Following are excerpts
from an interview with Egyptian General (ret.) Abd Al-Hamid Umran, which
aired on ON TV on August 21, 2011:
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
The Camp David Accord is like a treaty of surrender in the civil sense,
when one party holds all the power, and the other party wants to resolve
the problem in any possible way. The outcome was the Camp David Accord.
Back then, this is what our political and military capabilities enabled
us to achieve. President Sadat wanted to get them out of Sinai in any
way possible.
Interviewer:
So we were the ones who wanted to resolve the problem, while they held
all the power.
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
Not all the power, but relatively speaking…
Interviewer: They
were stronger…
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
Yes.
Interviewer: Therefore,
this treaty of surrender serves their interests more than ours.
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
Therefore, now that we have become more powerful – and we all hope
to become even stronger – we have the right to demand that this treaty
be changed, in accordance with our interests. Similarly, it is in their
interest not to take this too far, because this might drive us in another
direction. I would like to reiterate, and this may be the 20th time
I say this: There can be no Egyptian national security without an Egyptian
nuclear program. Full stop.
[…]
This will restore the
balance of power. Forget about all those minor battles, forget about
the occupation, forget about the five people killed, may they rest in
peace. All this stems from our lack of strategic power, which would
counterbalance the strategic power of Israel. This begins with a nuclear
program for peaceful purposes. It could require 5-10 years, whatever
it takes, but eventually, we will have enriched uranium. Obviously,
enriched uranium requires many ploys and tricks. They tell you that
it is okay to enrich to 3%, but not to 5%. This way we will have the
3%, and then we can leave…
Interviewer: We
can play the Iranian game…
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
Exactly. That's what Iran is doing.
[…]
The UN's atomic energy
committee allows you to enrich uranium to 3%-5%. This can be used for
many civilian purposes. That's fine with me. In order to achieve 3%
enriched uranium, I need, say, 100 centrifuges. So I install the 100
centrifuges, and eventually, I get uranium enriched to 3%. I need a
large quantity, so I install 10 production lines, one next to the other,
each with 100 centrifuges. I get uranium enriched to 3% from each and
every one, and when the UN comes to inspect, they see that everything
is on the up and up. The moment the UN inspectors get out… We shut
the door, we take the output of the first production line, and we insert
it into the input of the second production line.
Interviewer: That
gives you 6%...
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
Right. Then you take the output of the second and insert it into the
input of the third – and then the third to the fourth, to the fifth,
to the sixth… That way, after the inspectors go to sleep, you can
enrich 20%.
Interviewer: You've
turned us into an Iran.
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
20% is only the first stage, because a nuclear weapon requires…
Interviewer:
The international inspectors will be oblivious to all this? Will this
ploy work on the international inspectors?
Abd Al-Hamid Umran:
You should look at the details. When the inspectors go to Iran, they
stand in front of the centrifuge cascades, behind a chain barrier that
the Iranians placed there. The Iranians say to them: "This is the
output of that cascade." When the inspectors say that they want
to go in and see the actual connections, the Iranians don't let them.
[…]