Following are excerpts
from a report on a raid by Iraqi authorities
on an Al-Qaeda cell in Baghdad, which aired on Al-Arabiya TV on September
9, 2011:
Commander: Be
prepared to carry out this mission.
Reporter: This
was the beginning of a swift operation. We were allowed to film it,
but they did not reveal the exact location to us, pointing only to a
broad geographical area on a military map [of Baghdad]. Nevertheless,
we understood that the target was an Al-Qaeda cell. Later we learned
that this cell had specialized in attacks that spread terror in northern
Baghdad. The orders were summed up in a few words, because only three
hours were allocated to the operation.
Commander: You
have ten minutes from now to prepare the soldiers. You will carry out
this mission tonight. Understood? Good luck.
Reporter:
We have an eyewitness account through image and sound. For the first
time, the camera crossed a forbidden line, [filming] the mission of
this unit, which has been confronting Al-Qaeda for the past seven years,
but staying out of the limelight.
We will be accompanying
the elite Unit 54 of the Iraqi army on a night mission.
[…]
Footage
of Iraqi elite troupes making an arrest in the middle of the night
This scene of detention
recurred in three additional homes, bringing the total to four targets
arrested in four homes. We were forbidden to film the fifth target
after his arrest, because he was the commander in charge of ten districts
in the capital. The other four said the same thing: "We were merely
following orders."
The decision to return
to base was postponed, and the operation was extended by another hour,
in order to search for weapons with silencers. They were discovered
after carrying out a meticulous search in fields enveloped in darkness
and desolation. Luckily, none of the attacking force or the five prisoners
were harmed.
[…]
Commander: Sarmad,
when were you born?
Sarmad: In 1991.
Commander: And
you?
Al-Qaeda operative:
In 1992.
Commander: When
were you born?
Another Al-Qaeda operative:
In 1989.
Commander: And
you?
Another Al-Qaeda
operative: In 1986.
Commander: Note
that Al-Qaeda is focusing, at this stage, on [the recruitment] of young
men, who were led astray at a young age. Every attack carried out by
them was done for a price – between 100 and 300 dollars.
Reporter: [Lack
of] ideological support has perhaps become Al-Qaeda's greatest problem
when it comes to recruiting fighters from within [Iraq]. Due to the
fact that the security forces are focusing on the commanders alone,
and since the options open [to Al-Qaeda] are dwindling, the only option
left is to recruit minors.
Commander: The
assassinations have an effect on the mental state of the citizens. They
are easy to carry out, and it is difficult to expose the cells that
specialize in assassination.
[…]
Reporter: Each
of the four detainees has a different life story, but they all keep
saying that they were following orders. They never imagined that one
day, they would find themselves behind bars because they are mujahideen.
This is what their commander drilled into their tender minds, so that
they would become killing machines, ready for action upon demand.
The cell commander is
the oldest in the group, and he was constantly on the move in order
to keep his activity clandestine. He was the only one to undergo thorough
training by Al-Qaeda in the use of a weapon with silencer, so that he
could be the cell's sniper, and could, in turn, train the members under
his command.
[...]
Killing was not enough
for this commander. Muhammad Al-Nadim's cell strived to distinguish
itself by the swiftness of its operations, by its ability to move around,
and by the complete obedience of its members, not to mention their mutilating
the corpses of their victims, in order to leave a stamp of terror in
every region through which they passed.
This is precisely what
Al-Qaeda is looking for, after the deterioration of its media machine.
After a day of interrogation the cell commander confessed to having
carried out 13 well-planned the organized assassinations and to having
pulled the trigger himself.
[…]