mistakes. Within a short period of time - long before the publication of the Winograd Report in Israel - Mughniyah and the [other] resistance commanders prepared their report and assessment of the war. Lessons were learned and conclusions were drawn, and this led to the formation of a series of plans. Mughniyah supervised the implementation of many of these plans, while other [commanders] are now working to complete the rest."
Preparing for the Next Confrontation: The Annihilation of Israel No Longer Just a Dream
"Between August 15, 2006 [the end of the war] and February 12, 2008, Mughniyah [hardly] slept. He worked very long hours, sometimes going two or three days without sleep… During this period, he again formulated new plans for the resistance, based on the outcomes of the [summer 2006] confrontation and on [his expectations regarding the next] confrontation, which could occur any day. But his operational activities were grounded in the belief, shared by other Hizbullah commanders, that the annihilation of Israel was no longer just a dream that would take decades to realize. [They saw that] it was possible … to deal the enemy blows that would neutralize its ability to defend its entity [i.e., state], and to target the [Israeli] home front in a way that would undermine its unity and its strength - all in order to accomplish … the mission of rescuing Palestine and annihilating Israel.
"[Mughniyah] worked to introduce programs for developing, training, and preparing [the Hizbullah forces], and for arming them with every type [of weapon], as rapidly as possible, in preparation for a war that would last many months, not weeks like the previous war. [He also worked to introduce] new abilities at the various ranks [of the organization], to create advanced new mechanisms for all the sectors and for all the planning activities, to meet all the needs of the [forces in] training, to arm the tens of thousands of resistance fighters, and to deploy them according to the new plans, which presented an upgraded [version of the warfare] method based on combining resistance units with classical weaponry."
Conveying Hizbullah's Expertise to Hamas: Training Fighters in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran
"Palestine always remained a watchword for [Mughniyah] and for his comrades in the Palestinian resistance, who shared his cause. Neither side ever found it difficult to cooperate [with the other] in order to achieve the common goal, which serves the [even] larger purpose of creating conditions that will bring about the actual annihilation of Israel. Mughniyah did not need any special occasion, or any false pretenses, in order to explain to the enemy - even before [he explained it to his own] allies and resistance fighters - that the cause of restoring Palestine to its people and annihilating Israel took precedence over everything else…
"From October 15, 2006 onwards, Mughniyah did not rest for a single day. He behaved as if he sensed his approaching death, and before leaving, sought to finish every [task] he could, not only in Lebanon but in other places as well, and in particular, to convey [Hizbullah's] expertise to the Palestinians. He worked on this task long and scrupulously, along with the leaders of the Palestinian factions who were in charge of this issue in Gaza, the West Bank, and the rest of Palestine. He shared with them in detail the lessons drawn by the resistance from the July war, [including] its assessment of the functioning of the enemy army, its strong and weak points, with emphasis on the needs of the Palestinian resistance.
"[Mughniyah] took charge of the assistance program aimed at transmitting [Hizbullah's] experience to Gaza and the West Bank, and [supervised] the hosting Palestinian groups in order to furnish them with experience, ideas, and plans. This, in addition to transferring [weapons] into Palestine by various means - to which end the shahid [Mughniyah] recruited enormous human and financial resources. At the same time, his basic working hypothesis was that Palestine had prodigious human resources [of its own], which must be deployed correctly in the decisive battle that is sure to come one day - even if be far in the future." [1]
In an article he published during the Gaza War, Al-Amin shed further light on Mughniyah's role in preparing the Palestinian resistance forces for this confrontation. He wrote: "Soon after Israel's defeat in Lebanon, Mughniyah engaged in [the task of] transmitting [Hizbullah's] experience to Palestine. He hurried to hold a series of meetings, right until the period just before his death, pursuing what he regarded as his greatest dream… Soon, the plans were drawn up, and dozens of Palestinian resistance cadres traveled to Syria, Lebanon and Iran, where many details were revealed to them, and they were allowed to benefit from [Hizbullah's] comprehensive experience.
"Within less than a year, Gaza saw [the emergence of] a reality on the ground that was different from the [situation] that had prevailed there in previous decades. The hierarchical [structure] of the resistance forces - particularly of Hamas - changed to accommodate the possibility of an insane Israeli war, [just] like the one that is being waged today. All the issues were discussed [in advance], including how to defend [Hamas'] ever-growing arsenal, keep the supply lines open and maintain contact between all the units. The shahid Mughniyah was quoted as saying: 'The Palestinians are proving, day after day, that they are a heroic people capable of withstanding every hardship. The way in which Gaza and the area around it turned into [a system of] living [underground] cities shows that - with willpower and [the right] leadership - [today's Palestinians] may yet accomplish what all the previous [generations] failed to do." [2]
Endnotes:
[1] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), February 16, 2009.
[2] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 10, 2009.
