Editorials In Pakistani Dailies Assess Jihadist Threat After Pakistan-India Border Bombing, For Which Three Jihadist Organizations Claimed Responsibility

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Thousands of people turn out to watch the flag-lowering ceremony at Wagah border every day

Below are excerpts from editorials in Pakistani dailies, examining the jihadi terrorist threat to Pakistan after a suicide bomber killed over 60 people and wounded nearly 100 others on October 2 inside the Pakistani side of a border post at Wagah, on the Pakistan-India border near Lahore.

The suicide bomber, who possibly could not reach his main target due to enhanced security measures, struck at a parking lot as thousands of people were returning from the flag-lowering ceremony that takes place at the Pakistan-India border post every day. Three separate militant groups - Jundallah, Mahar Mehsud faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jamaatul Ahrar - claimed the attack.

The claim by Jamaatul Ahrar, which was recently expelled from the TTP, appears authentic, and the group has promised to release a pre-recorded video of the suicide bomber who carried out the Wagah border attack.

"With The Dreadful Spectre Of The Islamic State Making Its Presence Felt In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [Province] Through Pamphlets, There Is Now A Plethora Of Non-State Actors Who Are Well Motivated, In Many Cases Well Trained And Funded"

Following are excerpts from an editorial in The Express Tribune daily:[1]

"The device that wreaked havoc at Wagah was a suicide bomb of 10-15kg and was laced with nails and ball-bearings to maximize the damage. The arms and legs of the person thought to be the bomber have been recovered. The location of the bombing was significant as well, with tensions running high between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control [LoC, which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan], and it was clearly calculated to exacerbate those tensions. There may well now be an adverse fallout on India-Pakistan relations as a result of this attack. There have been reports that intelligence agencies had shared information with the police about a possible attack, but it was clearly not taken seriously.

"This was a target begging to be attacked, and it is a matter of wonder that it has not been struck before. Although the area is closely guarded and there are walk-through portals, it is a place where both military and civilian are in close proximity regularly. The attack was claimed by three possible culprits, all spin-offs from the fragmentation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] in recent months. It underlines yet again the powerlessness of the state when it comes to crafting and implementing an alternative narrative to that of galloping extremism. And with the dreadful spectre of the Islamic State making its presence felt in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [province of Pakistan] through pamphlets, there is now a plethora of non-state actors who are well motivated, in many cases well trained and funded, and all bent on the overthrow of the state by violent means.

"Operation Zarb-e-Azb [against the Taliban in North Waziristan], in purely military terms, may be going well, but in isolation, it may be acting as a magnifier for extremist thoughts and tendencies. The operation has created a well of anger and resentment among certain [extremist] elements that is not going to dissipate quickly. When you dispossess a million people and deprive them of their homes and livelihoods on an open-ended basis, the social compact between the people and the state disappears quickly. And extremism likes nothing better than pushing at an open door."

"If Soft Targets And Civilian-Centric Attacks Are Once Again Becoming The Principal Focus Of Militants, Then The Country May Have To Brace Itself For Another Wave Of Terror That Will Be … Difficult To Prevent"

Following are excerpts from an editorial in Dawn newspaper:[2]

"Worryingly, few of the questions have any clear answers. To begin with, with the blowback from the North Waziristan military operation [Zarb-e-Azb against the Taliban] now seemingly gathering pace, how well is the country's intelligence and law-enforcement apparatus positioned to deal with the threat? The army-led security apparatus took a great deal of credit for so-called intelligence-led targeted operations in the cities and towns around the time Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in the summer, and they did seem to blunt the urban terrorist threat for a while at least. But the militant threat ebbs and flow[s], and without sustained, focused, and relentless pursuit, the state will always find that a period of calm is followed by a period of intense attacks. Militant groups regenerate and, more problematically, tend to splinter over time, leading to ever-more virulent offshoots.

"Has the security apparatus of the state really kept up the pressure on urban militant groups, in the same way it did in the early days of Zarb-e-Azb? Next, both the site of the attack and the dueling claims of responsibility for Sunday's carnage [at Wagah border post] present a fresh challenge. It does appear that the border [para-military force] Rangers at Wagah were the target and perhaps the suicide bomber exploded himself among civilians because he was unable to get closer to a bigger security target or larger group of security personnel. But the bomber did blow himself up among a large number of civilians, which means it cannot be ruled out that the so-called soft option - civilian victims - was the original plan.

"If soft targets and civilian-centric attacks are once again becoming the principal focus of militants, then the country may have to brace itself for another wave of terror that will be fiendishly difficult to prevent. The only effective way of stopping a militant attack on a civilian target - necessarily open and accessible to the public - is to find the militant cells and dismantle them.

"How far though have the state's resources, especially on the civilian-led law-enforcement side, really been developed to make that possible? Lahore, possibly the richest, best resourced, and fawned over of all the provincial capitals, has suffered some serious attacks in recent years, and yet further attacks continue to be a very real possibility - as the Wagah episode has proved. Finally, with two [actually: three] separate groups claiming the Wagah attack, how much is really known about which groups are active in Pakistan and which militant ideologies are proliferating? Perhaps, as some politicians have called for, the government needs to give parliament a detailed briefing on the state of militancy in Pakistan today. To fight the militancy threat, knowing its contours is a prerequisite."

"So Far Three Different Groups – Jundallah, Jamaatul Ahrar, And The Breakaway TTP Group Led By Mahar Mehsud – Have All Claimed Responsibility"; "Militant Groups In The Country Have Become So Diffused And Splintered That Even Destroying One Organization Will Not End Terrorist Violence In The Country"

Following are excerpts from an editorial in The News daily:[3]

"The issue of who is responsible for the attack also raises questions about our approach to tackling the scourge of militancy. So far three different groups – Jundallah, Jamaatul Ahrar and the breakaway TTP group led by Mahar Mehsud – have all claimed responsibility. If even one of these groups ultimately turns out to be responsible it casts doubt on our strategy of solely pursuing a military option, and that too only against the main TTP. Militant groups in the country have become so diffused and splintered that even destroying one organization will not end terrorist violence in the country.

"It is also worth examining in detail the various groups that have stepped forward to own the attack. Jundallah is mainly based in Baluchistan and Karachi and has never before attacked in Punjab. Few believe that it even has the capability to do so and it has, in the past, falsely taken credit for attacks. Jamaatul Ahrar – a local offshoot of the Islamic State – was formed by seven defecting commanders of the TTP and so should, in theory, have the capacity to launch an attack of this nature, with the same being true of the Mahar Mehsud faction of the TTP. None of these groups, however, have had a large presence in Punjab, which has been the domain of Asmatullah Muawiya's Punjabi Taliban and local groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

"There is a large possibility that whoever planned this attack had help from local elements. The Punjabi Taliban had sworn off attacks in Pakistan in favor of concentrating on Afghanistan and it will be a major development if they have gone back on their word. The other militant groups [such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi] in Punjab have thrived with patronage from mainstream political groups so their involvement would also be an indictment of our state. No matter who is responsible, the Wagah attack shows that our strategies for destroying militancy need to see a lot of improvement if they are not to end up as a conspicuous failure."